867N.01/2–1747
The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African
Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary
of State (Acheson)
[Washington,] February 17, 1947.
Dear Dean: I am attaching hereto a summary
sent over by the British Embassy of a personal message which the
Secretary is to receive today from Bevin.1
It is suggested that the Secretary answer this message today; that the
reply be brief and that although expressing an understanding of the
difficulties of the situation in which the British find themselves, it
not go into the substance of the matter except perhaps to express the
hope that if the British Government feels that it could do so without a
further deterioration of the situation in Palestine it would be helpful
if it could make it possible for a larger number of displaced European
Jews to enter Palestine during the interim period than 1,500 a month,
the rate now in effect.
We might later find it advisable to suggest that the matter be laid
before the Trusteeship Council which should have its initial meeting in
about a month, rather than to hold it up for the General Assembly in the
autumn. It might be preferable not to advance such a suggestion,
however, until we have a better idea as to what the various reactions to
the British decision will be.
With regard to the line which we should take towards the Palestine
problem in the light of recent events, I feel that we should move slowly
in committing ourselves in any direction. There is a danger that not
only would we not be able to persuade the General Assembly to approve
any partition plan not recommended by the British Government, which
would provide for a really workable Jewish State, but that an attempt on
our part so to do would weaken our prestige and influence in the United
Nations and react unfavorably in the end against the Jews. Before we
engage in any international discussions regarding the matter or before
we begin to make any public announcements committing ourselves to any
line of action we should decide only after discussions with Congress,
with the White House and with American Jews and other interested
American groups what our policy is to be. We cannot afford in the forum
of the United Nations to retreat from a position once taken as a result
of pressure brought upon us from highly organized groups in the United
States.
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We are reviewing all the plans for Palestine that have been advanced thus
far and hope to have some concrete suggestions in the near future.
[Annex]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
Summary of a Message From Mr. Bevin to be
Delivered to the Secretary of State on the 17th February
Since Mr. Bevin sent the Secretary of State his personal message on
the 9th February the British proposals intended for a basis of
negotiations have been rejected by both the Jews and the Arabs and
the Palestine Conference has come to an end.
2. The Arabs have never accepted the Balfour Declaration or the
Mandate but the British Government in administering this
responsibility have nevertheless caused to be admitted some 535,000
Jews between 1920 and 1947. The highest figure in any one year was
62,000 in 1935 due to Hitler’s persecution, but this caused an Arab
revolt and finally a figure of 75,000 was agreed on for a definite
period ending December 1945. But owing to the petition in Europe,
the British Government extended the monthly quota of 1,500 after
that date with the result that some 24,000 Jews have been admitted
between January 1946 and the present time.
3. The British Government have tried hard to combine three proposals
(1) immigration (2) land transfer and (3) the ultimate establishment
of an independent state based on the people resident in Palestine,
whether Arab or Jew. This they felt should offer a reasonable
solution or at least a basis for discussion, since they consider
that the country ought to reach an independent status soon and the
Mandatory power yield up its responsibility. This proposed solution
has however been rejected by the Jews, since it did not provide for
unlimited immigration with the object not of relieving Europe alone
but of establishing a Jewish state. When their own partition
compromise was looked into, it became clear that the Arabs would be
left only a very small and rather desolate area in the hills. The
Arabs on the other hand rejected the British solution because it
contemplated further Jewish immigration, to which they absolutely
refused to agree. In view of the unsatisfactory working of the
Mandate and of the respective claims of the two parties, the British
Government could only decide to refer the Mandate back to the United
Nations which seemed to be the only course open to them in the
circumstances.
4. While the British Government will give the United Nations Assembly
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all the information
and all the documents relating to the schemes which have been put
forward from time to time to solve this problem, they have decided
not to make any recommendations themselves but to request the
Assembly to consider the position and recommend a settlement.
5. Thus far Mr. Bevin’s message. The British Government have informed
both the Arab and the Jewish Delegations of what they propose to do
and they hope to put the problem to the United Nations Assembly at
its next regular meeting in September. An announcement to this
effect will be made in Parliament, probably on February 18th, which
will be followed by a request for a debate later in the week. Before
the debate it is proposed to publish a White Paper2
containing (1) the Provincial Autonomy Plan (known as the
“Morrison–Grady” proposals), (2) The Arab proposals (3) The latest
British Proposals.
