740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee
Subject: Draft Directive Regarding Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan.
With reference to the memorandum of March 12, 1947 from the Secretary of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee60 stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that the enclosed message dated March 10, 1947 from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, it is recommended that this message be referred to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee and that it not be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, for the following reasons:
- 1)
- The message is extremely critical of a policy decision duly passed by the Far Eastern Commission with the necessary affirmative vote [Page 375] of the United States Government. It is unlikely that the FEC would reconsider its action even if the United States Government were to reverse its own position by supporting General MacArthur’s views. Reference of the message to the FEC would serve only to create ill will within the Commission and harm relations between SCAP and FEC.
- 2)
- The points made in the SCAP
message were thoroughly considered by the United States
Government before decision to support the proposal was taken.
The following conclusions were reached:
- a)
- The reference in the policy decision to consultation with the Allied Council is worded in such a way as to prevent any alteration in the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council. The phrase as it now stands: “upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan”, does no more than recognize a fact, without broadening the Terms of Reference or permitting any consultation which is not already provided for.
- b)
- The Terms of Reference of the Allied Council provide that “He (SCAP) will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.” It is not believed that the wording of the FEC policy decision would as indicated in SCAP’s telegram, “impose upon the Supreme Commander the obligation to seek, and upon the Allied Council for Japan the obligation to give, technical advice concerning thousands of industrial plants ….” SCAP will still decide in each particular instance whether the matter is one of substance, and whether the exigencies of the situation permit. Only if his decision on both points is affirmative, is he obligated to consult the Council, and in any case, his decision is controlling.
- 3)
- The SWNCC has already approved the establishment of an Allied Technical Advisory Committee whose functions will be to advise SCAP on technical matters concerned with reparations. Thus the Allied Council will not be called upon for technical advice and its terms of reference will not be affected since even in the case of the Technical Advisory Committee, SCAP’s decisions will be controlling.
It is further believed that no reply to SCAP’s message is required for the following reasons:
1) General MacArthur’s message does not specifically request any action by the United States Government, 2) by now SCAP must have access to the minutes of the FEC meetings at which this subject was discussed, and 3) Ambassador Atcheson, who is thoroughly informed of the considerations which led to the U.S. Government decision, is now in Tokyo.
I therefore recommend that 1) the message not be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, 2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed of the foregoing considerations, and 3) no reply be made to the SCAP message.