740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 52
C 50730. Reurad W 93518 dated 9th [7th] March.53 Those provisions of the policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission which require consultation between the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council for Japan are violative of the terms of reference of the Moscow agreement and consequently entirely lacking in validity. They attempt to prescribe the detailed action of the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council, both of which are agencies independent of the Far Eastern Commission, in carrying out the provisions of their inherent responsibilities. They would arrogate to the Far Eastern Commission an authority which by the Moscow Agreement lies within the exclusive functions of other bodies. The Far Eastern Commission in itself cannot thus change the terms of reference of the Moscow Agreement which can only be altered by the formal agreement of the 4 governments concerned—not by the representatives appointed by them to serve on the Far Eastern Commission for the purpose of exercising its legitimate and prescribed functions.
Even if valid there would be imposed upon the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council for Japan an unrealistic burden rendering impossible the orderly implementation by the Supreme Commander of the policy decision in reference, in that it would impose upon the Supreme Commander the obligation to seek, and upon the Allied Council for Japan the obligation to give, technical advice concerning thousands of industrial plants for which neither individually nor collectively is there available to the Allied Council for Japan or its members the large technical staff essential to an intelligent approach to this vast problem; and even were the contrary true, many months of [Page 372] study would be required to make such technical advice possible—causing a delay in implementation which would defeat entirely the purpose of the directive. On the other hand, to require the Supreme Commander to seek and act upon the Allied Council’s non-technical advice upon so highly technical a subject, would be to make a mockery of his executive and the Allied Council’s consultative responsibility in the occupation of Japan.