Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

IO Files: US/A/AC.14/125

Memorandum Prepared in the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret

[New York,] October 26, 1947.

Question of Palestine

Ambassador Johnson

General Hilldring

1. As was indicated at the last delegation meeting which discussed the question of Palestine, it is the view of the State Department, on consultation with General Hilldring and myself,¹ that there should be a very brief interim period between the recommendation of the General Assembly regarding Palestine and the establishment of independence for the two proposed states in Palestine. The actual date which has been proposed is July 1, 1948. On that day, if the suggestion of the United States is accepted by a two-thirds of the General Assembly, both Arab and Jewish states will become independent.

2. This means that the maintenance of internal law and order between now and that date will continue to devolve upon the British forces and administration now in control. With this thought in mind a telegram has been sent to Ambassador Douglas² requesting him to discuss this matter with Mr. Bevin. I shall read the telegram (Annex 1).

3. If the British agree to continue to be responsible for Palestine during the next eight months there will be no need for further implementation of the partition plan. Moreover, it is technically impossible for the British to evacuate their troops and supplies from Palestine in a shorter period than the one contemplated. It is conceivable that the British government may reject the suggestion regarding the date for termination of the mandate and may institute a policy of “scuttle and run”. This may cause civil strife and chaos in Palestine and would present the United Nations with a very serious problem, one concerning which it might feel a moral obligation to take some action of a pacifying nature, although its legal powers to do more than make recommendations are by no means established. It is partly to avoid, if possible, any such action by the British government that the telegram just read was sent to London. However, the British who have been responsible for Palestine for so many years and who voluntarily accepted this responsibility, can hardly object to being requested by the United Nations to continue in control in that area for a few months longer.

4. The feeling in the sub-committee now dealing with the partition plan is such that a date for termination of the mandate will probably be set regardless of the opinions of the British government. The Russian representative has already indicated strong opinions on that subject. It is apparent that the setting of an early and specific date for independence is the best way to avoid saddling the United Nations with the responsibility for administering the area and for implementing its recommendations, and hence is the best way to make sure that neither American troops nor Russian troops, nor any form of volunteer constabulary be employed, although the latter device might be appropriately used in the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem.

5. The other major elements of the United States proposed comments on and changes to the partition plan drafted by UNSCOP are as follows:

Immigration during the transitional period. The UNSCOP report envisaged a transitional period of not more than two years and therefore suggested interim mass immigration into Palestine, that is the future Jewish state, of 150,000. This works out to about 6,200 per month. The present quota is 1500 per month. The United States is not suggesting any change in this UNSCOP recommendation. However, it is to be expected that the British will be very reluctant to maintain administrative control over Palestine while admitting all these immigrants. It is true that such a mass immigration would make the task of keeping internal peace and order much more difficult. The United States delegation has been advised of this difficulty unofficially by the British Delegation. If therefore, the British express a strong desire that the present restricted quota of 1500 per month be continued until the states become independent, next July, at which time, of course, both States will be in exclusive control of their immigration policies, the United States will acquiesce. This interim period will be one of great tension; it may be a small price to pay, to have a temporary continuation of the present immigration regulations, in order to keep the precarious peace between the Jew and Arab.

6. A United Nations Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, will be established to facilitate the transition to independence. This Commission will have the task of consulting with the British regarding such matters as the regulations to be made for holding of elections prior to independence, the calling of constituent assemblies in both Arab and Jewish States, the acceptance of economic union between the States and similar matters. The Commission will not be the interim government, but will act in an advisory capacity, as agent of the General Assembly, to the mandatory power and the Jews and Arabs.

7. Religious rights and minority rights shall become fundamental law in both States, according to the UNSCOP recommendations, and it is also proposed that there shall be no modifications of these religious and minority rights without the consent of the General Assembly.

8. The proposed economic union will include articles preserving non-discrimination regarding development and use of such facilities as ports, railroads, irrigation projects and land reclamation. There will also be a common currency. I am not sure that the Arab State, if created, would agree to such an economic union, but it is designed to be of financial and economic assistance to the Arab State in the first instance, and only secondarily of help to the Jewish State. It has been accepted in principle by the Jewish Agency, albeit with some reluctance.

9. Finally, UNSCOP proposes that if the two States are formed along the lines laid down in the UNSCOP report and outlined above, “sympathetic consideration” should be given to their application for membership in the United Nations. The United States does not object to this recommendation, but will point out that it cannot be construed as committing the United States a priority to supporting applications for membership to be made at a future date. We do not want to run into the same difficulty as occurred regarding the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

1. Presumably Ambassador Johnson.
2. Supra.