894.50/8–1147

The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring)

Dear General Hilldring: I have read with care the paper on Unilateral Action on Japanese Economic Problems (SWNCC 380), a memorandum, with enclosures, submitted to SWNCC by the War Member. The paper, as you know, states that U.S. policies, after adoption by SWNCC, “frequently encounter lengthy delay before adoption as policy by the Far Eastern Commission.” The War Member is quoted as stating, “we must … no longer be balked by the FEC.” In his memorandum he says:

“I further believe it desirable for the United States to adopt the policy of exercising this power [of issuing Interim Directives to the Supreme Commander]44 whenever possible in the solution of economic problems presented by the occupation of Japan.”

In the draft paper, it is concluded:

c. In subsequent determinations of U.S. policy proposals, decisions and statements, there should be included a stipulation of a date by which time such proposal, decision, or statement shall be issued unilaterally by the U.S. Government to the SCAP for implementation should FEC approval thereof not be obtained by that date.”

I wish to submit for your consideration the following comments on this paper:

1.
The United States Government has frequently stated that it supports as a basic policy the principle of international cooperation; and that national action in accordance with this principle lays the foundation for international peace. In line with this policy the United States took the lead in establishing the Far Eastern Commission and in granting to it the authority to formulate the policies and principles in accordance with which Japan should fulfill its obligations under the Terms of Surrender. A clause in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission states that the United States may issue interim directives, but only in cases of urgency and pending action by the Commission.
2.
An international body, such as the Far Eastern Commission, normally reaches its conclusions more slowly than does a single state. The United States Government could make policy decisions much more quickly than the Far Eastern Commission. This delay, however, is the price which any state must pay for the recognized advantages of the policy of international cooperation.
3.
The assumption in the paper by the War Member of SWNCC that the Far Eastern Commission is under an obligation to approve within a few days, such as 21 days, United States policies submitted to it, when the United States Government has often taken months to determine these policies, is obviously inconsistent with the basic requirements of international cooperation.
4.
The Far Eastern Commission, despite delays, has passed some 45 policy decisions. The British acting representative on the FEC has commented that the Far Eastern Commission has accomplished more than any other international commission of which he has any knowledge. A number of these policy decisions have been approved within a relatively short period of time. Most of them have been based upon papers submitted by the United States and, in general, have been in accordance with them. The approval by eleven states of these U.S. policies is an asset for the United States of much importance in the Far East and helps to establish more firmly the principle of international cooperation.
5.
An international commission normally needs considerable time before it reaches a final policy decision on an important subject. After a paper is introduced the members must consult their respective Governments; the resulting views of the Governments have to be discussed by the representatives of other states; probably renewed requests for instructions are made; and finally a commission decision is reached.
Even the United States Government has often taken several months for the preparation of initial policy proposals for submission to the FEC. After U.S. members had requested working committees to postpone consideration of various subjects pending the presentation of U.S. policy proposals then under preparation, the U.S. Government has needed the following number of months to complete the papers: Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System, nearly five months; Zaibatsu Dissolution, six months; Interchange of Persons between Japan and other Countries, ten months. U.S. policy papers are overdue as follows: Agrarian Reform, seven months; Occupation Costs,45 nine months; Restitution of Looted Cultural Objects, nine months; and Japanese Patents, nine months.
6.
Such delays as have occurred within the FEC have been due to a number of causes, one of the most important of which has been the [Page 273] length of time needed by the U.S. Government to determine or to reformulate its own position. A few instances may be cited as typical.
[Here follow six instances of delays, and causes of each.]
7.
Long delays have occasionally taken place in Japan in executing directives which have been sent to SCAP as matters of urgency. The only important U.S. Interim Directive under the Commission’s Terms of Reference, on Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations, was issued on April 4, 1947. It provided for immediate delivery of advance reparations to the states named in the directive. After four months no article has been delivered as reparations. The FEC policy decision on Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan was passed on February 20, 1947. Although its adoption by the FEC was pressed as a matter of urgent importance, it has not yet been put into effect.
8.
These instances of delay are cited in no spirit of criticism of my own Government. I am calling them to your attention to show that if the U.S., with its stores of information, its personnel in all important positions, and its earnest desire for speed in completing the occupation of Japan, needs, sometimes, months for the formulation, revision and execution of its policies in regard to Japan, the Far Eastern Commission, composed of eleven states, obviously needs much time too.
9.
In conclusion, I recognize that a situation may arise in which it may be advisable for the U.S. Government to issue an interim directive to SCAP as a matter of genuine urgency and as a last resort after protracted discussion in the Far Eastern Commission has made it apparent that no prospect exists of an agreement on a policy decision. However, I cannot agree with the recommendation of the War Member of SWNCC that the U.S. Government should issue interim directives as a normal procedure in economic matters and that it should give the Far Eastern Commission a specified and limited number of days in which to approve U.S. policy proposals under the threat of the issuance of a U.S. directive if the dead line is passed. The recommendation, if carried out, would antagonize the other states on the Far Eastern Commission; it would violate the spirit and probably the letter of the Terms of Reference of the Commission, to which the U.S. is a party; and above all it would be inconsistent with a basic policy of the United States and my own instructions: to support the principle of International Cooperation.46

Sincerely yours,

Frank R. McCoy
  1. Brackets appear in the original letter.
  2. The FEO by a decision on August 7 approved a policy on disposition of funds covering fines collected by Allied military occupation courts; a directive, based on this decision, was sent as serial 86, August 12, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, and a copy was sent the FEC by the Department on August 21. For text of the decision, see The Far Eastern Commission, p. 42.
  3. General Hilldring replied on August 15 that he was in full agreement that the War Department proposal was neither necessary nor consistent with the implementation, in the FEC, of the principle of international cooperation, and enclosed a copy of his memorandum of August 7 (not printed), proposing a procedure which would permit consideration of the time factor without setting deadlines for issuing interim directives (894.50/8–1147).