Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/11–2547: Telegram

The Secretary of State ¹ to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

London, November 25, 1947—8 p. m.

Martel 6. Eyes only for Lovett from Marshall. Last night Douglas and I had dinner with Bevin. Alexander² and their two wives and Sir Edmund Hall-Patch³ were present. After dinner Bevin discussed a number of questions with us.

The first was Palestine. He took exception to Herschel Johnson’s statement of the day before implying criticism of the British attitude regarding their troops in Palestine, informed us that he had directed his delegate to abstain in the voting. He summarized the British position rather elaborately stating that the unanimous political reaction in Great Britain was against the Jewish influence in Palestine and that it stemmed directly from the execution of the two British sergeants which would never be forgotten; that the anti-Jewish feeling in England now was greater than it had been in a hundred years. He stated further that, mentioning Pakistan, the British Government could not possibly be committed to a position which might involve military action against the Arabs.

He referred to the Jewish influence from the United States making impossible his efforts to successfully solve the difficulty prior to its reference to the United Nations. He referred to Balfour’s declaration for Jewish home rather than Jewish state, stated that he had had thorough legal advice that the declaration did not commit British Government to development of Jewish state, characterized the declaration as an unfortunate error and outlined the good faith in which he insisted Great Britain had conducted its mandate obligations. He stated that British information indicated that Jewish groups moving from the Balkan states to Palestine illegally contained many indoctrinated Communists which presented a serious threat to Middle East stability.

Douglas questioned whether or not information regarding Communist infiltration was reasonably authenticated and Bevin replied that they were so informed.

I made no answer to his various statements other than to say that I had sympathy for the British in their difficulties in Palestine and under the pressures of the American Jew; that I felt the issue must be settled without further delays or it would result in a much more serious situation in the Middle East; that I hoped the United Nations would find an agreed settlement and that the British position would not render such a conclusion impossible.

Bevin had previously asked me if I had read the papers resulting from the British-American discussions of the Middle East⁴ and what action had we taken. He was informed that I had read them and that they had been forwarded to the National Security Council and that favorable action had been recommended by the Council to the British. In the previous discussion I referred to Bevin’s view that this pending Middle East agreement was of great importance, and that therefore the prompt settlement of the Palestine matter was of equal importance preliminary thereto.⁵

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Palestine.]

Marshall

1. The Secretary of State was participating in the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at London from November 25 to December 15.
2. Presumably Albert V. Alexander, British Minister of Defence.
3. Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
4. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 485 ff.
5. Referring to this paragraph in telegram Telmar 6, November 26, 1 p. m., to London, the Acting Secretary of State informed Secretary Marshall as follows: “For sake of accuracy National Security Council recommendation was made to President not to British. Note use of word ‘agreement’. We have taken great pains to make it abundantly clear to all concerned that no agreement is involved. Conversations represented merely exchange of views. Documents emanating from conversations were proposed statements of respective policies subject to confirmation. It was understood that these statements even after approval could not be considered as agreements; that no obligations were taken; and the policies outlined were subject to change to meet new conditions.” (867N.01/11–2547)