Office of the Historian

740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/12–247: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State 94

secret
Moscow, December 2, 1947—9 p.m.

3310. Following is Embassy’s estimate based on Soviet actions and press comment Far East for Dept’s consideration connection Soviet proposal for CFM meeting consider Jap peace settlement.

1.
Primary Soviet objectives Far East: (a) Communist domination Korea, Manchuria, secondary objectives: Communist control “democratic” regimes Indo-China and Indonesia, and of India. Tertiary objective: Communist dominated Japan.
2.
Soviets believe:
(a)
North Korea regime now consolidated to extent that taking advantage confused situation South Korea after troop withdrawal Communist control whole country can be quickly achieved.
(b)
Progress Chinese Communists Manchuria satisfactory; “democratic people’s” regime will be set up in due course, probably even without necessity direct Soviet aid.
(c)
General chaotic conditions China portend eventual Communist victory over entire country. Civil war is on Soviet side. American aid can never do more than delay inevitable.
(d)
Unrest in Southeast Asia, fully exploited, particularly through Chinese Communist organization, will grow continuously and eventually result in Communist dominated regimes.
(e)
Japan may not easily and quickly be swung into Communist orbit. However, with consolidation of Communist strength Manchuria, Korea, and possibly Southeast Asia, Jap party will inevitably be strengthened and after withdrawal occupation forces, its opportunities for activity greatly increased.
3.
Given such favorable conditions in Asia, peace with Japan is of little importance to Soviet strategic and diplomatic policy. Deeply apprehensive of American military power based Japan and Okinawa, Soviets will attempt build counter power in Korea, Manchuria and on newly acquired former Jap territories.
4.
Any peace settlement will inevitably be regarded as onerous by defeated peoples; by remaining outside Soviets gain propaganda advantages, [Page 584] incur no responsibilities, and win new opportunities for sabotage, infiltration, and boring from within. They count on early withdrawal occupation forces and ineffective weak post-treaty control regime.

Taken into account this presumptive Soviet view of Far East, US should be in no hurry to sign a peace and withdraw from Japan. In fact US should recognize advantages prolonging in some form present occupation activities and at same time be aware possible dangerous consequences hastily proceeding to peace settlement boycotted by USSR. In any case break over Japan should not occur before final break over Germany, even though both should prove to be eventually inevitable.

Therefore, we suggest following general principles should be borne in mind in determining US position toward Soviet proposal:

1.
Early treaty “for treaty’s sake” is not necessarily advantageous to us.
2.
We should be sure that UK, China, and majority FEC powers agree with US before rejecting Soviet proposal CFM meeting and even in such case, should exhaust efforts to get Soviets join 11–power conference before finally proceeding without them.
3.
If peace conference is convoked without USSR, post treaty controls should be devised which will maximize stability Jap Govt and minimize Soviet influence.
4.
In long run success or failure US policy in Korea and China may have more bearing on finality Jap peace settlement than what we do about the peace conference itself.

Sent Dept 3310; repeated to London 363.

Durbrow
  1. Repeated by the Department to Nanking as 1462 and to Tokyo as 466, December 3, 6 p.m.↩