Editorial Notes
The minutes of the meeting of Acting Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, held on March 19, 1947, stated in part: “Mr. Patterson said that he believes that some statement should be made setting forth the U.S. position why the UN was not used in our approach to the Greek-Turkish problems, and that we should explain to the UN, as well as to the public, that our action was necessary to supplement the purposes of the Charter of UN and also because of the inability of the UN to act in such a situation. Mr. Acheson said that our position in this connection had been discussed in detail with Senator Vandenberg and that in fact a letter had been drafted to the Secretary General of UN but after much consideration it had been determined not to send the letter because it was thought that it would only confuse the issue in the UN, and that any statement might be regarded by the Russians as a challenge . . . . [Page 127] Mr. Acheson said that we might as well face the fact that. UN will not settle problems of this type and that it is impossible for the UN to intervene in cases involving subversive movements.” (868.00/3–1947)
Ambassador Austin, in a statement before the Security Council on March 28, expressed his “belief that the proposed United States programme of assistance to Greece and Turkey, together with effective action by the Security Council in the case of the northern Greek frontiers, would materially advance the cause of peace.” He stated also: “The United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy, and it desires and welcomes corresponding interest and support from other members of the United Nations. We look forward to the time when such burdens may be carried through the United Nations. Therefore it is important that the United Nations should take an active interest in all that is required for the re-establishment of stability, to discourage and prevent threats of aggression of any kind, or threats to the independence of a fellow Member, and to afford its people an opportunity to enhance its welfare and dignity.” (United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 30, pages 622, 624.)
Two bills to provide aid to Greece and Turkey, H.R. 2616 and S. 938, were introduced into the first session of the Eightieth Congress. Messrs. Acheson, Clayton and Porter testified on the former measure before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 20, 24 and 28, respectively; Messrs. Acheson and Clayton testified on the latter measure before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 24 and 25, respectively. Their testimony is printed on pages 1, 63 and 123 of the House hearings and on pages 4 and 63 of the Senate hearings and also in Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947, Supplement, page 835.
S. 938, as amended, was enacted into law on May 22, 1947. An undated analysis of the bill, prepared in the Department of State, stated in part: “The pending bill (S–938) contains provisions regarding procurement, accounting and administration at the Washington end which appear to envisage an operation similar to that of Lend Lease.
“The President is authorized to grant assistance [not to exceed $400,000,000] ‘upon terms and conditions determined by him’. The money is to be appropriated by Congress but the bill calls for interim advances [not to exceed $100,000,000] by RFC (a device apparently calculated to make unnecessary the delay involved in the more usual authorization statute followed by an appropriation act). The President is authorized (Section 5) to exercise his authority through ‘such [Page 128] Department, agency, independent establishment, or officer of the Government as he shall direct’. While presumably this means that he may delegate the operations to a single entity, it may also be presumed that it is contemplated under the authority of this section to use multiple agencies for particular purposes and to do so by way of subdelegation. In other words, if the Secretary of State is delegated to coordinate for the President, the Secretary in turn would exercise procurement through the Treasury, engineering through the Army or the Interior Department, etc. This conclusion is supported by the provisions of Section 2(d) (II).
“The duties of the Washington back-stop organization seem to be primarily those of planning, organizing and reporting . . . .
“The problem is even more important, having in mind the success of the project, from the Athens end. Section 3 of the bill sets forth conditions which must be met by the Greeks. These conditions are to be set forth by an agreement, and the subject matter of the agreement is so crucial to the purpose and therefore the success of the program that it must necessarily occupy a major position in the American Mission. It is provided that the government in question shall agree (a) to permit free access of United States Government officials for the purpose of determining whether there is effective utilization of assistance in accordance with the undertakings of the Government; (b) to permit press and radio representatives to observe and report freely; (c) not to dispose, without authorization, of assistance received from the United States; (d) to provide for the security of the assistance received; (e) to repay only out of other funds.
“Section 1 leaves a wide scope for additional conditions: ‘The terms and conditions determined by’ the President under Section 1 would presumably also include the withdrawal or termination of assistance in whole or in part for failure to observe these conditions. Under this Section is the authority for exacting undertakings.” (868.00/3–2847)