740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947
The Chief of the Planning Branch, Civil Affairs
Division, War Department (Fahey) to the
Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield)
top secret
Washington, 29 August
1947.
Dear Jim: Reference is made to your memorandum
of 11 August to General Noce forwarding a copy of a preliminary draft
peace treaty for Japan.42
Our analysis has been confined to a consideration of basic
criteria—desirable from the Civil Affairs/Military Government point of
view—rather than to any recasting of your draft. This approach has been
made in the light of my understanding that governmental discussions on a
Japanese treaty will probably be delayed until after the CFM meeting this November.
[Page 507]
The attached draft of CA/MG criteria may
be useful in developing discussions on the subject at a planning level
prior to a more formal resolution of U. S. views, through SWNCC.
In addition to the draft criteria, I feel that the U. S. cannot be a
party to a Japanese Peace Treaty unless the treaty is fully definitive
and comprehensive in character—and not an interim control arrangement.
The existing arrangements for Japan permit considerable U. S. control
and leadership. Until this government may deal with Japan on a nation to
nation basis, diffused authority and multi-lateral control must be
avoided.
Subject to your, or Hugh Borton’s convenience, I should be glad to
participate in further discussions on the subject.
Consultation with P&O here in the War
Department develops that they are following a similar course of action
in their reply to you and are confining their discussion to the purely
security aspects of a treaty.43
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Draft Prepared in the War Department
top secret
Washington, 29 August
1947.
Draft Basic Civil Affairs/Military Government
Criteria Among Those To Be Encompassed in a Japanese Peace
Treaty
- 1.
- That the treaty be so designed as to encourage and continue a
Japan aligned with U.S. interests.
- 2.
- That during any interim period between now and the exercise of
full sovereignty of the Japanese themselves, no existing
authority now reposing with U.S. be relinquished.
Comment—Existing control measures
for Japan including the authority of SCAP, the FEC and the Allied Council
permit U.S. domination of the Japanese occupation.
Without relinquishing our dominant position nor our
authority, the U.S. can and should progressively
diminish the degree of control as Japanese political and
economic self-sufficiency progresses.
- 3.
- That the treaty fully recognize and be so designed as to
confirm:
- (a)
- Allied agreements re Japan thus far.
- (b)
-
SCAP accomplishments
thus far under U.S. directives.
- (c)
- The prestige of the U.S. and the significant position
occupied by General MacArthur.
Comment—Accomplishments thus far
in Japan are almost without exception attributable to
U.S. leadership. If the U.S. does not insist upon
confirmation of the things thus far accomplished we are
necessarily throwing away our leadership and
recommitting for further review that which is and should
remain as a fait accompli. As a
practical matter we should avoid any provision which
would create a hiatus between standing decrees and the
exercise of full sovereignty by the Japanese
Government.
- 4.
- That the treaty be so designed as to encourage and permit
Japanese economic self-sufficiency.
Comment—The Japanese must stand
on their own feet. The use of U.S. dollars to bolster
the Japanese economy cannot be continued
indefinitely.
- 5.
- That if controls of Japan’s war potential are necessary in a
treaty, they be limited to production potentialities and the
level of supply of the few basic commodities upon which a
revitalized Japanese war potential would be dependent.
Comment—The above contemplates
possible controls over such basic commodities as steel,
coal and petroleum.
- 6.
- That the treaty should permit full Japanese participation in
international trade subject only to international
conventions.
- 7.
- That the treaty should provide for the settlement of
reparations claims subject only to occupation costs and without
prejudicing the retention of sufficient productive capabilities
essential to permit Japan’s reasonable economic
self-sufficiency.
- 8.
- That the treaty should insure the restitution of all items in
Japan which may be reasonably identified as having been
improperly removed from other countries.
Comment—It appears that
restitution may well be completed before a treaty is
consummated. If so, this criteria is unnecessary. In the
event restitution is covered in the treaty, a cutoff
date for the filing of claims would be necessary.
- 9.
- That the treaty should encourage the continuation of
educational methods and standards along democratic lines
established during the occupation.
- 10.
- That the treaty be so designed as to nullify previous treaties
and conventions which do not respect the rights of the U.S. and
its nationals in the publications field.
Comment—The Bi-lateral Convention
of 10 November 1905 between Japan and the U. S. is the
type convention referred to. This
[Page 509]
convention, which should
be nullified, permits citizens of either country to
translate without authorization written material of all
sorts into either English or Japanese. SCAP’s administrative
decisions have provided that U. S. authors and
publishers must be afforded copyright protection equal
to that granted nationals of other countries having more
favorable treaties with Japan. Thus, the convention has
been inoperative under the present occupation.
- 11.
- That the treaty be so designed as to insure known war
criminals, under Japanese jurisdiction, be surrendered for
trial, and that those incarcerated in Japan serve the full term
of their sentence, unless clemency is granted by the committing
authority, with the U. S. having a final voice in clemency
proceedings involving offences against U. S. nationals and a
dominant voice in clemency proceedings involving international
tribunals.
Comment—The objective of the War
Crimes program in both Europe and in the Far East is
that those guilty shall be apprehended, tried and
punished as a deterrent against future war crimes and
crimes against peace and humanity. It appears probable
that the Japanese War Crimes’ trials will be
substantially completed prior to the effective date of a
peace treaty. Unless the sentences as a result of the
trials, are enforced, there exists the probability that
our war crimes program, at a great expense of effort and
money, may be converted into a mockery and a farce.
There is already considerable indication among both
Japanese and Germans on trial for war crimes that if
they escape the death sentence, the most they must
endure, is imprisonment not beyond the period of
occupation. The ultimate place of confinement of
convicted war criminals is now undetermined. Probably a
determination will be required before a treaty, insofar
as it pertains to war crimes, may be given final
form.
