Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Palestine/10–347

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper

secret

[New York,] October 3, 1947.

Participants:	Emir Faisal, Chairman of the Saudi Arabian Delegation
	General Nouri Pasha, Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation
	Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation
	Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, of the Saudi Arabian Delegation
	Ambassador Wadsworth, of the United States Delegation
	Samuel K. C. Kopper, Adviser, United States Delegation

Shortly after the Palestine Ad Hoc Committee adjourned today, Dr. Jamali, accompanied by Nouri Pasha, approached Ambassador Wadsworth and myself. Dr. Jamili said they had a matter of extreme importance which, on behalf of all the Arab delegations, they had been charged to take up with the United States Delegation through Mr. Wadsworth.

Dr. Jamali launched at once, without preamble, into his subject. He said that the six Arab States had held an important meeting last night at which the question under discussion was: Should the Arab States approach the U.S.S.R. with a view to obtaining support of the Arab position on Palestine.

Dr. Jamali then made a special point of saying that he and Emir Faisal had opposed such an approach until the attitude of the United States with regard to the UNSCOP report had been made known. He recalled that he had already informed us that Soviet overtures had been made to Arab delegates.¹ These had been renewed yesterday by a Polish delegate; no answer had been given. He stressed that basic long-term Arab interests lay rather with the United States and Great Britain than with Soviet Russia.

His view and that of Emir Faisal, Dr. Jamali continued, had prevailed. The meeting had decided, therefore, to endeavor to ascertain the United States position on the UNSCOP report. If the United States could not now “guarantee the Arab position”, the Arab States would then feel compelled to respond to these Soviet overtures for the purpose of obtaining Soviet support (six votes), in return for which Arab support (six votes) would be given to the U.S.S.R. on matters of concern to it.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that this was a matter of high importance and would require attention at top levels. Accordingly, before he could take the matter up effectively it seemed essential to have a clear and definite indication of exactly what the Arab States meant by this démarche.

At this juncture, Emir Faisal and Shaikh Hafiz Wabha joined the discussion. Dr. Jamali recapitulated. The following are the essential points made and repeated by the Arabs in the ensuing discussion:

1. The Arab delegations have recently received overtures from representatives of the Soviet bloc to discuss the possibility of arranging an agreement for a mutual exchange of support on matters of vital interest to each group. The Arab States had not thus far made favorable response.

2. At the meeting of the Arab delegations last evening, there was considerable feeling that the approach to the Soviet Delegation should be made now. However, Jamali and Emir Faisal were able to prevail against such feeling by urging that the attitude of the United States be first determined.

3. While loathe in any way to link themselves with the U.S.S.R., Palestine is of such vital importance to them that the Arab States are willing to arrange a “voting deal” for Soviet support if it appears that the United States position will not be substantially in accord with that of the Arab world. Such a deal, both Faisal and Jamali insisted, would not, however, mean a permanent orientation.

4. The Arab States must themselves know whether the United States can give assurance that it will not support partition of Palestine and, consequently, the establishment of an independent Jewish state. To block the latter was the paramount Arab objective.

5. If no such assurance can be given, the Arab States will, in all probability, decide, regardless of other considerations, to approach the Soviet bloc to seek support for the Arab position on Palestine.

In the event of such a “voting deal”, Dr. Jamali and Emir Faisal made clear, in answer to Ambassador Wadsworth’s specific enquiry, that the Arab States would go so far even as to support the U.S.S.R. on the Greek question, the Interim Committee, Warmongering, Korea and any other subjects necessary to obtain a Soviet commitment to support the Arab position against the establishment of an independent Jewish state. Sole exception would be continuing Arab support for India’s election to the Security Council.

In reply, Mr. Wadsworth assured Emir Faisal and Dr. Jamali that he would report their communication to the United States Delegation. He added that the United States position on the UNSCOP report was now in process of formulation and that he was particularly glad to be able to inform them that, before the United States would state that position in the Ad Hoc Committee, its text would be communicated to them in strictest confidence. In its substance, it might not fully answer their question, but it would certainly merit their careful consideration. He felt that they would wish to give it such consideration before deciding “whether or not” they would respond to the Soviet overtures in question.

Both Emir Faisal and Dr. Jamali seemed considerably relieved that they could report in the sense of this reply to their colleagues of all the Arab delegations.

(This memorandum was prepared in draft and then gone over in detail by Ambassador Wadsworth, Harley Notter and myself.—S.K.C.K.²)

1. Telegram 916, from New York, reported on October 1: “The Soviet delegation had approached the Arab States with an explicit offer to support the Arabs on Palestine if the Arab States in turn would support Ukraine for the SC, Jamali (Iraq) told USGADel Oct. 1. The Arab States turned this down. He added that the Lebanese Delegation was approached Oct. 1 by a member of the Polish Delegation speaking for the Soviet bloc with a request that the Arab States shift their votes to the Ukraine in order to preserve: (1) the effectiveness of the UN, and (2) the logical geographic distribution on the SC.” (501.BB Summaries/10–147)
2. Mr. Notter and Samuel K. C. Kopper were advisers to the United States Delegation at the General Assembly.