Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs⁷⁸

secret

[Washington,] October 29, 1947.

Subject: Timing of the Japanese Treaty.

The following thoughts are offered as of possible interest on the present situation regarding the Japanese treaty.

It is over a month since Mr. Vishinsky referred Dr. Wang’s proposal for an eleven-nation conference utilizing the FEC voting system to Moscow. The length of time which has elapsed, and the unlikelihood that the Soviets will commit themselves on the question without first knowing whether the United States supports and is prepared to act on the proposal, makes it highly doubtful that they will ever reply. Even if Dr. Wang makes good his stated intention to put the question to the Soviets and British in formal notes on his return to China, the Soviets are likely to return a vague answer or a refusal as long as they do not know how we stand on the proposal. The possibilities open to us in the circumstances thus appear to be either (1) to defer further action for a time and see what develops; (2) to decide, and publicly announce the decision, to postpone the calling of a peace conference for a definite minimum period, say one year or eighteen months; or (3) to submit a new proposal for the convening of a conference in the near future so drawn that there would be a reasonable prospect that the Soviets and Chinese would accept. These three courses will be considered in turn, followed by a statement of conclusions and recommendations.

I. A Policy of “Wait and See”

The first alternative, to defer further action for a period, would afford time (a) to await Moscow’s reply to Dr. Wang’s proposal if a reply should be forthcoming, (b) to form a better estimate of the probable future course of events in Korea, and (c) to await any changes in China’s attitude on the treaty question resulting from our “new China policy” if such a policy should be developed, before deciding on our next step respecting the treaty. On the other hand this course, which could not unfairly be described as a policy of drift, has definite disadvantages. First, as a result both of General MacArthur’s statements and action here in Washington, the Japanese have come to expect and count on a treaty to an extent, according to persons recently returned from Tokyo, not appreciated in Washington. Failure to follow up on our treaty proposals would cause a letdown and feeling of disillusionment in Japan which might have definitely undesirable consequences for our program there. Second, some SCAP Staff Sections are handicapped by uncertainty regarding the timing of the treaty and the length of time they will have to complete their respective programs. A progressive lessening of enthusiasm and effectiveness in these Sections must be expected as a price of a policy of drift. Third, some of the British Commonwealth countries, or at least their leaders, have come to expect and count on a treaty, and there is risk of their wishing to withdraw more of their occupation forces and adopting a less cooperative attitude in the FEC if we do not follow through in the matter. Fourth, General MacArthur has banked on an early treaty and from the point of view of his own personal plans if nothing else will probably request a definite statement of intention by Washington on the subject in the near future. Finally, America’s primary responsibility in Japan is recognized the world over, and our failure to follow up in some definite fashion on our July 11 treaty proposals would create an unfortunate impression everywhere as to the strength and forcefulness of American leadership.

II. Postponement

The second alternative, to postpone calling of a peace conference for a set minimum period, and to announce publicly our decision to postpone the conference and the period of such postponement, has been supported in some quarters within the Department during the past month. The arguments in favor of this course are summarized below, followed in each case by the pertinent counter-considerations to permit a balanced appraisal:

(1) We need two more years to complete our major reform programs and this can be better done under a predominantly American control structure than under a post-treaty Allied control structure:—

One counter-consideration here is that there would probably be up to a year’s grace for completion of our reform programs under SCAP supervision even if immediate action were taken for the convening of a conference. Further, the recently drafted economic reform annex (Annex H) in the treaty would definitely and specifically bind Japan to complete the reforms on the pattern already set. Although the Council of Ambassadors’ advisory and supervisory powers to ensure their completion would be less than SCAP’s, it can be argued that they would be entirely adequate for the purpose, considering the relatively advanced stage which the reforms would have reached a year hence. Our sanctioning powers, exercised through the Council and through our control over imports, would be almost as effective after the treaty as before.

(2) We can better supervise cranking-up under the present control structure than under the post-treaty structure:—

It is true that the United States has a freer hand in Japan today than it is likely to have after the treaty. Under present plans, however, cranking-up will be provided for by a separate US-Japanese economic agreement, and with the United States putting up all or the bulk of the funds we should be in a strong position to insist on the supervisory powers within Japan which we require. There is of course the added probability that the Japanese would implement cranking-up more wholeheartedly and effectively after a treaty, when they are more on their own, than under SCAP. While the proportion of civilian employees in SCAP will doubtless increase, and while General MacArthur has assented in principle to the assignment of limited numbers of State personnel to the SCAP Sections, we cannot be certain that the military command structure (civilians responsible to military officers instead of to civilians in the performance of political, economic and social functions) which reportedly has seriously obstructed efficient and imaginative implementation of our policies, particularly our economic policies, in Japan will be modified prior to the conclusion of a treaty. That such modification would be possible, however, is shown by the fact that it has been carried out in our zone in Germany.

(3) Cranking-up funds can be more easily obtained from Congress for expenditure prior to than after the treaty:—

This is probably true, but if cranking-up is provided for by a separate US-Japanese agreement, and if we retain effective powers of supervision over the program, possibilities that Congress will appropriate the necessary funds should not be materially lessened. Congress will be asked under the Marshall Plan⁷⁹ to provide funds for the rehabilitation of many countries not under American occupation, and, it may not be too much to hope, would be able to perceive that our stake in Japan was as great after the treaty under the Council of Ambassadors as under SCAP and the FEC.

(4) A definite decision for postponement would open the way for a general program of civilianization of the SCAP organization to increase the effectiveness of that organization:—

It seems clear in the light of recent high level decisions on the subject that a State takeover of the Japanese occupation is not to occur. At the moment the Department of the Army is questioning even the present role of State in the occupation. While thoroughgoing civilianization could, as stated in (2) above, be effected without a State takeover, as in the American zone of Germany, it is questionable whether General MacArthur would give his consent to this as long as he remains in control. If General MacArthur were to resign his post fairly soon after a decision for postponement, as is probable, this opposition would be removed, but General MacArthur’s own loss would have to be set against the gain.

(5) It would be desirable for the U.S. to maintain its predominant control and its armed forces in Japan at least for the next two years in the present state of world tensions:—

Regarding the strategic advantages deriving from our predominant position in Japan, it is significant that General MacArthur and high Army Department officials, who, respectively, have actively sponsored or interposed no objections to an early treaty calling for withdrawal of our forces and a greater sharing of our occupation responsibilities with our Allies, do not share this concern,^* provided we retain control of the Ryukyus. It seems unlikely even if the treaty is postponed that the present number of U.S. forces would be retained. Although our present predominant position in Japan, irrespective of exactly how many troops we have there, does afford certain security safeguards most of these would be preserved under the presently contemplated post-treaty control structure.

(6) The economic benefits which a treaty might be expected to confer on Japan (reduction of occupation costs, travel of Japanese businessmen abroad, etc.) can be as well achieved without a treaty:—

While this is generally true, there may be much truth in the thesis that the Japanese will only take hold of their economic problems with their customary energy and singleness of purpose after conclusion of a treaty putting them essentially on their own.

(7) The Soviet Union and China might prevent the United States from achieving several of its principal desiderata in a veto-type conference, which it appears is the only type of conference we could convene at this time. These desiderata include (a) satisfactory solution of reparation issues, (b) absence of restrictions on war-supporting industries, (c) acceptance of the principle of cranking-up, (d) a Ryukyus base, and (e) a simple two-thirds voting system in the Council of Ambassadors:—

Without going into detail there seems little doubt but that the Soviets and Chinese would oppose us on some of our basic desiderata at a peace conference and, possessed of a veto, could prevent us from achieving those desiderata in the treaty. It is pertinent to consider, however, whether we would be any better able to obtain these desiderata (most of which we must endeavor to obtain in the next year or eighteen months at most) without a treaty, or if we did obtain them without a treaty over the objections of the Soviets and Chinese, whether the cost in ill will and dissension would be worth it. The reparation and industrial disarmament issues, for example, would, in large measure, have to be resolved in the FEC, where the veto of course obtains, if not at a peace conference. As for cranking-up, if we could not obtain acceptance of the principle of cranking-up at a conference there is no good reason why we would be better able to obtain it by independent negotiation. A Ryukyus base will be achieved only over the categorical objections of the Soviets, and possibly the Chinese, no matter how the matter is approached. The question of the voting procedure in the Council of Ambassadors would not arise in the absence of a treaty, of course, but the importance of avoiding the veto in the Council may in any case have been exaggerated. Other powers, particularly the Soviets, are likely to be even stricter than we in ensuring that Japan abides by its reform commitments and other obligations in the treaty, so that Big Four veto rights in the Council should be no handicap and perhaps even a convenience to us.

The fact that every nation possesses an effective veto in peacemaking in its decision to ratify or not to ratify the treaty produced by the peace conference is of course another reason why we should not necessarily be deterred by the Soviet and Chinese positions on the voting question from continuing our efforts for a treaty. A non-veto conference at which we won our points by two-thirds majorities but the results of which were not ratified by the Soviet Union and China would be no better than no conference or treaty at all. Because of this factor, and because we might have been expected to anticipate, and indeed did anticipate, that the Soviets and Chinese might want a veto voting system, these countries’ attitudes on the voting issue may not provide as convincing an excuse for our postponing the conference as has been imagined.

III. An Early Peace

The above arguments and counter-arguments do not permit easy decision on the question of whether an early peace or postponement of the peace conference for a prescribed minimum period up to two years, is more in United States interest. However, the following positive arguments for an early peace, some already advanced negatively as counter-arguments to postponement or a policy of drift, can be adduced:

(1) Failure to convene a peace conference at an early date would

(a) cause a feeling of letdown in Japan which might impair Japanese initiative for recovery and otherwise militate against the success of our occupation program.

(b) Cause dissatisfaction among those of our Allies who have favored an early peace, possibly reflected in a less cooperative attitude in FEC.

(c) Probably result in General MacArthur’s resignation before termination of the occupation, necessitating the finding of a competent successor.

(2) If the peace is postponed the momentum which the treaty project has achieved will be lost, interest will decline, and the specialized personnel now available in the Department and in the various delegations of the FEC for use at a conference will disperse.

(3) There is danger, evidenced particularly by General Draper’s views⁸⁰ and the views of some American business and financial interests, that determination within the American Government and among the American people to see our economic reform programs in Japan through may lessen over the next year or so, especially if a Republican Congress should begin to question them, as it well may, in connection with cranking-up. The possibility of the programs being carried to completion, therefore, might actually be greater if they were embodied at an early date in the treaty (as set forth in the newly drafted economic reform annex) than if another year or two were afforded for their completion under the occupation.

(4) Possibly the strongest argument of all for an early peace is that the Japanese are only likely to exert their best efforts for economic recovery after a treaty, provided that treaty succeeds in imparting to them the feeling that they are again in a real sense the masters of their own fate.

(5) It can also be strongly argued that the chances of our obtaining those of our basic objectives in and with regard to Japan which it is important that we should obtain during the next year or eighteen months will be greater at a peace conference, even with the veto, than by the other means which would be available to us if a conference were not held during that time. With the representatives of all concerned nations gathered around a table it may be possible to iron out differences and reach agreement on leading issues more quickly and more amicably than if we do not convene a conference but set out to obtain our objectives unilaterally or through bilateral deals. Moreover, the greater share which our Allies would obtain in the control of Japan as a result of a treaty of the type prepared by the Working Group would serve as an inducement for their acceptance of the other features of our program, an inducement which would not exist if a conference were not held and we sought our ends by unilateral action or bilateral negotiation.

IV. Recommendations

A. About the only recommendation which I would be prepared to offer in unequivocal terms on the basis of the above considerations is that the United States adopt some definite course as soon as possible regarding the calling of a Japanese peace conference, and that it not pursue a policy of drift. The advantages of deferring action until the Soviets answer Dr. Wang’s proposal or until the Chinese and Korean situations are further clarified would seem to be far outweighed by the disadvantages of this course.

B. As for the question of what course we should take, to postpone the conference for a prescribed minimum period or to submit new proposals for a conference which we could reasonably expect the Soviets and Chinese to accept, my thinking since my memorandum of September 22⁸¹ on this subject has moved more in favor of the latter. During the last five weeks the economic reform annex has been prepared and, if adopted and accepted by Japan as a part of the treaty, would appear to constitute an effective guarantee, under the Council’s supervision, of the completion of these reforms after the treaty. At the same time, opposition to the reforms in the Army Department and elsewhere has increased the danger that they may not be fully implemented if they are not soon embodied in a treaty. Further, several persons recently returned from Japan have reported that the Japanese expect and count on a treaty to an extent I had not previously appreciated and that postponement would have definitely unfortunate psychological consequences. Finally, further reflection on the voting issue has led me to doubt whether Big Four veto rights at a conference would be the handicap I had imagined, and whether we could not better hope to accomplish our objectives at a peace conference, even a veto conference, than by the means open to us in the absence of a conference. While I would not be prepared without further thought and discussion to recommend positively that we make important concessions to the Soviets and Chinese on the voting question and other outstanding issues to induce them to attend an early conference, I do now incline to that view.

C. If the Department should decide to renew its efforts for an early treaty, it would have to decide, on the one hand, how far we would have to retreat from our original, preferred position expressed in our July 11 notes to be reasonably certain of Soviet and Chinese acceptance of our new proposals and, on the other, of how far we can go in modifying our original position without jeopardizing basic principles or sacrificing fundamental aims.

It seems clear on the first score that the Soviets, and hence probably the Chinese, will not participate at any stage without a veto. While the Soviets might be willing to participate in an eleven-nation conference with a veto this is not “reasonably certain” (in fact the chances of it are considerably less than even), and there is little doubt but that to be “reasonably certain” we would have to offer more. Without going into detail on the exact steps which might be taken, which is not the purpose of this memorandum, it seems clear that the least we could do with confidence that we would not be turned down again would be to address notes to the Soviets, Chinese and British, with information copies to the other seven FEC nations, raising with them the question of how to proceed. Our proposal to the three might, as suggested by Mr. Hamilton a while ago, be to convene an eleven-nation conference with Big Four veto rights to consider the treaty preliminarily and to report to the CFM after a predetermined period what they had been able to agree on and what not. The CFM nations, which collectively and individually would retain effective control of the proceedings from beginning to end, would then, if they so determined, attempt to reach agreement on the remaining issues. If they succeeded, they would produce a treaty for consideration and signing by all the nations at war with Japan, and if they failed they would drop the matter temporarily or consider some further means of reaching agreement. This procedure would seem to be both the maximum we should be prepared to offer and the minimum the Soviets and Chinese are likely to accept.

D. If the Department decides to postpone the calling of a conference, or if it makes renewed efforts for an early conference and those efforts fail, it is believed that we should immediately inform the other concerned governments and the public at large of our intention not to undertake again to convene a conference for at least a year, two years, or whatever period may be decided. With that decision made, fundamental reorganization of the SCAP structure should be undertaken to make it the most efficient organization possible for the execution of Allied policy during the prescribed remaining period of the occupation.

78. Addressed to Maxwell M. Hamilton and Hugh Borton; Mr. Hamilton noted: “Very good. MMH”.
79. For documentation on this subject, see volume iii .
80. Admiral Wooldridge in a preliminary comment on the August 5 treaty draft did, however, express concern on this point. [Footnote in the original. The reference is presumably to his memorandum of August 18, p. 495.]
80. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army, had visited Japan in September and issued a favorable report on the success of the occupation.
81. Not printed.