740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)65
The Planning Staff has spent considerable time during the past eight weeks in a study of the problems connected with the Japanese peace treaty. In the course of this study, we have consulted not only with the officials of our own Far Eastern Office, including Mr. Penfield and Mr. Butterworth; but also with representatives of the Army and Navy; and with leading outside experts, including Mr. Grew.66
As a result of this study, I am convinced that in regard to several of the most important issues involved we do not have before us here in Washington the facts which would enable us to make firm and sound judgments on some of the most important points at issue. The remaining information we require can be obtained, for the most part, only in Tokyo, and in consultation with SCAP. Furthermore, I think [Page 537] it important to make sure in advance that General MacArthur is in accord with any position we may take.
I have therefore decided not to submit a final paper on this problem at this time. Before we attempt to do this, I think it essential that some high official of this Department proceed to Japan and discuss in detail with General MacArthur and his assistants the issues involved.
In the attached memorandum, I set forth briefly the results we have been able to come to on the basis of the incomplete factual matter we have before us. In accordance with what has been stated above, I am not recommending to you that these be accepted now as a Department position; but I think they should serve as points of departure for discussion with SCAP at the earliest possible date.
If you approve of this general procedure, I recommend that orders be issued for a high official of the Department concerned with policy matters to proceed at once to Japan to discuss with General MacArthur all essential points of the problem at hand.67
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
PPS/10
Results Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement
1. Timing of Settlement.
The Staff sees great risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control over Japan. It has no satisfactory evidence that Japanese society would be politically or economically stable if turned loose and left to its own devices at this stage. If Japan is not politically and economically stable when the peace treaty is signed, it will be difficult to prevent communist penetration.
Nevertheless, we recognize that the occupation is in many ways entering on a period of diminishing returns. Furthermore, we are [Page 538] already committed to proceed with peace discussions by the invitations we have issued to other governments.
The Staff considers, therefore, that we cannot very well refuse to proceed with the negotiations at this time. On the other hand, we should not force the pace in any way but should keep the talks exploratory and non-binding and hold open some possibility of further postponement of final decisions, until we can arrive at a firm judgment on certain of the basic issues involved. Accordingly, discussions of substance should not be begun until after January first at the earliest, and we should not plan on completing them before about next June.
2. Voting Procedure.
If possible, the U.S.S.R. should be included in the negotiations. If it is to exclude itself, it would be better that this occur on a substantive issue damaging to the U.S.S.R. in Japanese eyes rather than on a procedural question such as voting arrangements.
If the other drafting powers will agree to a veto, on the FEC rules or otherwise, the U.S. should concur reluctantly. Otherwise, assuming that there is no agreement on a two-thirds rule, we should permit the whole question to carry over to next spring before proceeding with the talks at all.
3. Tactics.
It is highly questionable whether we will be able to get agreement at this time on a treaty which would satisfy our minimum requirements. Should we not be able to get such agreement, we always have the possibility of unilaterally introducing a virtual peace-time status in Japan by gradual modification of our occupational regime. In other words, we might achieve something approaching a normal peace-time status without any treaty at all.
This alternative is our main bargaining weapon in these discussions. If it is to be fully effective, we should begin in the near future to shape the trend of our occupational policy in this direction. In this way, we will be better prepared for whatever may come; and others will be able to convince themselves of the reality of our alternative.
4. Territory.
The final status for which we should press, with respect to the territorial limits of Japan, would be that shown on the attached map (Appendix A). Under this arrangement:
A. The southern-most islands of the Kurile archipelago would be retained by Japan.
B. The Bonins, Volcano Islands and Marcus would be detached from Japan, with a view to their being placed under U.S. strategic trusteeship.
[Page [Map 1]]appendix A
[Page 540]
C. A decision on the disposition of the Ryukyu islands south of 29° would be held in abeyance pending the receipt from SWNCC of information regarding the relative desirability of
- (a)
- a U.S. strategic trusteeship over those islands and
- (b)
- a long-term lease of base areas, nominal sovereignty over the islands being retained by Japan.
5. United States Security.
As stated above, we would insist on U.S. strategic trusteeship of the Bonins, Volcano and Marcus Islands.
In addition to this, we should proceed in the negotiations on the assumption that we will require military facilities in Okinawa.
As to the general disposition of the Ryukyus south of Latitude 29 and the framework in which the U.S. should retain the right to strategic facilities on Okinawa, the Staff feels that this should be made the subject of a special study by SWNCC which should include appraisal of the prospective cost and burden to the U.S. of civil administration of those islands in the event that this Government takes responsibility for them. (A special recommendation on this subject is being submitted to Mr. Lovett.)
As to whether American base facilities would be required on the Japanese main islands, the Staff does not have the basis for an adequate judgment at this time. We have no evidence that facilities for land forces or for air forces alone on this territory would serve any useful purpose. The question narrows down to whether facilities should be sought for the U.S. Navy, presumably at Yokosuka, with air support facilities. A decision on this score involves far-reaching political considerations, both internal Japanese and international.
From the standpoint of U.S. security, the Staff does not consider this moment propitious for a final decision on this subject. It would prefer to see this postponed, if possible until next spring.
6. Military Defense of Japan.
This brings up the whole question of the future defense of the Japanese home islands. We are already committed to the demilitarization of Japan. The Staff considers that the idea of a four-power agreement on Japanese demilitarization should be abandoned but that the Treaty should provide for complete Japanese disarmament, with the reservation that Japan should be permitted to maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary and coast guard, at a strength to be defined initially by SCAP. A Council of Ambassadors should be charged with the continued supervision of demilitarization and disarmament.
Admittedly, this leaves the Japanese without means of self-defense against foreign aggression. The Staff sees no means of avoiding this. [Page 541] It feels that in the coming period Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity (or in extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces, and that it should be accepted as a principle of American defense policy to retain in the Pacific areas sufficient armed strength to make plain our will and determination to prevent any other military power from establishing itself in the Japanese home islands.
7. Political and Economic Defense of Japan.
The Staff does not consider that there should be any formal allied control or supervision of Japan’s political life following entrance into force of a peace treaty. One of the greatest values of a peace treaty, from our standpoint, is its psychological effect on the Japanese. This would be lost if formal political controls were to be retained. If we must retain controls, it would be better to have no treaty.
This means that when American occupation forces leave, Japan will be politically on its own. There can be no doubt that Moscow-controlled communists will then make an intensive effort to penetrate and dominate Japanese political life. Japan’s fortunes will then depend primarily on the stability of its internal political structure. This in turn will be partly a matter of the political institutions inherited from the occupational regime and the extent to which Japanese political psychology is adjusted to them and finds normal expression in them. But it will be also in large part a question of whether tolerable economic conditions exist and whether hope for a better economic future can be maintained. If economic distress and insecurity prevail, this will provide greatly added incentive and assistance to communist efforts.
It is clear that with the loss of a certain portion of its economic substance, with the loss of its markets and raw material sources in Soviet-dominated portions of the mainland, with highly unstable conditions prevailing in China, in Indonesia, in Indochina, and in India, and with no certainty as to the resumption of certain traditional exports to the dollar area, Japan faces, even in the best of circumstances, an economic problem of extremely serious dimensions. It is impossible to undertake any reliable appraisal of the dimensions of this problem on the basis of information now available. This can be remedied in some part by further study in the Department, and the Staff understands that this is already being given further attention in the competent operating divisions. But it is clear that complete certainty will never be achieved. Some degree of calculated risk will be present in any solution.
As things stand today, the information we have does not satisfy us that Japanese society, if turned loose on its own now or in the [Page 542] near future, would be able to survive successfully the resultant strain on its political structure.
If, on the basis of further study and discussions with SCAP, we can see no real likelihood that Japan, even after an initial “tiding-over” period of U.S. aid, will be able to stand on its own feet economically, then we may have to revise our basic approach to this whole problem, even at the possible cost of abandoning the idea of concluding a peace settlement at this time.
If, however, we conclude that Japan does have a fair chance of a satisfactory economic future, then the best we can do is to see that Japan is placed, before the occupation is terminated, in as favorable a position as possible to orient itself in a new and unfavorable environment and to carry on independently.
In either case, we shall have to determine whether the directives under which SCAP is now operating are such as to make the maximum contribution to Japan’s eventual ability to meet the strain of renewed economic independence. On this, the Staff has heard and considered directly contrary opinions from highly competent and serious sources. The negative view holds that our present purge and de-cartelization policies, in particular, run counter to the requirements of future stability and economic vigor in Japan. This view is categorically rejected by SCAP. In the light of the limited facts available to it, the Staff is unable to find any satisfactory reconciliation of these conflicting views, and considers that further discussion with SCAP is in order.
8. Reparations.
The reparations program should be wound up at the earliest possible date. Minimum reparations, consistent with existing commitments, should be exacted, and none out of current production. The Council of Ambassadors should be charged with the administrative supervision of reparations in the post-war period.
9. Industrial Disarmament.
Japan’s industrial disarmament should be limited to the prohibition of the manufacture of weapons of war and aircraft and the minimum of restrictions on industrial production which can be advocated in the light of commitments already made by the U.S. regarding the reduction of industrial war potential. Japan’s economic war potential should be controlled by restrictions on allowable stockpiling of designated strategic raw materials within Japan. Japan should be permitted to operate at least domestic civil air transport and a merchant marine, although she should not be permitted to manufacture aircraft. In defining our position on the limitations on merchant [Page 543] shipping, primary consideration should be given to the views of the Navy.
10. Provision in Treaty for Future Revision.
It is absolutely essential that a peace treaty contain adequate provision for revision. A peace treaty imposing servitudes of indefinite duration rests on the inexcusable assumption of a static world and constitutes an infallible invitation to eventual unilateral violation.
- Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State.↩
- Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador in Japan and Under Secretary of State.↩
- In a memorandum of October 29, Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat of the office of Secretary of State, informed Messrs. Thorp, Armour, Saltzman, Kennan, and Butterworth that the Secretary had approved the attached study of problems of the Japanese peace treaty in principle and that the question of who would be sent to Japan should be worked out by Messrs. Lovett, Armour, and Kennan. In a memorandum to Mr. Armour of the same date, Mr. Humelsine suggested that he talk with Mr. Kennan about the individual to assume this assignment. (740.0011 PW(Peace)/10–2947).↩