867N.51/5–2847
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
As Mr. Shertok and Mr. Epstein of the Jewish Agency plan to see you this morning at 11:30 am, I believe it will be helpful for you to have a brief account of my conversation yesterday afternoon with Mr. Shertok and Mr. Kaplan of the Jewish Agency, accompanied by Mr. Gass and Mr. Epstein, with regard to economic developments in Palestine.
Mr. Shertok expressed the hope that the Special Committee on Palestine, which represented a new phase in the consideration of the problem, would be successful in finding a solution. Mr. Kaplan then spoke at length on Palestine’s economic and financial needs. During Mr. Kaplan’s talk requests, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, were made for the following:
[Here follows a summary of main points of Mr. Kaplan’s memorandum, supra.]
I told Mr. Kaplan that the Department appreciated the expression of the views of the Jewish Agency with regard to the financial implications of a Palestinian settlement, that I would immediately study his memorandum and that I would communicate with him concerning it as soon as possible.
Although I have not yet had an opportunity of studying the memorandum of the Jewish Agency in detail, it is my preliminary opinion that if the United States Government engaged in “confidential exploratory conversations” with the Jewish Agency at this particular moment the most serious repercussions might ensue.
The commencement of such conversations would immediately be publicized in the press throughout the world and might be taken as an indication that the United States Government had developed its policy in advance of the report of the Special Committee on Palestine and had prejudged the case in favor of the Jews. Such conclusions might well cause such serious doubts to arise in the minds of the Arabs with regard to the sincerity and impartiality of our support of the British request for a Special Committee of the United Nations that they might refuse to cooperate with the Committee and thus nullify its work before it had even been undertaken.
It is accordingly suggested that you might wish to indicate to Mr. Shertok, during the course of your conversation with him this morning, that the United States Government would be reluctant at the present time to take any type of action which might prejudice the [Page 1094] work of the Special Committee. It might be added that the views of the Jewish Agency with regard to the financial implications of a Palestinian settlement would undoubtedly prove of interest to the Special Committee on Palestine in its consideration of the problem. You might also wish to add that the Department was prepared to receive the plans of the Jewish Agency as they developed and were presented to the special Committee but that it felt it would be untimely for it to enter into discussion with regard to such plans at least before the meeting of the General Assembly in the autumn.1
- Marginal natation by Mr. Acheson: “I agree.” In reply on June 25 to the Jewish Agency’s memorandum, Mr. Henderson advised Mr. Epstein: “I am now able to inform you that this matter has been discussed and that the Department believes it would be unwise to engage in conversations of the character suggested by the Jewish Agency while the Special Committee of the United Nations is endeavoring to make constructive suggestions with regard to a solution of the Palestine problem.” (867N.51/5–2847)↩