740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1447
Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield)29
Urgency of a Peace Settlement With Japan
The following are offered as being among the important factors making urgent a peace settlement with Japan:
It is impractical to attempt measures to revive the economies of the Far East until the existence of a state of war has been resolved. [Page 493] It should be obvious that the interdependence of economic well-being requires simultaneous up-swing of economic activity in China, Japan, and other closely associated areas. It would not promote the interests of the United States to attempt to stimulate artificially with political state-to-state loans such an economic up-swing unless that revival were to be based solidly upon the resurgence of private enterprise and the active and increasing participation of private business of all countries and nationalities. This solid foundaton of private business activity is not possible of realization so long as a state of war continues. In other words a sound national move toward economic revival, which must be started at the earliest possible moment, requires as its first step a peace settlement with Japan.
Any delay in proceeding to a settlement with Japan would have serious psychological repercussions, highly detrimental to United States interest. The stage has been set, the audience assembled and the overture played. Failure to raise the curtain now could destroy the possibility of the United States’ taking the leading role and might well allow another actor to steal the show. Reference to editorial comment in this country and to recent statements by such Allied leaders as President Roxas of the Philippines should furnish ample evidence to support the psychological urgency of a settlement with Japan.
In view of the stand which we have taken vis-à-vis Soviet Russia’s attitude toward settlement with Japan and more especially the interpretation which has been placed by the press on our position, any hesitancy, postponement, or delay on our part would in all likelihood be subject to serious and detrimental misinterpretation. It is probable that the Soviets themselves would misinterpret any delay or postponement with possible serious repercussions on our position and adverse effect upon other Allies.
While many may argue that the last factor to be taken into consideration is that of the effect of delay on Japan and the Japanese, it should be borne in mind that to the degree that we plan to use Japan and the Japanese we must give consideration to assuring that the timing of the settlement not be allowed to impair effective utilization of Japan’s ability promptly to contribute to economic revival and political stability. Delay in the settlement would have a disheartening effect on Japan, would lead to confusion because of inability to determine the cause of the delay, and would, at the least, seriously diminish the immediate usefulness of Japan for our purposes. The Occupation has accomplished its purpose and the point of diminishing returns has now been reached. The obvious and only logical change is that of settlement of the state of war. The present situation can be continued [Page 494] only with the expectation that if we delay or postpone peace settlement we shall gradually lose ground or at best make more difficult the gathering of momentum in our eventual peace program for the Pacific.
The crying need of the moment is believed to be the assertion of leadership by the United States in the Pacific. The peace settlement with Japan is the ideal springboard for such a program and failure to use or delay in using this springboard could well threaten, and would at least be an important obstacle to, any program of leadership.
- Mr. Penfield forwarded the memorandum on the same day to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), with copies to Mr. Bohlen and General Saltzman. Mr. Penfield stated the importance of not allowing long delays to occur in the peace-making process.↩