740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–2547

Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton)

secret
Ser. 00498P35

Subject: Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan.

Reference: (a) Navy Dept. letter, Ser. 00496P35 of 18 Aug. 1947.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of reference (a) the following additional informal comments are submitted:

1.
Preamble page 2. It is indicated that the Allied and Associated Powers will support, in due course, Japan’s application to become a member of the United Nations.
2.
Article 26, Chapter IV indicates “in due course” to mean as soon after the coming into effect of the Treaty as the Council of Ambassadors is satisfied that Japan has sufficiently fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty to warrant application for membership.
3.
Article IX of the Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan stipulates that the Contracting Parties agree to consult together on the need for revising the present Treaty, at the time of Japan’s admission to membership in the United Nations.
4.
At the time of admission to membership in the United Nations, Japanese armed forces will be completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded. Japan, therefore, will be unable to fulfill her commitments to the United Nations relative to furnishing prescribed armed forces. It is, therefore, recommended that provision be made for revising the Treaty well in advance of Japan’s admission to membership in the U.N.
5.
Article 18, Chapter III requires that requests for the handing over of War Criminals shall be made within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. In view of the tremendous amount of documentary evidence to be reviewed in the determination of persons involved in War Crimes it appears that six months’ time is insufficient. It is conceivable that, unless a longer period is allowed, [Page 504] many guilty persons will remain unapprehended. This would result in loss of prestige by the Allied or Associated Power concerned.
6.
Article 22, Chapter IV abolishes FEC, SCAP, ACC and their effective directives upon the coming into force of the Treaty. Such a sudden disruption of the functioning of these policy, implementing, and advisory agencies might well defeat the aim of the Interim Supervision and Inspection program. For this reason I suggest that the FEC be abolished as provided (each nation now represented in the FEC will be represented in the Council of Ambassadors), but that SCAP and ACC continue to function until such time as the Chairman of the Council of Ambassadors sees fit to terminate their offices. This provides for more freedom of action on the part of the Council.
7.
Article 23, Chapter IV stipulates that during the course of withdrawal of Allied military forces from Japan, these forces shall be under the control of an American commander designated by the President of the U.S. and that this commander shall be under the authority of the Chairman of the Council of Ambassadors for Japan. Inasmuch as it is not considered sound practice, from a military point of view, to have military forces under the authority of other than normal military commanders it is suggested that this clause be modified to provide for the control of military forces under the prescribed nation’s military commander and the functions of the Council be limited to formulation of policy for implementation by the said commander.
8.
Paragraph 13, Article 53, Chapter IX provides that the language in which the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be conducted shall, unless otherwise agreed, be English, French, Russian or Chinese. Because Japan will always be a party to the disputes it is suggested that this paragraph may be too restrictive and may work a hardship on the Tribunal. Therefore, it is suggested that Japanese be added to the other four languages allowed.
9.
Page 7, Article 1 of the Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan includes the following statement: “All military forces brought into or operating against Japan … shall be under the general control of the Council.” This statement is subject to the same suggestion as offered in paragraph 7 above.
10.
The following minor changes are suggested:
[Here follow 17 suggestions for minor changes.]

E. T. Wooldridge