Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Palestine/9–2647

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Paul H. Alling, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the General Assembly¹

New York, September 23, 1947

top secret

Participants:

The Secretary; Amir Faisal of Saudi Arabia; Faris Bey el-Khouri of Syria; Noury As-Said Pasha of Iraq; Dr. Mohamed Hussein Heykal Pasha of Egypt; M. Camille Chamoun of Lebanon; Ambassador Johnson; Major General Hilldring, U.S.A. (ret.); Lieutenant General Ridgway, U.S.A.;2 Mr. Wadsworth; Mr. Alling; and Shaikh Ali A. Alireza of Saudi Arabia (Faisal’s interpreter)

At a luncheon offered on September 23, 1947 by the Secretary at the quarters of Lieutenant General Ridgway, at which the foregoing were present, the general question of the UNSCOP report was discussed. Faris Bey el-Khouri of Syria was the chief speaker for the Arab Delegations. He opened the discussion by saying that the Arab group was greatly disappointed that the Secretary in his address of September 17, 1947 had come out in favor of the majority report of the UNSCOP. Mr. Khouri stated that he was a member of Parliament in his country and that he would, from his point of view, consider the UNSCOP report, because of its biased position against the Arabs, an unacceptable draft document and not worthy of consideration as a working paper. He elaborated on this thought by presenting the usual Arab point of view that none of the Arab states could accept the thesis of a Jewish sovereign state, that such a state was only the beginning of Zionist penetration in the Near East which sooner or later would end up in bloodshed and disaster. He stressed the point that the Zionists had progressed in Palestine only because of the tremendous sums of money poured into the country from abroad, particularly from the United States, and cited the failure of the colonies established and financed in Palestine early in the present century by Lord Rothschild after the latter had withdrawn his support.

The Secretary replied that although he had not received as yet a full analysis of the UNSCOP report and therefore could not express any definitive views, he hoped that the Arab Delegations would bear in mind certain points:

1. He thought he had an understanding of the general Arab point of view on the Palestine question.

2. He had resisted strong pressure put upon him to make statements regarding the American position during the period the UNSCOP inquiries were in progress, since he felt any such statements might prejudice the findings of the Special Committee.

3. He asked the Arab Delegations to remember that the United States faced critical problems all over the world, among the most pressing of which was the question of “majority voting”. That question came up at Rio de Janeiro;³ it was among the outstanding questions at the present meeting of the UNGA.

4. In view of the foregoing, and looking at the broad picture, the Secretary could not “throw the UNSCOP report out of the window” and revert to the situation existing last spring. Such a procedure would have weakened the UN and would not have served the cause of peace.

5. The alternative was to dignify the proceedings of the UN by paying tribute to the UNSCOP effort and by accepting the UNSCOP report as a working basis.

The Secretary went on to say that he had listened to Mr. Chamoun’s address at the UNGA on September 20, 1947⁴ in which the latter had referred to the position of the Secretary as favoring partition. He pointed out that during Mr. Chamoun’s address a member of the United States Delegation had turned to him (the Secretary) and said: “But the Lebanese delegate misunderstands the situation; you have made no such commitment”.

Ambassador Johnson supported the Secretary’s view and emphasized the point that the Secretary had no choice but to pay tribute to the efforts of the UNSCOP and would have been obliged to do so whatever the nature of the report since it was most essential at this critical period to strengthen and reinforce the procedures and machinery of the UN with a view to furthering steps toward a real peace.

General Hilldring pointed out that the Secretary had not committed the United States to accept any particular solution of the Palestine question; that we wanted to hear all points of view before reaching any conclusions: and that the way was still open for all interested governments to express their viewpoints which we were anxious to hear. General Hilldring added that the minds of the United States Delegation were by no means closed.

The Amir Faisal made few remarks but those supported the views of the other Arab leaders. However, he followed with close attention, through his interpreter, the exchange of views.

After discussing the question with the Syrian delegate and the Lebanese representative, who added little to Faris Bey el-Khouri’s views, the Secretary invited the comments of the Egyptian and Iraqi representatives.

Heykal Pasha, the Egyptian delegate, asked why should the UN perpetuate a failure which, he asserted, the Palestine mandate had been from the beginning. It had brought on several serious conflicts in Palestine which had been put down only by British arms. From an economic point of view the Zionist experiment had continued only because of the funds poured in from abroad. He pointed out that the Balfour declaration (which was in conflict with British promises to the Arabs) had at the maximum agreed to “a Jewish National Home in Palestine”. Now the Zionists asked for a Jewish state and that was only the beginning. Once having obtained a foothold, the Zionists would demand more and eventually try to gain complete control of the Arab lands. Faris Bey el-Khouri reinforced the thesis of failure by pointing out that although a thousand years ago the Crusaders had attempted to establish their dominance in the Holy Land, they had finally been ejected with disaster to themselves. He predicted a similar fate for Zionist efforts.

Noury As-Said, speaking for Iraq, said that in his view the political and humanitarian aspects of the matter had to be separated. If the political aspects of Zionist aspirations could be put aside, the Arab countries would be with the United States fully in efforts to solve the humanitarian side of the Jewish problem. (Although Noury As-Said does not express himself adequately in English, it was the general understanding of those present that he was attempting to convey the idea that if other countries would accept their fair share of the problem of displaced persons, particularly Jewish DP’s, the Arab countries would cooperate completely.)

The luncheon was terminated by the Secretary expressing his appreciation for the courtesy of the Arab delegates in informing him of their views. He expected he would have occasion to seek their views again during the coming weeks. Faris Bey el-Khouri thanked the Secretary for his friendly reception of the Arab delegates.

After the luncheon the Amir Faisal spoke to Ambassador Johnson and me at Flushing. He stated that he wanted the Secretary to know that all of the Arab countries desired nothing more than to work with and cooperate with the United States in the Near East, but they could not do so if we supported the thesis of a Jewish state in Palestine. He added in strict confidence that he could not say publicly at the Secretary’s luncheon one most important consideration, as follows: Speaking as a responsible Arab statesman he wanted the Secretary to know that NO Arab Government in the Near East would be able to restrain the outraged feelings of its people if a Jewish state were established in Palestine.

I had a brief talk with Faris Bey el-Khouri at Flushing after the luncheon and inquired about his impressions of the talk with the Secretary. He said he felt somewhat reassured but hoped that the American delegate in the Ad Hoc Committee in Palestine would make clear that the United States had not taken a firm position in favor of the majority report of the UNSCOP and that we were open to suggestions. Faris Bey el-Khouri thought such a clarification was important since several non-Arab and non-Moslem Delegations had received the impression that the United States was out to railroad through the majority recommendations at all costs to us and to the rest of the world.⁵

1. The conversation covered by this memorandum took place in New York on September 23. Mr. Alling, however, prepared and dated the memorandum on September 26.
2. Matthew B. Ridgway, senior United States Army member of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.
3. This refers to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security which met in Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 2, 1947; for documentation on the Conference, see vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.
4. For statement by Mr. Chamoun, see GA (II), Plenary, vol. i, p. 164.
5. This memorandum was cleared with General Hilldring.