740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–147: Telegram
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State
C55205. I have carefully read the suggested draft of a treaty of peace with Japan brought here by Colonel Kades. I fully agree that this draft requires major revision before being acceptable for presentation as the considered view of the United States Government. As it is apparent from the message in reference that the paper is still under study in Washington from which marked revision in both form and context [content?] may be expected, I shall limit myself here to comment only upon the following features which instantly appear to me as highly questionable:
- 1.
- The draft provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier. It is not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan’s economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in my opinion, failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous;
- 2.
- Provision that the forces of occupation should pass under the authority of the American Ambassador, a civil functionaire, upon the effectuation of the treaty is professionally unsound and follows a concept fraught with the danger of grave consequences. At such stage the entire military operation under the terms of the draft would have become one of evacuation which should be conducted, as any other military operation, under the control of the War rather than State Department with respect to American forces and the other governments concerned with respect to foreign forces. Should it become necessary in an emergency to use the force remaining for other military operations during the withdrawal period arrangements therefor should be effected on the highest governmental levels;
- 3.
- Provision for the post-treaty utilization of Allied force in Japan after the withdrawal of the occupation forces would provide a possible stepping stone for Russia or some other objectionable foreign power later to acquire a military foothold upon Japanese soil, an eventuality which would not only threaten all gains made during the occupation but our strategic position in the Western Pacific as well. Should the application of Allied military force be so required, we would be confronted with a situation in which the treaty had broken down and reestablishment of the occupation rendered mandatory;
- 4.
- It is believed a faulty concept which would provide for Allied executive authority over Japan in the post-treaty period, exercised through the proposed Council of Ambassadors. It would but continue the existing SCAP control organization under a new name and defeat the primary treaty aim of seeing Japan emerge from occupation control as a self-respecting, autonomous and democratic nation. The principal functions of the Council of Ambassadors should embrace the close observation of the manner of compliance with the treaty terms (which should provide for the full and faithful implementation of SCAP directives issued in furtherance of Allied policy, except where expressly modified by treaty provisions) and the reporting to the member governments or the United Nations, as appropriate within its terms of reference, of serious violations thereof;
- 5.
- Provision for a separate 25-year treaty among the 11 powers to insure the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan fails realistically to recognize Japan’s present situation and its potential for rearmament during that period of time. It would bring US into doubtful military alignments, unjustified by the circumstances existing, which might well later prove politically embarrassing and militarily disadvantageous. Apart from the fact that, from a physical and material standpoint, Japan is utterly incapable of rearming herself for modern war within the 25-year period prescribed, any possible will or attempt [Page 514] toward such end, in disregard of treaty commitments, can better be controlled by the power and prestige of the member governments and the moral force of world opinion, than by the overhanging threat of Allied forces;
- 6.
- The proposal to establish a commission of inspection, arbitral tribunals, et cetera, would appear cumbersome and unnecessary and would invite the establishment in Japan of unwarranted numbers of foreign officials for many years and create the basis for the spread of internal ideological conflict through widespread abuse of official status and misuse of power and authority, and inevitably would subject Japan to an unprecedented carpet-bagging invasion. The proposed Council of Ambassadors would possess inherently the authority to organize such technical and other assistance as might prove essential to the proper discharge of its functions, without the rigidity of treaty mandate;
- 7.
- The proposed staging of post-treaty supervision from the Council of Ambassadors to one or more successor organizations follows a seeming faulty concept and would prove uncertain, unwieldy and confusing in its failure to provide a positive solution to the problem;
- 8.
- The unilateral right vesting in the Allied Powers, in their sole discretion, to alter the treaty terms after ratification by all powers, including Japan, is highly questionable. Such indefinitive treatment of the problem would not prove the freedom of action inherent in the change from war to peace, would suggest indecision and vacillation on the part of the Allied Powers, and could not fail to foster confusion and unrest among the Japanese, with a chaotic situation resulting where confidence and stability would be the pressing need. Sufficient information which guided Allied policy in the past is now at hand to boldly and explicitly set forth the conditions prerequisite to the restoration of peace. Such conditions should be stated in simple and unmistakable language with every effort made to avoid arbitrary, oppressive, and unnecessary controls which would tend to stultify the evolutionary development of a democratic, peaceful, and economically self-sustaining Japan;
- 9.
- Nothing could be fraught with greater danger to the composed and stable situation which now exists in Japan than to abrogate all orders and directives, issued both by and to SCAP during the occupation, upon the effectuation of the peace treaty. Such procedure would have the effect of nullifying all of the considered action taken by the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP during this post-surrender period and would thoroughly discredit both international entities and threaten all gains made through the exercise of their respective spheres of authority. The whole framework to political, economic and social [Page 515] reform rests upon these policies and directives, many of which may only be fully implemented in the course of a long period of time, and all of which automatically will, in any event, cease to have force and effect as implementation is completed;
- 10.
- It is highly objectionable to commit the United States by treaty provision to post-treaty credits of hundreds of millions of dollars to support the Japanese economy. With the restoration of peace, such matters should be left to negotiation by the Japanese under the normal methods of international finance. Furthermore, such action by treaty provision would commit future Congresses of the United States to the appropriation of funds without the opportunity for legislative consideration;
- 11.
- The economic levels fixed in the treaty are highly speculative and may well prove unrealistic and opposed to our basic purpose in the restoration of peace, as may also features of the reparations solution. Economic levels consistent with stability are dependent upon too many variables impossible now to assay, to permit arbitrary ceilings by treaty mandate without threat to the achievement of a self-sustaining Japanese economy, and a resultant possibility of burdensome expense to the American taxpayer.
As stated, the foregoing is comment upon only those features of the draft which appear to me at first glance to be most doubtful. I should be very glad, when revision of the paper as now contemplated has been completed, to give my views thereon in greater detail, or at any time my comment on any specific point involved.
It is possibly needless to point out that discussion of this matter has been predicated upon the concept that the treaty of peace will be ratified by all nations involved in the war against Japan. Should any nation, such as Russia, abstain from the peace negotiations or fail to ratify the peace pact, the situation thereby created would necessitate consideration of aspects of the problem, especially those involving withdrawal of the occupation forces, from an entirely different point of view, with markedly different conclusions resulting.