CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 104: Anglo-US-French Conversations
British Memorandum of Conversation1
Anglo-American Conversations
Mr. Marshall paid a farewell call on the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office at 6 p. m. on December 17th. The situation resulting from the breakdown of the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and other subjects concerning Anglo-American relations were discussed in a conversation lasting 1¼ hours.
Arab Reactions to the General Assembly’s Decision on Palestine.
The Secretary of State explained that Arab reactions had been even worse than we had expected. We were getting in reports from all over the Middle East, which were disturbing. He wished to tell Mr. Marshall in confidence that he was proposing to get along various Arab representatives [Page 1313] to London one by one in order to steady them. The situation might blow up throughout the Middle East with serious reactions on the Americans as well as ourselves. He was himself convinced that the Soviet Union had supported partition in order to cause a general mix up, from which they would profit when the Jews and Arabs began to fight. He thought that if and when the Russians intervened, it would not be in Palestine itself but in Iraq. He was anxious about the position of 100,000 Jews in Bagdad and of others in other places in the Middle East. They would not be the victims of war but would risk having their throats cut.
Mr. Marshall said he had not had many reports yet. He had heard the situation was serious but had not thought it was as bad as the Secretary of State had said. The American representative[s] in the Middle East countries were of course disturbed and he would keep a careful watch.
The Secretary of State said that Mr. Marshall ought to know that some Arabs, including Nuri Pasha, whom he had recently seen in London, alleged that after Mr. Marshall had left America pressure had been put on many members of the United Nations, especially the Latin America countries, to vote for partition.
Mr. Marshall said that the position was very difficult. The Arabs also had been bringing pressure to bear everywhere. He had tried to stop this, although the Latin American countries had asked the Americans for a lead, he had refused to give it. He had taken a similar line over elections to the Security Council. He felt it was better in the long run not to intervene. He had given his people instructions accordingly over Palestine, and he had the greatest confidence in General Hilldring, who was handling this and who, he was absolutely sure, would handle it with very clean hands.
- This memorandum was prepared by Frank Roberts, Personal Secretary to Mr. Bevin, and copies were given to Ambassador Douglas; see footnote 30, vol. ii, p. 822.↩