851G.00/12–3047
The Consul General at Hong Kong (Hopper) to the Secretary of State
No. 450
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that on December 24, 1947, I received a visit from Mr. Ngo-Dinh-Giem24 of Saigon, who stated that he had come to Hong Kong for the purpose of consulting with Bao Dai, ex-Emperor of Annam, and that while in this city he wished to talk with me about conditions in Indo-China. Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated that he knew Mr. Charles S. Reed, American Consul at Saigon, and understood that I was a friend of Mr. Reed. I may state that on December 18, I received a telegram from Mr. Reed to the effect that Ngo-Dinh-Giem was coming to Hong Kong to see Bao Dai, and that he might call on me while here.
Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated at the outset of our interview that while he was aware that my duties did not concern affairs in Indo-China he wished to take advantage of his visit to Hong Kong to talk with me and to let me know his views concerning the protracted negotiations which French authorities have been conducting with Bao Dai and other political groups in his country in an effort to put an end to the strife and to set up a stable government.
Ngo-Dinh-Giem impressed me as a nervous young man of about forty years of age, but who was very serious in his desire to help to [Page 153] solve the impasse prevailing at present in the above negotiations. He was suffering from a bad cold, but spoke fairly good French, as he did not desire that an interpreter or third party be present during our interview. He stated that he believed it to be in the interest of his cause that American officials everywhere be fully informed as to developments. I replied that I would be only too glad to learn his views.
Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated that Bao Dai had sent for him in order to have reliable and current information on present conditions in Indo-China as both of them had found that due to strict censorship in Indo-China on communications of all kinds it was very difficult to communicate with Hong Kong and other places, particularly on subjects of a political nature. As the Department is probably aware, Bao Dai left Hong Kong on December 24 for Europe to join his family in Switzerland, I am informed.
Ngo-Dinh-Giem asked me if I had followed the course of negotiations in Hong Kong among various political groups from Saigon within recent weeks. I replied that at first I attempted to keep informed but that as the conference dragged for weeks without any apparent result, I had to curtail my interest due to pressure of work, but that I naturally read with deep interest the daily press reports on the progress of the conferences. (As a matter of fact I have forwarded Hong Kong press articles, and other notes obtained from various sources, to Consul Reed at Saigon, in view of French censorship of mails entering that country.)
Ngo-Dinh-Giem gave me his opinion of the terms of the offer submitted some time ago by the French Government to Bao Dai and to the political groups in Indo-China. In brief Ngo-Dinh-Giem considered the terms of the proposal as falling far short of real independence, which is the ultimate desire of his people; he stated that the Bollaert offer was entirely unacceptable to his chief, Bao Dai, but he then stated that Bao Dai was a poor man without resources with which to conduct a political campaign. I gathered the impression at this point that Ngo-Dinh-Giem was worried lest Bao Dai might accept the French offer for personal and financial reasons, plus his desire to regain his throne as emperor of Annam. Ngo-Dinh-Giem claimed that he was an old friend of Bao Dai, had served as his Prime Minister in former years, and that their families enjoyed close relations. He said that when Bao Dai left Hong Kong he suggested that if Ngo-Dinh-Giem found conditions ripe upon his return to Saigon he might go ahead and attempt to form a government within the framework of the French proposal, with as many amendments as possible in order to satisfy nationalistic aspirations. When I asked Ngo-Dinh-Giem if [Page 154] this meant that Bao Dai intended to accede to the French terms regardless of public opinion in his country, he replied: “I hope not as it would mean continued slavery for my people.” He then said that an outright refusal to accept the French offer might result in continued strife in Indo-China. He said that even though a compromise solution may be reached with the French they still had the Communist group to reckon with; and that this group seemed well supplied with money and arms, and had received much help from “foreign sources”. He feared that if an agreement was reached with the French that the latter would expect the newly organized government to assume most of the burden of exterminating the Communists, as the French were “getting fed up” with fighting and the continued losses which they have suffered. I might observe at this point that the French Consul in Hong Kong, M. Jobez, had remarked to me some time ago that he thought that French authorities would be only too pleased to turn over the job of fighting Communists in Indo-China to any newly organized native government, as the present guerrilla style of warfare was something the French did not relish, and had proved very costly in men and material.
Ngo-Dinh-Giem spoke then of the sad state of the economy of his country; that the French had for many years exploited the riches of Indo-China, without giving much in return; that although the French realised that they could no longer continue exploitation in such highhanded manner as before they had no intention of turning over the resources of Indo-China to all comers, and that they would never agree to an “Open Door” principle. Ngo-Dinh-Giem then stated that the only hope for his country, if it ever expected to escape from French domination, is to enlist the sympathy and support of the other great democracies and that the United States was in best position to extend the needed aid. I then realised that my visitor was approaching the actual purpose of his interview, and that he was appealing to me as an American official to use my influence in his behalf. He spoke of how we had extended moral and financial aid to other “small oppressed countries” in order to prevent their exploitation by a great power, and, more recently, to prevent the spread of Communism. I refrained from expressing any opinion on these statements of my visitor, but asked him if the majority of the people of Indo-China were united in their efforts to reach an agreement with the French. He hesitated before replying, but finally stated that he “thought that unity might be reached were it not for the Communist element”.
The opinion of Ngo-Dinh-Giem may be summarized as follows:
- 1.
- That the French offer made sometime ago falls short of native aspirations in that the French wish to retain control of foreign [Page 155] relations and defense (meaning retention of troops in the country).
- 2.
- That the French do not honestly intend to relinquish control of the economy of Indo-China, but expect to keep it within the “French Union”.
- 3.
- That Bao Dai may weaken and be more directly under French influence, as he naturally desires to revive his dynasty and lead his people into better days.
- 4.
- That any native government must look to outside sources for means to exist—at least for a few years.
- 5.
- That the Communist danger is very evident, and that any seizure of power in France by the Communist Party would result in similar action in Indo-China.
- 6.
- That continued resistance to French proposals to join the “French Union” will only make matters worse in Indo-China, and will not improve the tragic condition of the people, with increasing numbers turning to Communism.
- 7.
- Finally, that only concerted representations by other great powers will cause the French to agree to more acceptable terms for the formation of a local government, and that such a new government must obtain financial aid from abroad until such time when it can stand upon its own feet.
Respectfully yours,
- Usually known as Ngo Dinh Diem.↩