867N.01/12–1147
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)1
| Participants: | Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister |
| Mr. Chorbachi, Iraqi Chargé d’Affaires | |
| Mr. Henderson, NEA | |
| Mr. Colquitt, NE |
Dr. Jamali called on Mr. Henderson on December 4 to pay his respects and to discuss with him the Palestine problem as it appeared following the UN decision in favor of partition. There were now two principal fears in his mind, Dr. Jamali said, namely, the possibility of armed conflict between Arabs and Americans, and the possibility of Soviet troops gaining a foothold in Palestine from which it might prove impossible to dislodge them. In the latter connection he referred to press reports of a statement by an un-named American military authority expressing fear of such military penetration of the Mediterranean by the Soviets through the opportunity presented by Palestine. Dr. Jamali felt that the seriousness of the situation made it essential that thought be given by those truly interested in preserving Arab-American amity—such as Mr. Henderson and himself—to some constructive solution of the problem before matters progressed so far that it would be too late to prevent a catastrophe.
Dr. Jamali commented that the Arab delegations felt badly disillusioned by the UN’s handling of the Palestine case, which they considered a gross injustice. Not only have the American delegation used pressure on other delegations, but even Dr. Evatt, the Australian chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had been strongly opposed to the Arabs and had been observed canvassing for partition votes. Dr. Jamali said he could not understand why the last-minute Arab proposal for delay in the hope of achieving conciliation had been rejected.
The situation had now deteriorated so badly, Dr. Jamali reiterated that some means must be found out of the impasse. It was his personal belief that the problem should eventually be brought before the Security Council as a situation constituting a threat to peace, that the SC should pass the dispute on to the Assembly for conciliation, and that the Arabs should then propose cantonization as the basis for the future of Palestine.
In answer to Dr. Jamali’s inquiry as to whether he thought a solution might eventually be achieved by this course, Mr. Henderson replied [Page 1311] that he did not think it could be. Mr. Henderson stated that it would be misleading to hold out any such hope: the US had determined its policy of supporting partition after long and careful consideration, with full realization of the seriousness of the decision, and that the decision was final and would undoubtedly be adhered to. Mr. Henderson thought that the Arabs were mistaken if they thought that through bloodshed they could gain a reconsideration of the problem in UN. The use of violence would probably be regarded as coercion and would be resisted by the US. The only solution that he could think of, Mr. Henderson said, was for the Arabs to accept the UN Partition Plan; otherwise, he could see no way of breaking the impasse.
Dr. Jamali replied that the UN Partition Plan would never be accepted by the Arabs and that they would die in defense of their rights rather than accede to it. The world had not believed the Arabs when they had said they would give their lives to prevent the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, but now it would see the Arabs meant what they said.
Concluding, Dr. Jamali said that although the situation was very gloomy and that he feared a possible Arab-American clash, he felt that every effort must be given to thinking out a means of solving the problem while there was still time. Iraq wanted America’s friendship, he said, and needed its help in implementing its plans for national development. Some means must be found to preserve that amity through removal of the friction caused by the Palestine problem.
Mr. Henderson assured Dr. Jamali that the US was equally anxious to preserve Arab-American friendship. As for the Palestine issue, however, he could see no other solution than the acceptance by the Arabs of the UN solution.
- Drafted by Mr. Colquitt.↩