740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1447
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Subject: Japanese Peace Conference.
| Participants: | Mr. Everson, British Embassy |
| Mr. Butterworth, Director of Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Borton, Special Assistant to the Director, FE |
Mr. Everson called at his request to convey to the Department the following:
1. The British Embassy in Nanking reported that their Ambassador had inquired of Dr. Wang whether the Chinese had received a formal note from the Soviets reminding them of their commitments under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. The Ambassador had been told by Dr. Wang that no such note had been received.
2. Mr. Everson then read a telegram from the Foreign Office to effect that the Foreign Office had given further consideration to the Chinese proposal that the voting procedure at the Japanese Peace Conference be similar to that in the Far Eastern Commission. The telegram continued that the Foreign Office found this procedure, or any procedure which included a provision for a veto, “unpalatable” [Page 567] and assumed that the United States would likewise find any such procedure unpalatable. In view of the fact that it was not impossible that the Chinese proposal would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, the British Government proposed that the British and American Ambassadors in Nanking approach the Chinese Foreign Minister and suggest that the Chinese Government refrain from pushing further their proposed voting procedure. The telegram concluded that, unless the United States perceived objections to this procedure, the Foreign Office intended to instruct their Ambassador in Nanking to make such an approach to the Chinese Foreign Minister.
Mr. Butterworth replied that far as this Government is concerned he thought that it would be inadvisable for us to take such a step in view of the fact that the Secretary had told Dr. Wang in New York on two occasions that we had no objection to his approaching Mr. Vishinsky informally to obtain the Soviet views on the Chinese voting procedure. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that we had made it clear to the Chinese that our consent to their making such an approach in no way indicated a change in attitude on our part in reference to the voting nor did it imply we had reconsidered our position. Mr. Everson inquired as to whether our consent to have Dr. Wang talk with Mr. Vishinsky indicated that we favored the Chinese voting procedure. Mr. Butterworth replied that, in the first place, we could not prevent the Chinese from talking to anyone they want; and, in the second place, no decision had been reached on the question. Furthermore, it was logical for the Chinese to wish to raise this question before they would be willing to accept a two-thirds voting procedure.
Mr. Everson then asked whether we would consider it inadvisable for the British to take the step contemplated. Mr. Butterworth stated that he would not be able to give an answer until after he had taken the matter up with his superiors.
In answer to a question as to whether the British Government desired Soviet participation in the Peace Conference, Mr. Everson said that his Government preferred Soviet participation but was prepared, at an earlier stage, to proceed with a peace conference without the Soviet if the way was left open for Soviet participation at any time. Mr. Butterworth then asked whether the Foreign Office expected the Soviets to accept the Chinese formula. Mr. Everson replied that he thought the FEC voting procedure was tantamount to acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the treaty be considered by the Four Powers as the other states would be forced to comply with the desires of the Four. Mr. Butterworth then pointed out that while he was not arguing for the FEC voting procedure he did not agree with this analysis.
Mr. Butterworth noted that it was significant that the Foreign Office had stated that the FEC voting procedure was “unpalatable” rather [Page 568] than “unacceptable” to it. Mr. Everson answered that he had assumed that in this case the two words were synonymous.
Mr. Everson then inquired whether there was any indication that the question of the Japanese Peace Conference would be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers. In reply it was pointed out that the subject was not on the agenda, that if the matter was raised by the Soviets the Secretary would doubtless take the same attitude that had been taken in Moscow, namely, that matters not on the agenda should not be discussed formally in the Conference itself.
3. Mr. Everson concluded the discussion by reading from a telegram from Nanking in which the British Ambassador set forth Dr. Wang’s views on the treaty as follows:
- a.
- It was desirable to have a peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible.
- b.
- The Soviet Union would support an early peace treaty as it is anxious to have American troops withdrawn from Japan.
- c.
- Voting procedure in the Peace Conference should be by a two-thirds majority, including the Big Four.
It was noted that this was the first time the Chinese had suggested this form of voting.
[In a conversation on Nov. 14, the member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations, Maj. James Plimsoll, informed Mr. Borton of his Government’s anxiety lest a Japanese peace treaty be drafted without Australian participation. He also stated Dr. Evatt’s desire for a preliminary conference in January or February to lay down basic principles and directives under which deputies would operate in drafting a treaty. This would go beyond the American idea of a brief meeting on procedure. (740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1447) On returning from London, the British Counselor of Embassy (Graves) had a conversation with Mr. Borton on November 17, reviewing the situation, and stated the British preference for a preliminary conference to settle only procedural matters, not matters of substance (740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1747).]