501.BB Palestine/11–2547
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Pursuant to your request this morning SPA desires to submit the following background information with regard to the United States position on implementing any United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine:
The original basic instruction to the Delegation,1 as approved by the Secretary of State, required that the Delegation, in dealing with the Palestine question, be guided, among other basic objectives, with the requirement
“to implement the United States position on the Palestine question, as set forth below, by methods best calculated to safeguard the strategic, economic, and political interests of the United States in the Near East.
“to achieve a United Nations recommendation regarding the Palestine problem and, to this end, to implement the United States position in such a way that the final recommendation of the General Assembly cannot be regarded as an ‘American plan’”.
When the President approved the Delegation’s proposed statement on Palestine with regard to the question of implementation the President, as set forth in the Department’s Top Secret telegram No. 461 of October 9, 19472 to the Delegation in New York
“emphasized that the Delegation must make no commitment for the use of United States troops in Palestine except as a part of United Nations action. Similarly any United States economic assistance would have to be our share in a general United Nations program. We do not wish in any sense to replace the British in Palestine nor to accept unilateral responsibility.”
When the United States statement of position on Palestine was made by Ambassador Herschel Johnson before the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on October 11, 1947, Ambassador Johnson said that
“The United States Government was willing to participate in any United Nations plan designed to assist the parties involved to establish a workable political settlement in Palestine. He had in mind assistance through the United Nations in meeting economic and financial [Page 1286] problems and also the problem of internal law and order during the transition period. The latter problem might require the establishment of a special constabulary or police force recruited on a volunteer basis by the United Nations. He would not refer to the possibility of violation by any member of the United Nations of its obligation to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force, since he assumed that the Charter would be observed.”3
Pursuant to these basic instructions the Delegation has continuously made it clear that in the first place it felt strongly that the United Kingdom could not divest itself of its responsibility at least materially to assist the United Nations in the carrying out of whatever plan for Palestine was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Likewise consistent with these basic instructions the United States Delegation has throughout the Palestine debate during the past two months insisted that United States participation in implementation would only be as a part of a broad United Nations endeavor directed to this end.
It was pursuant to these broad basic instructions that Ambassador Johnson, on the evening of November 22, made the following statement:
“Furthermore, references have been made to the attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council. My Government has authorized the Delegation of the United States at the General Assembly to support the Report of Subcommittee 1. That report brings the Security Council into the picture. It makes the Security Council responsible certainly for the security elements involved in this implementation program. The Security Council may send instructions to the Commission. The Security Council may receive a request from the Commission for appropriate instructions. Certainly if the situation would fall under the proper clauses of the Charter, Chapter VI or VII, the Security Council will be seized of the question and my Government will perform its duty under the Charter along with other members of the United Nations in carrying out the decision of the Security Council in such a case.
“This is the situation, it seems to me, where we should grasp the nettle and go ahead. This is not something to be afraid of. If we drop it and let it go it will be worse next year than it is now. The time now is for decision and work out the inequities later on. The United Nations machinery is quite sufficient for that purpose if we can just make up our minds to move now.”
No comment would seem to be necessary on the foregoing portion of Ambassador Johnson’s speech other than to point out that, when he said “my Government will perform its duty under the Charter along with other Members of the United Nations in carrying out the decision of the Security Council in such a case”, this statement by no means [Page 1287] implied that the United States would necessarily send troops to Palestine. The United States Representative went no further than to reaffirm under his basic instructions the readiness of the United States to assume the responsibility which it shares equally with the other ten members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.