891.6363/9–1547
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
Lord Inverchapel1 called by appointment and read me a portion of a communication from London2 which indicated some anxiety on the part of the Foreign Office to make plain to us the position which the [Page 954] British had taken in connection with the Iranian problem on Soviet oil concessions. The concern of the British apparently arose out of newspaper accounts which quoted the precise language of the British representative, Mr. Le Rougetel, who is said to have advised the Iranians to adopt an “open door” policy toward Russia. Inverchapel said that this was an unfortunate choice of words and that what the British meant was that the Iranians, instead of giving the Russians a flat turndown as a result of Majlis’ action, should endeavor to continue discussions and thereby have an opportunity to drag their feet, an occupation at which Inverchapel said the Iranians were most experienced. He said he did not think that the British and American positions differed and he expressed high approval of the attitude taken by this Government and the comments made by Mr. Allen. In the latter part of the message from London the Foreign Office had asked what we proposed to do in the way of aid to Iran in the event of an attack by the Soviets. I told him that we would obviously support the Iranian case to the utmost within the United Nations organization, but that we had likewise assumed that the Iranians could not effectively defend themselves from the Russians. I asked him what the British position was and he said that they had reached the same conclusion and that neither the British Government nor the British people could be expected to send British troops in to fight Russia.
Inverchapel asked whether or not Iran would not be better off by giving Russia a concession in the North. I told him that we had given the matter long and careful consideration and that it was my recollection that we had concluded that if Russia were given an oil concession in the North, to all intents and purposes that was the equivalent of ceding the territory to Russia, as she would never get out and would infiltrate her people into the district in large numbers. The problem, therefore, in somewhat over-simplified form, was whether or not Russia should be permitted to take the North by invitation or whether the Iranians should make her fight for it and thereby label her as an aggressor. Inverchapel said he thought this stated the question very neatly and realistically, and indicated that he felt that we had a somewhat freer choice in the decision than Britain had because we were not in Iran with an oil concession.
I suggested that if he wanted more detail on the position of this Government he could obtain it by having his specialists get in touch with our geographical divisions.
- The British Ambassador.↩
- This refers, presumably, to a Foreign Office telegram of September 13 which was shown by officials of the Eastern Department to an officer of the American Embassy on September 15. Telegram 5030, September 17, from London, reported that the officials described the telegram “as an ‘effort to clear up any remaining misunderstanding between US and UK’. Earlier paragraphs this message asked rhetorically whether US realizes dangers which may follow if Iran provokes USSR to drastic action . . . . While telegram was general re-hash of British fears and doubts, it ends with strong paragraph recognizing that US and UK attitudes vis-à-vis Iran must be identical.” (891.6363/9–1747)↩