501.A Summaries/11–2147: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1243.
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In the afternoon,1 Cadogan declared that the UK had not deviated, “and cannot deviate,” from the position announced by Creech Jones, “and my task today is simply to apply the general principles contained” in that statement “to the specific proposals which are now before you.” He restated these principles[:] refusal to play a major part in implementation of a scheme not acceptable to both Arabs and [Page 1274] Jews; but without wishing to impede implementation of a recommendation approved by the GA.
The UK has assumed, he said, “that the Assembly, in drawing up its proposals, would take full account of the risk of strife in Palestine and of the need to provide means of filling the gap in the process of enforcement” left by the UK’s decision “that its troops could not be used as the instrument of the UN for this purpose.” Feeling bound to make clear the extent to which the role assigned the UK by the Subcommittee was compatible with the UK’s declared intentions, he said the transitional period, as defined by the Subcommittee, “may begin in a few days’ time.” The Subcommittee’s proposal that the commission be entrusted with authority in the transitional period was sure to create confusion and disorder because it would mean establishment of “an authority which would operate concurrently with the existing mandatory administration.” He was therefore instructed to leave “no doubt that, so long as my government continues to hold the mandate for Palestine, they must insist upon their undivided control of that country.”
“I should at once make it no less clear,” he went on, “that my government have every right to relinquish the mandate at a very early date. In determining this date, they will certainly give proper consideration to such arrangements as may have been made by the UN for the establishment of a provisional regime to succeed the mandate.” He added, however, that “there is no reasonable basis for the suggestion that my government must await the approval of the SC” before exercising their right to lay down the mandate. Regarding the Subcommittee’s recommendation of “a progressive transfer” from the UK to the provisional councils and the joint economic board of responsibility for governmental functions, Cadogan declared that “the transfer of authority by the Palestine Government directly to councils of government or any other local representatives under a scheme of partition would in practice amount to the implementation of this scheme” by the UK, “which, failing Arab-Jewish agreement, they are not prepared to undertake.” “If a scheme of partition were approved and a UN Commission set up as proposed in the Subcommittee’s report,” Cadogan stressed, “it would be to this commission that the Palestine Government would, when the time came, hand over its authority. The commission could then transfer authority to appropriate bodies.”
Within the zones in which British troops would remain pending final withdrawal, the paramount concern of British authorities would be to expedite withdrawal; therefore, they would have to maintain order, prevent sabotage, etc. “They will in no circumstance allow their forces to be used for the attainment of any other purpose.” Cadogan repeated [Page 1275] that it was the UK’s objective to withdraw the last British forces “as speedily as possible.”
If the object of the Subcommittee’s provision about SC approval was to see that there was no delay in British departure, Cadogan assured the Committee that this was the identical purpose of the UK. It intended to move “as quickly as is practicable”; and it feared that “if other parties must participate in determining the date of our departure, there may be unnecessary delays.” He assured the Committee “we shall endeavor to keep the UN commission informed beforehand of our intentions regarding the stages of our withdrawal.”
Summarizing the UK’s intentions, Cadogan said the UK “will in due course announce a date upon which the British civil administration will be considered at an end. After that date, apart from those British authorities who will be exercising strictly limited functions in certain areas, there will be no regularly constituted authority unless the UN can fill the gap. It is for the Committee to recommend in what way this gap can be effectively filled. If the problem is solved there should be no great difficulty in making arrangements consequent upon the subsequent stages of our military retirement from the country.”
Regarding Subcommittee 2’s report, Cadogan said that UK policy would preclude it equally from playing the part assigned to it in the plan for a “unitary Palestine.” Subcommittee 2 had not decided to establish a commission, he noted. If the GA decided on such a commission to carry out the unitary plan, the UK attitude would be the same as toward the commission contemplated by Subcommittee 1. Without such a commission, the UK would inevitably be drawn into major participation in implementing a plan which would not command general consent in Palestine. Therefore, if the GA were to adopt the unitary plan, the UK would carry out withdrawal without assuming any responsibility for establishment of a new regime. In this case, also, a gap would be left between withdrawal and the recommendations as they now stood.
Pruszynski said the UK statement had not made the Committee’s task any easier. Since this declaration might have changed the situation, he suggested adjournment to give delegates a chance to consult their governments. Pearson asked (1) whether the date of ending of civil administration mentioned by Cadogan would be the same as the date of the termination of the mandate; and (2) whether the UK intended that the date of the termination of the mandate would be prior to the date of progressive troop withdrawal. Cadogan replied in the affirmative to the first question; in regard to the second, he said it might be assumed that the mandate would be terminated early during the troop withdrawal, or possibly even before withdrawal began. Evatt [Page 1276] inquired about “when the time comes,” asking whether that meant when the mandate had been terminated and civil administration concurrently established. Cadogan said the time mentioned could not be before termination of the mandate, and he supposed it would be after completion of withdrawal. The UK, he added, would retain full authority so long as it was the mandatory. There would be no British civil authority after the mandate had been terminated, but the UK would retain military authority in the areas where it was still withdrawing.2
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