740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister; |
| Secretary of State Marshall; | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State. |
Dr. Wang called and brought up with me this morning the following subjects regarding the Japanese peace conference:
Japanese Peace Conference:
Dr. Wang informed me that he had mentioned to Mr. Vyshinsky the Chinese suggestion that the Japanese peace conference should follow as to membership and voting procedure the precedent of the Far Eastern Commission. Mr. Vyshinsky had expressed doubt as to this suggestion, reaffirming the Soviet position that the treaty should be drafted in the first instance by the four powers sitting on the Council of Foreign Ministers and the draft when completed should be submitted to a conference of eleven. Mr. Vyshinsky had, however, promised to refer Dr. Wang’s suggestion to Moscow but although this had been some time ago the Russians according to Chinese information had not yet received Moscow’s reply. In this connection Dr. Wang outlined the reasons for China’s suggestion and concern over the consequences of proceeding without Russia which he had already stated to me and subsequently in greater detail to Mr. Bohlen.
Dr. Wang said that his Government while determined to adopt a completely firm attitude in regard to the Chinese Communists was nevertheless being very careful to avoid any action which might provoke the Soviet Union. He said also that the Chinese Government was very careful not to request anything of the U.S. in connection with Chinese matters which might heighten the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that should, however, the Soviet Union begin overt assistance to the Chinese Communists or other actions designed to frustrate the re-establishment of the Chinese Government over Manchuria, the Chinese Government would face squarely up to that fact and would not back away from it. He said one of the central aims of Chinese foreign policy at this time was to re-establish the central Government’s control over Manchuria, that without Manchuria, China would be in an impossible economic and political state. He said for this reason that he personally had not considered the Yalta arrangement made by President Roosevelt as bad as others had in that it involved an official recognition of Chinese [Page 528] sovereignty over Manchuria. He also stated that he felt my efforts in China had been directed towards the same end.
I told Dr. Wang that I was continually turning over in my mind the problem of how best the U.S. could help China in her present difficulties without complicating the situation in relation to the Soviet Union. I said I was fully conscious of the concern which the Chinese Government felt over possible Russian action in this area and that I myself had been trying to analyze the real motives of the Soviet Union in staying out of the proposed Japanese peace conference and what this attitude might mean in relation to Soviet policy towards China and the Far East in general.
Dr. Wang said that he was returning to China next week and that following his return he proposed to address a formal note to the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet Union setting forth officially the Chinese suggestion that the Far Eastern Commission voting procedure should be followed at the Japanese peace conference. He said he hoped thereby to obtain a definite answer from the Soviet Government. He said he realized that the U.S. had made a definite proposal on that subject and could hardly be expected to reconsider its position until it was known whether the Soviet Union would participate on the basis of the Chinese suggestion. He said that if the Soviet Government refused while England and America had indicated a willingness to go along with the Chinese suggestion, he would have to present to the National Council the question of whether China in the circumstances should proceed without Russia. He said frankly he did not know what the decision of the National Council would be but he felt that the question of proceeding without the Soviet Union was so important for China because of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 that it would have to be placed before the Council.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]