740.00119 Council/12–647: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
us urgent
Martel 40. For Lovett from the Secretary. At a meeting with Bevin Thursday morning, at which Douglas and Dixon, Bevin’s secretary, were present, the following matters were discussed:
- 1.
- Middle East
- 2.
- Austrian Treaty
- 3.
- Tactics toward Germany
- 4.
- Palestine
I shall comment on each separately, as follows:
1. Middle East.
Memorandum being mailed.1
[Here follow comments on Numbers 2 and 3; for texts, see volume II, pages 750 and 751.]
4. Palestine
Bevin handed me an informal note2 on the plans and intentions of H.M.G. regarding the transfer of power in Palestine. He added that it should not be supposed that the withdrawal of the British administration and forces was an easy matter.
Various arrangements had to be made and they had to make provision for British assets in the country. He laid particular stress on the importance of stopping any further illegal immigration. It was bound to lead to bloodshed, since the Arabs would undoubtedly be incited to massacre the Jews, and the situation might then require the use of force. The US Government might then find themselves required to provide forces and the Soviet Government might press to provide a force. Would the US Government like this? I admitted that the [Page 1302] greatest fear of the US military authorities in regard to the question was the presence of a Russian force in Palestine. Bevin, continuing, said that if on the other hand Jewish immigration ceased until they were ready to hand over the administration to the United Nations commission in May, it would be possible to proceed in an orderly way. They should then hope to be able to introduce into Palestine the illegal immigrants now in Cyprus, numbering nearly 30,000, and they might also be able to provide a port on the Palestine coast for the introduction of legal immigrants after the taking over by the U.N. commission. They should also be able, in the period between now and May, to stop the infiltration of Jews across the frontiers. Bevin considered that it was not safe to leave this situation to the UN commission, but an understanding regarding the problems of the transfer of power was required between the US Government and H.M.G.
I said that I could not believe that the Jews would any longer proceed with illegal immigration, since it must be a dead loss to them and would be of no pressure value.
Bevin questioned this. He had no confidence in the Jewish Agency, to whom illegal immigration would still seem to have a pressure value; their object would be to cause incidents and keep their cause alive. He urged that the US Government should restrain the Jewish Agency from these courses and if possible arrange for some public announcement, condemning illegal immigration and urging the Jews to remain patient. Such a step would incidentally steady the Arabs.
I said I would send a message to Washington in the general sense advocated by Bevin. I remarked that the Zionists would be unwilling to make any statement regarding illegal immigration which would imply any responsibility for it on their part.3