Editorial Note
Ambassador Alling discussed the matters covered in the memorandum of October 3, supra, with Charles Malik of the Lebanese Delegation the following day. According to a memorandum of conversation dated October 4, by Ambassador Alling, he stated that “the Arab intentions were no less than a form of blackmail. Dr. Malik reluctantly admitted that this was more or less the case, but that I must understand how vital the Palestine question was to them. I told him that after working on the problem for more than twenty years, I thought I understood their position fully, but that if I considered their present intentions a form of blackmail, how much more so must American officials less familiar with the problem consider it to be blackmail. I asked him what sort of an impression he thought the American people would have when they read in the newspapers that all of the Arab Delegations were voting against American proposals, no matter how right and just such proposals might be. Again, he stated that the American people must realize the importance which the Arabs attached to the Palestine question. I told him I thought it unlikely that the American public would look at the matter in that light. All they would observe was that the Arab countries were opposing our reasonable proposals. I asked him if he thought that such an attitude on the part of the Arab Delegations would further their interests in this country or advance Arab-American relations and the cause of world peace.
“Dr. Malik appeared impressed by the foregoing arguments, and said that he would discuss them at a meeting of the Arab delegates, which was to take place this evening.” (10 files: US/A/AC.14/35)
Mr. Henderson brought the matter of the October 3 memorandum “urgently” to Mr. Lovett’s attention on October 6. His transmitting memorandum stated in part: “If we choose, we can regard this approach on the part of the Arabs as a species of blackmail. We must, however, remember that the question of Palestine is to them the most important question in their international life and that they consider it their duty to use all means available in order to block the setting up of a Jewish state. They feel that if they reject the overtures of the Soviets, whom they suspect are also negotiating with the Zionists, the Soviets may come out against them. It will be recalled that the Russians last spring, following Gromyko’s speech in which he indicated that the Soviet Union might support partition in case the establishment of a [Page 1176] Federal State would prove impracticable, indicated to the Arabs that their trend towards the Zionists was based on their feeling that the Jews were socially further advanced than the Arabs. This statement was properly interpreted by the Arabs to mean that Arab refusal hitherto to deal with the Russians was the motive which prompted Gromyko’s speech. The Arabs now undoubtedly feel that the Soviet Union will turn against them if they continue to refuse to bargain with it. If the Soviet Union should turn against them and if the United States should also be against them, their hope of preventing the establishment of a Jewish state would indeed be small.
Therefore, we cannot consider the Arab approach as a mere species of blackmail. What they are really trying to do is to persuade us to take an attitude which will enable them to reject Soviet overtures.” (501.BB Palestine/10–347)