740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/7–2847: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

202. C–54398. For the eyes only of Secretary and Assistant Secretary Hilldring. In separate conversations with General MacArthur and with me, Evatt has outlined his general ideas in regard to peace settlement as follows:

  • (a). The matter should be pushed as rapidly as possible.
  • (b) It should be an 11-power settlement, and if the Soviets will not join at the beginning they will come in later because they will not wish to be without a voice in the interim regime of control.
  • (c) There is no connection between the German settlement and a Japanese settlement, and no reason why a Japanese settlement should be delayed on account of the German question.
  • (d) Preliminary conference should not be one of deputies and experts, but should be one of governmental representatives capable of making decisions and moving forward with practical results.
  • (e) He himself wished to attend such conference and believes that, in general, the conferees should be Foreign Ministers rather than deputies because Foreign Ministers have their jobs to get back to and thus are forced by circumstance to progress with the conference work and achieve results.
In broad outline the interim controls should consist of a working group of perhaps [not?] more than four Allied representatives, possibly along the lines of the interim commission of control in the projected 25-year four-power pact (but the pact, if made the basis, should not be limited to the four) reporting to a council of Ambassadors of the 11 Allies which would ordinarily meet say, once in 3 months. The council of Ambassadors would report to their governments which would consult together under a regional security pact for the Far East consonant with the Charter of the United Nations. The council of Ambassadors [Page 476] should be headed by an American chairman. In contemplation that the high contracting parties to the peace settlement would commit themselves under appropriate conditions to support Japan’s application for membership in the United Nations, it should also be contemplated that eventually Japan would become a member of the regional security arrangement. The regional security arrangement should not be directed against Japan or any one nation.
He felt therefore nations such as France which [sic] do not deserve full participation in the peace settlement and the interim controls, et cetera, but appeared reconciled to their inclusion for the sake of moving forward with and effecting the settlement. As regards voting procedure, he indicated doubt that a two-thirds system would be workable, mentioned the desirability of unanimity and, speaking very generally, said the main thing was to work out a wholly democratic procedure.
He indicated he felt there should be no collective trusteeship over the Ryukyus (Okinawa), but that the United States should be sole trustee.
His attitude has been cordial and friendly in every way. He expressed himself emphatically in regard to Japanese Antarctic whaling question, but indicated he felt that the question of the future of whaling had not been prejudiced, and that the second expedition was a closed matter and he intended to say nothing further about it. He expressed himself as completely optimistic that basic American and British Commonwealth policies were identical, and that agreement as to the essentials of a peace settlement would not be difficult.