740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/5–1447
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs (Vincent)
confidential
[Washington,] May 14, 1947.
Memo for the Record
Recommendation hereunder agreed to by Secretary on May 14, 1947, in
conference with General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent with following
modification:
We are prepared to agree to four-power unanimity as stated in the
attached memorandum but are not prepared to agree to six-power unanimity
as stated therein. The Secretary believes that the inclusion of France,
in view of its negative record in the Pacific during the war, among the
“principally interested” powers would inevitably raise embarrassing [Page 458] issues with other Pacific
nations, such as New Zealand, the Netherlands, India and the
Philippines.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
confidential
[Washington,] May 12, 1947.
Preparatory Conference on a Japanese Peace
Treaty
Officers of the Department have discussed methods for initiating
action on the above subject. There is complete agreement that a
preparatory conference should not be confined to the representatives
of only four nations (US, UK, USSR and China) or of the CFM powers (France in addition to the
four powers named). A majority of the officers felt certain that the
USSR would not join in a conference of eleven nations which did not
provide for large-power unanimity (for a Soviet veto). Some officers
felt that Russia would, faced with a definite decision to hold an
eleven-power conference based on a two-thirds voting procedure,
choose participation as less disadvantageous than abstention. There
were some officers who felt that the US itself should retain some
kind of veto.
Discussion produced general agreement to proceed as follows:
Ambassador Smith upon his return to Moscow would consult with
Molotov. Simultaneously, Department officers would consult with the
Ambassadors in Washington of the other nine powers. An eleven-power
preparatory conference to meet in Washington at an early convenient
date would be suggested, and the views of the various governments
would be solicited. In response to the inevitable question as to
voting procedure, we would express a preference for a two-thirds
majority system and request the views of the various governments as
to what nations might be considered as “principally interested” if
large-power unanimity were desired.
It is recommended that we make the approaches to the representatives
of the various governments as indicated above; that we be prepared
to reject flatly any suggestion of a conference limited to only
four, five or six powers; that we stand firm on our desire for a
conference composed of eleven powers; and that we be prepared to
accept the principle of large-power unanimity on a basis of four
powers (US, UK or Australia, USSR and China) or six powers (US, UK,
USSR, China, Australia and France).
