IO Files: US/A/AC.14/205
Excerpts From the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 15, 1947, 10 a. m.
Position on Palestine
The Secretary explained that Ambassador Johnson could not be present because of the meeting of the Security Council. Before proceeding with the Agenda, he brought to the Delegation’s attention a matter arising from discussion held by Mr. Henderson and General Hilldring with the Zionists. He reminded the Delegation that General Hilldring had been designated by the President as an alternate representative, replacing Dean Gildersleeve.
Secretary Marshall said he was being pressed for a decision before he spoke to the General Assembly on Wednesday on the subject of Palestine. The United States, he recalled, had been largely involved in the procedure which had been followed regarding the sending of a United Nations committee to Palestine. This committee had now returned a majority and a minority report. While Australia had abstained, he now understood the Australian representative on the committee would now be pushed aside and Dr. Evatt would step in and press vigorously for the majority report.
Adoption of the majority report, the Secretary said, would mean very violent Arab reaction. To be consistent with the integrity of its position, the United States should avoid actively arousing the Arabs and precipitating their rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the first week or ten days of the General Assembly. This would happen, he said, if the Delegation took a clear stand on Wednesday. On the other hand, if the Delegation did not take a clear stand, the Secretary said, he and the State Department would undoubtedly be severely attacked for “pussyfooting.” If the Delegation took a stand in accord with the evident popular desire, for support of the majority report, it thereby would create difficulties for itself in subsequent General Assembly maneuvering.
The Secretary added that Mr. Henderson was especially concerned by the long-term factor. If the Delegation committed itself definitely—and a two-thirds General Assembly majority would hardly be possible without such a United States commitment—then the United States would be obligated to take part in implementing action agreed upon by the General Assembly.
Arab reaction, the Secretary repeated, would be hostile to such implementation action. About twenty per cent of Zionist opinion would [Page 1148] also be hostile. No commission could undertake the job. Great Britain had made it clear that it would not carry through alone; it was therefore quite obvious that the United States would have to take part.
Mrs. Roosevelt1 at this point asked whether it was really evident, as indicated in previous discussion, that the U.S.S.R. would be opposed to the majority report. Secretary Marshall replied that this was the assumption, since the case offered such a fine opportunity for the Soviets to carry out their ends regarding the Arabs, for the sake of expediency. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Arabs were clearly more afraid of the U.S.S.R. than of us. Mr. Henderson said he was convinced that just as we, during the war, lined up with the U.S.S.R. although having nothing in common, so the Arabs for convenience would work with the U.S.S.R. against the No. 1 common enemy, ourselves.
General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state. He believed they would espouse a federal state to the very end, as an advocate of Arab desires.
The Secretary then introduced the statement which had been framed by Mr. Lovett and Mr. Henderson for delivery by him on Wednesday. This expressed hope that the General Assembly would find a definite solution for the problem of Palestine; that if this problem were to be solved it must be approached with resolution and restraint; that in considering the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine it was worthy of note that although the committee had been unable to reach an [unanimous?] agreement on partition, it had reached unanimous agreement on eleven other points; and concluded with the hope that general agreement would be reached during this session, after the General Assembly has had an opportunity to study in full the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report.
General Hilldring then said that it would certainly be a disappointment to American Jews and Jews everywhere, who hoped the United States would take a favorable position on Palestine at the beginning of the General Assembly in favor of the majority report. But, he felt, this was not a serious enough consideration to warrant a definite statement by the United States on Wednesday in favor of the majority report. The Delegation should talk to representatives of the Jews, explain that it was impossible for the United States to take a definite position, and ask them to contain themselves a little longer. This was not the time for such a definite position.
Mrs. Roosevelt asked what was to be supported by a definite position. [Page 1149] General Hilldring replied that he meant a definite position at least in support of partition. The real nub of the matter, he said, was disagreement in the United States Government as to whether to accept the principle of partition. He thought the United States should go further and accept the majority report, while remaining willing to amend it as a result of debate in the Assembly.
Mrs. Roosevelt then asked whether another question was not involved in this matter, something which had nothing to do with the Jewish situation. She felt this was the question of the importance of supporting a report brought in by a United Nations committee, for the value of such support in promoting the success of the United Nations. She posed the question whether this was not quite a serious consideration for the Delegation, as important or more important, a consideration than whether such a stand would please American Jews. Such a position in support of the United Nations report would strengthen the United Nations in the minds of the American people.
The Secretary said he had been surprised at the quality of the report and at the extent of agreement on this extraordinary difficult matter. The report had proved much better than he had anticipated. He added that one consideration which must be borne in mind by the Delegation was that when the United States supported the report, it must follow through. It could not be regarded merely as an immediate political settlement, bringing relief to all parties in the United States. Recalling his mention of the ability of the Soviet Union to take advantage of Arab hostility to partition, he said this was merely part of the problem. We will have to be ready to put troops into Palestine, the Secretary said.
Mr. Henderson agreed that there was no doubt that the majority report, if accepted, would have to be implemented by force. The British Government, he felt, would either say it would not have anything to do with implementing the report or that it would do its share. He doubted very much that the British Government would even be willing to do its share. Mr. Bevin, Mr. Henderson said, had been evasive during a talk with Mr. Henderson,2 but had made it clear that Britain could not be prepared to raise hostility toward itself in the Arab world. The question therefore arose of whom the United States was to send to aid in implementing. Two fronts would arise: Jewish terrorists would continue to fight and assassinate, and Arab terrorists would do likewise. He did not know how far this would go, Mr. Henderson said.
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report, while intended to be impartial, was not based on any principle, he said. It [Page 1150] was full of sophistry. Mr. Henderson said he thought it proper for the United States to use force and to incur enmity when a principle was involved, but he failed to find any principle here, only expediency. Those who signed the majority report would not be concerned in carrying it out; it was therefore easy for them. Those who would carry it out would have to be the great powers. He did not think Great Britain, France, or the U.S.S.R. would be willing to help carry it out.
Assuming the United States was going to favor the majority report, Ambassador Austin said, then it was necessary to judge the timing of the statement of the United States position. The question was whether to take up a position now or to wait until the row got hot, resentment higher, and until the favor we would have to exert for the side we favored would have to be stronger. In line with the United States stated principle of backing the United Nations by defending political independence and integrity, Ambassador Austin did not see how it was possible to carve out of an area already too small for a state a still smaller state. He thought it was certain that such a state would have to defend itself with bayonets forever, until extinguished in blood. The Arabs, he said, would never be willing to have such a small state in their heart.
Ambassador Austin said he stood with the Secretary on the matter. On the assumption that the Delegation was going to support the majority report, it would be necessary to take the urgent next step, and to support it with all the required help, including troops. However, he feared his judgment might have been affected by his special study of the matter in 1936, accordingly, he made the following statement with reservations. His notion was that it would be a much sounder policy for the Delegation to take its position then, and to announce it Wednesday, not in a threatening manner but in dignified accents. Such action would buoy up the United Nations, he felt. The Delegation had taken a position in the Secretary’s speech the previous day,3 a very strong position, and the Delegation would be slipping if it did not march consistently in accord with that speech. He therefore repeated that he felt Wednesday’s statement should be as clear as possible; the United States then would stand before the world as courageous and wise, and by creating a determined effect early would prevent the situation from flaring up—since the Arabs would not get the idea that they would yet convince the Delegation.
[Page 1151]Mr. Dulles4 said lie did not feel confident enough about his views to want to volunteer them at the moment, although he would speak, if necessary, with great reservations.
The Secretary said that in that case the meeting would proceed, and that a copy of the proposed statement from Washington would be given each of the delegates for consideration before the afternoon meeting. Mr. Dulles said he would like this procedure, and also he wanted to ask some questions of General Hilldring and Mr. Henderson.
- Anna Eleanor Roosevelt (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt), Representative of the United States at the Second Session of the General Assembly.↩
- For Mr. Henderson’s memorandum of September 9, see pp. 496, 498.↩
- For the address delivered by Secretary Marshall before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, see Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1947, p. 539.↩
- John Foster Dulles, Representative of the United States at the Second Session of the General Assembly.↩
- Deputy Secretary General of the United States Mission at the United Nations.↩