867N.01/2–947

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State 1

I read with pleasure the newspaper account of your remarks on Palestine at your press conference on February 7th. I know how deeply [Page 1036] concerned you must be about the Palestine problem, and I am doing my best to keep you fully informed. You will have read the outline of our new proposals left with you by Lord Inverchapel. I am sending you this personal message in addition so that you may be aware of some of the considerations which we have had in mind when drafting this plan.

We were faced with three alternatives. We could have advanced proposals which would have satisfied one party but which we should have had to impose on the other at the point of the bayonet. I think the Arab plan could only have been imposed in this way, and the same is true of partition, especially of partition along any frontier which would have satisfied Zionist claims (incidentally one of our difficulties has been that the Jews have never given us any proposals. I have a feeling that this is due to disagreement among themselves). Or we might have concluded that the problem was insoluble by ourselves alone and referred the whole matter [to] the United Nations without making any recommendations. Even now we may be driven to adopt this course. But we thought it right first to make one more attempt to arrive at a settlement which would seem just to all reasonable people, through negotiation if possible, or at least with a fair prospect of acquiescence from the inhabitants of Palestine. I am sure you will understand my determination that the British Troops who fought for freedom in the late war shall not now be used to impose a policy by force in Palestine. And I think you will sympathise with us in exhausting our own resources of conciliation before we carry the matter to the United Nations.

We have given much thought to our obligations under the mandate. I am sincerely convinced that we have honestly carried them out hitherto, with the very important exception that we have not found it possible to develop self-governing institutions. We have now decided that a time has come when the peoples living in Palestine must be made to accept responsibility for their own fate. We cannot go on for ever maintaining an alien rule over that country. First objective of our new policy is therefore to make Palestine independent after a short period of transition, which we have fixed at five years.

I think you will find that our proposals are consistent with the present mandate. This has the great advantage that, if we find we can carry them into effect, we can begin to do so without waiting for the conclusion of a Trusteeship Agreement, but we intend to seek international approval of our policy through the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement as soon as possible.

During period of transition, the High Commissioner would try to [Page 1037] form an Advisory Council, and would be guided as far as possible by its advice. We have left composition of this body open for negotiation. It is obviously a very difficult point to decide, but we have provided that, even if we cannot give numerical parity to the Jews and Arabs, the High Commissioner should pay attention to views of the minority as well as of the majority. We have also thought it logical that, as soon as a central representative organ is established in Palestine, the Jewish population should deal with the High Commissioner through the Jewish members of that body and not through the Executive of the Jewish Agency, which represents Jews in all parts of the world. An international organisation cannot be embodied in the constitution of any country.

We have thought it right, especially as a safeguard for the development of a Jewish National Home, to provide for local areas with a large measure of autonomy. Our difficulty here is of course to de-limit Arab and Jewish areas. As you are aware it is impossible to find in all Palestine, apart from Tel Aviv and its environs, any sizable area with a Jewish majority. But we are still working on this problem and I think we shall solve it and in due course produce a reasonable map.

The vexed question of immigration has worried me more than anything else. I think that time has come to refer it, if the Arabs and Jews cannot agree, to international arbitration. This we have provided for at the end of two years. But in the immediate future we felt we should ask Palestine to make a special contribution to the relief of distress in Europe. We had also in mind President Truman’s desire to see 100,000 immigrants admitted into Palestine. The proposals therefore guarantee the entry of approximately that number before international arbitration is invoked. To admit them in a shorter period than two years would probably cause an upheaval.

After four years, we hope to hold elections for a constituent assembly, and to put before the Palestinians themselves the problem of constituting their independent state. If they cannot agree on how to become independent, we shall ask the Trusteeship Council to advise us on our next move.

The initial reaction of the Arabs to our proposals is sharply hostile, and I cannot say that I hope for a better reception by the Jews. I realise that you will receive strong representations against our proposals from sections of American public opinion. But I think that if you imagine yourself in my position you will agree that this last attempt we are making to solve the problem ourselves is just and reasonable.

[
Ernest Bevin
]
  1. Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Sir John Balfour, the British Minister, on February 9.