740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047
The British Embassy to the Department of State 88
Japanese Peace Treaty
On the 17th November the Chinese Ambassador left a formal note at the Foreign Office proposing that a preliminary conference of all member states of the Far Eastern Commission be convened at an early date, to be agreed upon by the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., United States and China, to proceed with the drafting of the Japanese Peace Treaty and to determine matters pertaining to the calling of a final Peace Conference. The note went on to propose that all decisions of the conference should be taken by a majority of the member states, including the concurring votes of the Big Four. It is understood that identic notes were to be delivered to the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R.
The Chinese Embassy in London asked the Foreign Office on the 18th November what were the preliminary reactions of the Department. The Chinese Minister was told that the note was being studied and that it was not possible to say when a formal reply would be given since, as the Embassy would be aware, His Majesty’s Government had only recently taken part in a British Commonwealth Conference at Canberra where the general view was that the decisions of the Japanese Peace Settlement should be reached by simple majority vote of the member states of the Far Eastern Commission, bearing in mind that Pakistan and Burma would wish to be added to the number of participating states.
The Chinese Minister was asked what he presumed would happen if the Chinese proposal were acceptable to the Soviet Union and to [Page 576] all the other states concerned. Assuming that the Peace Conference assembled in these circumstances and assuming that it were possible to reach general agreement on a number of questions, would it not be likely that precisely on those questions most closely affecting China (such as external Japanese assets in Manchuria) the Big Four would find themselves in disagreement? Where, the Minister was asked, would China then stand? It would only need one veto to ensure that no treaty would be made. His Majesty’s Government did not want a treaty without the Soviet Union: on the contrary it was desired that the Soviet Union should participate. But the Foreign Office did not perceive that the Chinese proposal would necessarily produce the desired result.
The Chinese Minister was not prepared to answer these questions. He said that China was between two fires and that her proposal was in the nature of a compromise. In his personal view—and this he mentioned confidentially—it would be a good idea to try to get rid of the veto, since it did not work. He went on to say that China was anxious to have an early peace with Japan but there were Chinese fears of the Soviet interpretation of Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. In regard to this point the Foreign Office official commented that we were, after all, all of us parties to the original United Nations Declaration of 1942 which bound us not to negotiate or to conclude separate armistices or peace treaties, and that although China might be in a slightly different position by virtue of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, it was the view of the Foreign Office that the provisions about separate peace making had little application to present circumstances or to a peace (hostilities being over), in the negotiation or conclusion of which Russia would be given every opportunity to participate and to which she could still adhere even if she refused to participate. On the interpretation of Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Foreign Office considered that there was a clear let-out for China in the phrase “or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.” The Foreign Office official also remarked that if the Soviet Union used Article 2 of the Treaty to justify their action in Manchuria then it would be open to China to raise the question before the Security Council and to suggest, if she so desired, a reference to the International Court of Justice (though there was of course no way in which Russia could be forced to agree to such reference). Alternatively China could bring Russia’s action in Manchuria to the attention of the Security Council, though this might well prove to be much the most serious matter with which the Council had yet had to deal and might even lead to its undoing. The Chinese Minister showed interest in these arguments and [Page 577] appeared to be relieved that such views were held. The Chinese Minister’s attention was drawn to an article in the Ta Kung Pao which appeared to show that credence was given to the view that the United States was building up Japan instead of helping to build up China. The Soviet Union seemed to be making use of this line of propaganda. It was suggested to the Minister that the best way to ensure that Japan was not in a position once more to become an aggressive state was to thresh out all these points at the peace table. As far as the Foreign Office were aware no one dissented from the view that security must be the first consideration in framing the Japanese Peace Treaty.
It was made clear to the Chinese Minister that the foregoing were only the preliminary reactions of the Foreign Office, but he was left in no doubt that the Chinese proposal, even if it proved acceptable to all, was, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, unlikely to provide a solution for China’s difficulties.
- Handed to Mr. Penfield by Mr. Graves on November 20.↩