Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

890B.00/2–547: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

London, February 5, 1947—6 p. m.

789. Meeting Arab Delegation and British Delegation yesterday according Beeley lasted 2½ hours and was marked by “gloves off” attitude from both sides. See Embtel 771 February 5¹ for agreed statement issued conclusion meeting.

1. Faris el-Khoury opened meeting with formal statement Arab case in general terms and concluded with thought that October Arab Delegation proposals represent only just and equitable settlement. Delegates from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt elaborated some points made by el-Khoury but said nothing of special interest.

2. Jamal Husseini said he desired to appeal to Creech Jones and Bevin as Socialists. He said that leaving aside dispute between Arabs and Jews, Palestine constituted a serious social problem as result of congestions on land in Arab parts of Palestine where even now average Arab farmer has insufficient land to support his family. Within next twenty years high Arab fertility will still more seriously congest land even if no more immigrants are admitted. He asked whether mandatory under a Socialist government did not feel responsible for this growing social problem.

3. British Delegation “did its best” to present Zionist counterarguments to Arab plan and discussion followed until el-Khoury interrupted to say that he wanted to cut these useless arguments short. Would British Delegation answer two questions?

(a) Do British intend to propose partition or a course which would lead to partition?

(b) Do British intend to permit continuance of Jewish immigration into Palestine?

4. Bevin said that he could not answer first question but that he would put Arab views against partition to Cab[inet]. (At this point a member of Arab Delegation evoked Arab applause by stating “partition means war”). To second question Bevin said that Arabs had better wait until they had seen British proposals. However, public opinion in Britain believed that further Jewish immigration should take place. He intended to put this question before Cab also.

5. At one point Bevin made appeal, mentioned in reference statement, for more yielding attitude on part of Arab Delegation.

6. Bevin said that he would within a few days and after consulting Cab lay before Arab Delegation British proposals in some form.

7. Beeley said that proposals Bevin had in mind were those promised Jewish Agency Delegation at February 3rd meeting (Embtel 752, paragraph 8, February 4th). At first Bevin had thought he would put in “personal paper” without commitment as a basis of discussion and this was what he had in mind when he talked to Jewish Agency Delegation. However, Bevin has changed his mind and decided that before any paper is submitted to either side, Cab must be consulted. Consequently, neither Jewish Agency Delegation nor Arab Delegation will receive proposals from British before Cab gives its clearance which may be obtained either tomorrow or Friday. Cab may decide that proposals should be submitted as Bevin originally intended, (i.e. without commitment) or it may decide that they should be submitted with full backing British Government subject only approval UN. A third but unlikely possibility is that Cab might decide that British should give no proposals to the two Delegations.

8. Beeley said that he had been working with others night and day on British proposals which he felt represented “an honorable and reasonable attempt to avoid choosing sides”. He was not free to go into details regarding them but it was clear that they envisaged a bi-national unitary state. He thought that proposals would please neither side but that they represented a fair and just approach. Beeley indicated that early increased Jewish immigration was involved “at least in the draft as it now stands.”

9. One important virtue of proposals now in draft was that lawyers would possibly consider them to be within terms of mandate and thus, if Cab so decided, they could be put into effect at once.

Gallman

1. Not printed.