740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–2647:
Telegram
The Secretary of State to
General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, at Tokyo
secret
Washington, June 26,
1947—3 p.m.
237. From the Secretary for General MacArthur: There follows for your
info and such comment as you may
care to make the text of [Page 465]
instruction which has received careful consideration here in Dept and
which we expect to dispatch to Moscow in near future:91
- “1. As suggested in your conversations with General
Hilldring in Dept please take up personally with Mr. Molotov
at earliest possible occasion question of conference on
peace treaty for Japan and give Dept as much advance notice
as possible of date of your engagement with Molotov in order
that similar conversations may be held in Washington with
nine other interested powers.
- “2. You should endeavor obtain USSR views on our desire to
hold 11 power conference soon as practicable. You may inform
him similar confidential conversations are being held with
other nine interested powers in order to obtain such
positive ideas as they may have on questions relating to
drafting of peace treaty with Japan and that we would
appreciate expression of Soviet views on question soon as
possible. It is our idea also that other states at war with
Japan should be given opportunity to present their views at
drafting stage and that after draft has been sufficiently
advanced it should be considered by conference of all states
at war with Japan.
- “3. In reply to questions which Mr. Molotov may ask as to
voting procedure, you may state that this Govt is disposed
to favor decision by simple two thirds majority but wishes
to have benefit of views of other powers.
- “4. For your info and for
communication to Molotov at your discretion Dept is prepared
to reject any suggestion of a conference limited to only
four, five or six powers and to stand firm on our desire for
a conference composed of 11 powers, namely those of the
members of the FEC. An
11-power conference is considered preferable to a conference
composed of nations represented on the Council of Foreign
Ministers because: 1) such a conference would broaden the
representative basis of participation to include all nations
with a primary interest in Japan; 2) the thorny problem of
Australian representation would be solved; and 3) the
problem of arranging for consultation with directly
interested powers in the course of drafting would be greatly
simplified.
- “5. For your info but not
for discussion with Molotov at this time, although Dept
prefers a voting procedure requiring only two thirds
majority of the 11 powers, it would be prepared to consider
provision for unanimity among interested powers if the
suggestion came from a substantial number of the powers
consulted and if the provision for unanimity could be
limited to four powers—the US, USSR, China and UK or
Australia. Dept believes that the extension of unanimity
provision to include greater number of powers would be
highly impracticable. In foregoing connection, there have
been intimations from British officials here that British
Govt would oppose substitution of Australia for UK as one of
the vetoing powers but would be prepared to accept straight
two thirds majority plan. In December we informed Dr. Evatt
of our hope and desire that Australia participate on a full
[Page 466] and equal
basis in the formulation of a peace treaty with Japan but
that it seemed natural to expect the Russians would insist
upon a more limited group than the Far Eastern Commission
for treaty negotiations and that it was therefore impossible
for us to predict what final arrangements would be made for
negotiating the treaty.”
