Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 P.W./7–2347

Memorandum by Mr. Cleon O. Swayzee of the Division of International Labor, Social, and Health Affairs²²

secret

[Washington,] July 23, 1947.

Subject: Comments Respecting the Draft SWNCC Paper which Deals with the Problems of the Utilization of Japanese Technical Personnel by Claimant Countries in the Installation and Operation of Industrial Facilities Removed from Japan on Reparations Account.

The proposed U.S. policy in dealing with the above-named problem, as laid out in the draft SWNCC paper, would permit the recruiting of a “reasonable” number of Japanese technicians by reparation claimant countries under a number of safeguards to be set up by SCAP designed to protect them from involuntary employment. The reparation claimant countries would be responsible only for transportation and “subsistence” during the period of the contract, while the Japanese government would be responsible for the workers’ remuneration “in excess of subsistence”. The latter payments would be made in yen to the account (or the dependents) of the individual Japanese so employed and would be debited to the reparations accounts of the reparation claimant countries.

This Division has two general comments regarding the proposals embodied in this paper:

I. While we recognize the validity of the various arguments put forward in support of this program, such as the necessity for the industrially undeveloped claimant countries to secure the use of skilled technicians, and that the amount of reparations that these countries will receive from Japan is likely to be relatively little at the best; we still believe that certain aspects of the program as outlined has serious disadvantages from the U.S. point of view:

a. We believe as a matter of principle that it is undesirable to recruit labor for service abroad as reparation because we believe such arrangements considerably increase the risks that are always present in recruiting labor for service abroad, namely those of involuntary servitude and the exploitation of labor. Largely because of this danger American labor has gone on record as opposing the use of manpower as reparations, and would undoubtedly protest if our Government agreed to a plan calling for the same. Moreover, if we give assent to a labor reparations program, however carefully we might attempt to safeguard the rights of labor, our action would be subject to misrepresentation and distortion abroad, and consequently our future position in dealing with international issues involving moral considerations would be weakened.

b. This policy differs radically from the one that we have been following in Europe. Thus on March 19, 1947 an outgoing telegram for the Political Adviser in Berlin (No. 603)²³ which cleared through A–H, GA, CE, EUR and ILH stated:

“We have considered proposal stated in urtel 482 Feb 27²⁴ relative to recruitment of labor in Germany for work abroad for purposes of reerecting plants allocated member countries IARA as reparation.

“We are opposed in principle to use of German labor abroad as form of reparation. …

“However we are agreed in principle that recruitment of German technicians be permitted for purpose assisting in reerection of plants removed as reparation. Such recruitment should be conditioned upon following requirements in addition those you listed: First, recruitment be on voluntary basis. Second, that technicians be permitted leave Germany only on temporary assignments limited to period necessary to accomplish reerection of the plants, and that arrangements be made to ensure their return. Third, arrangements for remittances of earnings to Germany be accomplished. …”

In view of the foregoing considerations we recommend that this Government: (1) oppose any proposal that Japanese workers be recruited for labor abroad on reparation account; and (2) support, as a substitute, the idea of voluntary recruitment in keeping with the general provisions of the third paragraph of the Department’s telegram to Berlin.

II. We are considerably concerned over the possibility that Japanese workers recruited for service abroad at this time and for the purpose indicated, whether on reparations account or by voluntary recruitment, might in fact become subject to involuntary labor. However carefully the work contract required by SCAP might be drawn up, once the workers were in the reparations claimant country, unless some special safeguarding plan were adopted, they would be entirely subject to control of the authorities of that country. This would follow because they would have no Consul to appeal to in case the terms of their contracts were not lived up to, and would be unable in all probability to finance a return trip to their own country (certainly unable if “subsistence” only is paid directly to them as under the payments for reparation account plan) or to secure the needed travel permits or tickets.

Therefore, we believe that the safeguards set out in the draft SWNCC paper should be altered to include the following provisions:

a. The contract be drawn for a fixed period, not to exceed one year, but subject to renewal in case both parties agree.

b. Either party should be permitted to terminate the contract at any time by giving one month’s notice. In order to protect the employing country from capricious actions by Japanese employees, we would favor including in the contract a wage-withholding plan which would place at least some portion of the cost of the repatriation of workers who wished to return home before their contracts expired upon the workers themselves.

c. The setting-up of some system of inspection to ensure that the Japanese workers are given the treatment called for in their contracts; and especially that they are not being detained against their wills. Possibly we should insist that SCAP, until such time as the Japanese Government resumes control of her foreign relations, be given authority to send or delegate representatives periodically to inspect the conditions of the men so recruited. In practice this should not prove too difficult as it could be done by the regular U.S. diplomatic corps in the countries in question. Another possible method of protection might be that of arranging periodic inspection by International Labor Office representatives who would report to SCAP directly.

In order to expedite action on this problem we are drawing up specific suggestions for the amendment of the draft SWNCC paper and will forward these to you for consideration by the China Committee²⁵ at an early meeting.

Cleon O. Swayzee

22. Addressed to General Hilldring; Arthur R. Ringwalt, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs; Hugh Borton, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs; and Melville H. Walker, Assistant Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development.
23. Vol. ii, p. 1105.
24. Ibid., p. 1104.
25. Mr. Ringwalt was Chairman of the Committee.