IO Files: US/A/AC.14/153
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins
| Participants: | Sir Alexander Cadogan, United Kingdom Delegation |
| Mr. Lester B. Pearson, United Kingdom [Canadian] Delegation | |
| Ambassador Herschel Johnson, United States Delegation | |
| General John Hilldring, United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Wilkins, United States Delegation |
Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring called on Sir Alexander Cadogan this morning at Mr. Pearson’s suite at The Biltmore. Mr. Pearson was also present. This meeting had been arranged at Ambassador Johnson’s request for the purpose of discussing with Sir Alexander Cadogan recent developments at the United Nations respecting the Palestine question and for the purpose of ascertaining, if possible, to what extent the British authorities in Palestine would be willing to cooperate in Palestine during the period prior to independence.
Mr. Pearson commenced the conversation by outlining the present situation in Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine. Mr. Pearson pointed out that this Subcommittee had been charged with the task of drawing up a plan for the partition of Palestine based on the majority plan of UNSCOP. Mr. Pearson explained that the vital part of this plan—its implementation—had been under discussion during the past few days in a working group of Subcommittee 1 consisting of the representatives of the United States, Soviet Russia, Guatemala and Canada. It was explained that the representatives of these four states had met as each of them had advanced suggestions regarding implementation.
Mr. Pearson observed that the United States plan provided for implementation during the period preceding the suggested date of July 1, 1948 by the United Kingdom with the advice and assistance of a United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly; that the Russian plan provided for the termination of the mandate on January 1, 1948, implementation by the Security Council and a United Nations Commission appointed by the Security Council reflecting the same membership as the Security Council and independence for the Jewish and Arab States on January 1, 1949; that the Guatemalan plan provided for a United Nations administration of Palestine, following the General Assembly’s recommendations, with forces supplied by such states as Mexico, Sweden and Czechoslovakia; and that the Canadian [Page 1245] plan was very similar to the United States plan except that, for legal reasons, the United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly, as envisaged by the United States, would be replaced by a United Nations Commission appointed by the Security Council.
Mr. Pearson explained that the United States had yesterday endeavored to compromise with the Russians by suggesting that the General Assembly’s recommendations might stipulate that the United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly would have general supervision of the transfer of powers from the mandatory to the two new states, would be instructed to advise and assist not only the mandatory but the two new states and would be instructed to report to the Security Council on matters affecting international peace and security and might report to the Trusteeship Council on other matters. Mr. Pearson related that the Russians had found this compromise unacceptable.
Mr. Johnson then explained that he had informed the working group that he and Mr. Pearson would discuss the general question with the United Kingdom Delegation and would endeavor to ascertain to what extent the British authorities in Palestine would be willing to cooperate in Palestine during the period prior to independence. Mr. Johnson expressed the view that the United Kingdom would be mandatory for Palestine until the termination of the mandate and that it was inconceivable to him that the United Kingdom would deny all responsibility for the administration of Palestine and the maintenance of law and order during the period of British withdrawal prior to the termination of the mandate.
Sir Alexander Cadogan replied that he had been following developments with regard to Palestine in the United Nations closely and that yesterday he had sent a telegram to London raising similar questions and accordingly could not answer Mr. Johnson’s question until he had had a reply. Sir Alexander continued that it seemed obvious to him that the British authorities in Palestine, as representatives of a good member of the United Nations, would continue to administer Palestine and maintain normal internal law and order while withdrawing. Sir Alexander said that London was presently working on plans of withdrawal, and that, although he was not aware of the time schedule or the manner in which it would be accomplished, he could say difficulties arising in Palestine as a result of United Nations recommendations would not be allowed to retard or reverse the British plan of withdrawal. In other words, as Sir Alexander envisaged the British plans, the British forces would gradually withdraw from the more stable areas, hand over the administration to the new authorities, and would leave what were believed to be the more unstable areas to the last. If [Page 1246] during this process trouble broke out in an area which the British forces had already evacuated, Sir Alexander did not believe that the British forces would return to it and again assume the responsibilities of administration and the maintenance of law and order in that area.
Mr. Johnson said that he appreciated the British position, and, of course, assumed that if a situation arose in a part of Palestine which appeared to affect international peace and security, that development would be a matter for consideration and action by the Security Council, but that as long as the United Kingdom had the responsibility for the mandate territory, it also had the responsibility for the maintenance of internal law and order within it.
Sir Alexander indicated that in general he concurred with Mr. Johnson’s views and that he personally felt that the United Kingdom would cooperate in the transfer of administration and in the maintenance of internal law and order, but that more serious difficulties arising as a result of partition would not be the responsibility of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Johnson suggested that if the United Kingdom were in a position to issue a statement indicating in general terms the extent to which the United Kingdom was prepared to cooperate with the United Nations or its agents, such as the United Nations Commission, it would have a clarifying, salutary effect upon the present state of discussions in the Working Group on implementation, and in Subcommittee 1, and in the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Johnson was of the belief that a statement by the United Kingdom, such as that which he had indicated, would tend to remove the doubts which the Russians and the Guatemalans entertained as to the honest intention of the British to withdraw and would assist the United Nations in reaching a solution on the Palestine question.
Sir Alexander Cadogan remarked that there could be no doubt whatever about British intentions to withdraw and that there would be a “dwindling suspicion” in the minds of the Russians and the Guatemalans when the British forces actually began to depart. Sir Alexander further remarked that he hoped London’s reply to the telegram which he had sent to London yesterday incorporated views along the lines of those which had been exchanged today would be favorable, and that it would be possible for the United Kingdom to issue a statement clarifying its views with regard to normal implementation.1
- According to a second memorandum of November 7 by Mr. Wilkins, Sir Alexander Cadogan, during this discussion, informed Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring that “the United Kingdom would abstain from voting on United Nations recommendations with regard to the future government of Palestine.” (IO files: US/A/AC.14/159)↩