Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/12–347: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

secret

Washington, December 26, 1947—5 p. m.

1695. For Tuck. Re statements made by King Farouk as reported urtel 1387 Dec 3. Unless you see some reason for not so doing please seek immediate audience with King and inform him you have been instructed by the President to discuss with him informally and orally problem of Palestine partition. During your discussion you should adopt following line:

1. US Govt decided after anxious and sober consideration to support partition in the UNGA despite realization of how strongly opposed Arab States were to establishment of Jewish state in Palestine. Its support of partition was not motivated by any unfriendliness towards Arabs or lack of appreciation of their concern in matter. US Govt took position because:

(a) After reviewing statements and expressions of policy by responsible American officials, resolutions of Congress, and Party platforms of last thirty years it came to conclusion that unless there was some unanticipated factor in situation the trend of public opinion and policy based thereon practically forced it to support partition.

(b) Majority Report of UNSCOP recommending partition did represent new factor but one supporting Jewish state.

(c) Public opinion in US stirred by mistreatment of Jews in Europe and by intense desire of surviving Jews to go to Palestine strongly supported establishment of Jewish state.

(d) Troubled situation in Palestine accompanied by British decision to withdraw made it evident that solution of this difficult problem could not be postponed.

2. US Govt concerned re Palestine problem and sincerely desired fair solution. It therefore welcomed presentation to UN and earnestly and sincerely worked for impartial UNGA Committee with broad terms of reference to examine problem. At no time did Amer Govt directly or indirectly endeavor to influence recommendations of UNSCOP. It desired UNSCOP to approach matter in impartial way and work out solution of Palestine problem which would have overwhelming support of world opinion as one which was fair and workable.

3. US Govt in deciding to support Majority Report of UNSCOP at UNGA took position that it should not use its power and influence in prevailing upon other countries against their will to support Majority Report. US delegation was instructed that it should explain US reasons for supporting Majority Report but should not exert pressure on other delegations. So far as US Govt has determined no undue pressure was brought upon other countries by US Governmental officials responsible to Executive. Statements have been made that pressure was brought by Amer private citizens and by Americans holding official positions over whom Exec Branch of Govt had no control. It is impossible to determine definitely whether such pressure if it was applied changed any appreciable number of votes. In any event it is considered that the vote of the UNGA reflected the belief that partition was best of the solutions of the Palestine problem which were advanced.

4. It is understood that one of the reasons for Arab resentment at the UNGA decision is concern lest the Zionists intend eventually to use their state as a base for territorial expansion in the Middle East at the expense of the Arabs. It is the conviction of the United States Government, based on conversations with responsible Zionist leaders, that they have no expansionist designs and that they are most anxious to live with the Arabs in the future on cordial terms and to establish with them relations of a mutually advantageous character. If at a later time persons or groups should obtain control of the Jewish State who have aggressive designs against their neighbors, the United States would be prepared firmly to oppose such aggressiveness in the United Nations and before world opinion.

5. The United States Government, prompted by the friendliest feelings for the Arab Governments and for the Arab peoples, expresses the most sincere hope that in their disappointment and resentment at the decision of UNGA, the Governments of the Arab countries will not attempt by armed force, or will not encourage the use of armed force, to prevent the carrying out of that decision. It is my own hope that Egypt, possessed of a sense of responsibility derived from long experience in world affairs, not only will set an example in restraint, but will use its great influence with its sister states to prevail upon them not to resort to actions of a character which may bring discredit to the Arab people, undermine the present order of the whole Middle East, and eventually lead to a world conflict in which the peoples of the Middle East may be the most tragic sufferers.

6. It seems hardly necessary to point out that there are in the world today powerful aggressive forces which create hatreds, promote violence, and result in chaos. It would be tragic if the forces striving for an orderly, peaceful and prosperous world should at this juncture allow themselves to be disrupted over the question of Palestine.

7. There is a mutual need for friendly political and economic cooperation between the United States and the countries of the Middle East. If there is to be a real sense of security as well as a developing prosperity in that area, the countries of the Middle East and those non-Middle Eastern powers who sincerely desire the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to be applied to that area in the Interest both of the Middle Eastern people and of world security must work with cordiality and mutual trust. If the problem of Palestine, which has long been a source of suspicion and uneasiness could once and for all he eliminated, the United States Government can see no obstacles to the attainment of the cooperation so vital to all of us. It is the conviction of the United States Government that acquiescence on the part of the Arab States in the UNGA decision on Palestine, difficult though such acquiescence may be, would remove Palestine as a disturbing influence in international affairs.¹

Lovett

1. Telegram 1695 was initialed by President Truman.