Office of the Historian

501.BB Palestine/10–2847: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

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London, October 28, 1947—8 p. m.

5758. Discussed with Bevin for more than an hour the proposals contained Deptel 4578, October 25.

I can summarize Bevin’s position as follows:

1.
The British Government will support, within reason, any proposal or recommendation which has the concurrence of the Arabs and the Jews.
2.
He will not make any commitment in regard to British assistance to implement any recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly until the British Government has had an opportunity to examine them carefully. He therefore refrained from commenting on any details suggested Department’s reference telegram.1
3.
However, in a general way, the suggestions contained in Deptel 4578 imply to him that the British lend assistance in carrying out a [Page 1216] program for Palestine which, in his judgment, will lead to disturbances, if not in fact, to violence and bloodshed, the latter of which he considers to be certain.
4.
The British Government does not now contemplate announcing a date for the withdrawal of its forces and the termination of its mandate.

Bevin is deeply concerned about two former American ships—the Pan York and the Pan Crescent—now either at Constanza or putting into Constanza for the purpose, allegedly, of lifting some “18,000” illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine. (See Embassy’s 5702, October 24.)2

Douglas
  1. Telegram 1127, November 1, from New York, reported that in “Creech Jones’ opinion, Bevin refused to commit himself to Ambassador Douglas because the Cabinet would decide what UK action would be taken after a study of the recommendations. However, he personally felt that the UK would decide to carry out UN recommendations, although it would not be willing to accept any unilateral responsibility after the date of independence.” (501.BB Summaries/11–147)↩
  2. Not printed.↩