891.6363/9–947: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
866. British Ambassador’s advice to Qavam and Shah, on instructions from Bevin, that Iran should not close door to further negotiations with USSR regarding oil, has been taken by both Shah and Qavam as indication that British Government has weakened in face of Soviet threats and now wishes Iran to grant USSR petroleum concession. [Page 949] Shah, who has discussed matter with me at length, says Qavam is now preparing some sort of proposal to Soviets on oil. Shah clearly considers that situation has materially deteriorated since British Ambassador’s advice. It seems evident that although Qavam has assured me he would not be frightened by Soviet threats, he has been, and that he has seized on the British advice as an excuse to change his position. He can now tell the deputies privately that he himself would never have weakened but could do nothing else in face of British advice.
When Shah reminded Qavam that practically all members of Majlis had declared their opposition to any oil agreement with Soviets, Qavam replied that if deputies felt events were running towards renewed Soviet influence in Iran, they would change their views overnight and would hurry to make their peace with Soviets. Qavam referred to situation in 1912 [1911] when Russia gave Iran ultimatum to discharge Morgan Sinister as Director General of Finance. Qavam said Majlis was 100 percent against acceptance but when Britain advised compliance with Russian demands, deputies did so without demurrer.
Shah seemed resigned to inevitability of Government’s making oil proposal to USSR in view of British advice. He referred to considerable British influence in Majlis and to constitutional limitations which prevented him from taking strong action himself. Shah asked me what else Iran could do when only reply US gave to Iranian requests for aid was to refer to UN, which he characterized as a fiasco. Shah said that if we would give Iran direct support as we are Greece and Turkey, Iran would have something dependable to rely on.
I did not conceal my disappointment at Shah’s slighting reference to UN. I said Iran had more reason than any other nation to appreciate value of that organization and emphasized that American determination to base its policy on UN was in Iran’s own best interests. US could defend itself from aggression without UN, but Iran could not. I said it seemed to me that what His Majesty really wanted was a straight old-fashioned bilateral military guarantee from US. If so, I thought this was worst thing he could ask for, in Iran’s own interest. Suppose, I continued, we gave him such a guarantee. It would not last, since it would not be based on sufficient American national interests to warrant American people in supporting it very long. American national concern with Iran would not justify our committing all our man-power and resources merely to guarantee that the people of Azerbaijan continue under Persian rule. I believe, however, that American people would continue to support world organization dedicated to prevention of aggression anywhere.
Although British attitude has complicated matters greatly, I do not [Page 950] despair of situation. While few Iranians are able to see beyond the events of the moment, Shah is somewhat more far-sighted than others and constant repetition of our point of view has some effect on him. Certain leaders of Majlis who call on me regularly are also capable of understanding our position. In view of Qavam’s continued illness and fact that there is still technically no government in office,1 I have refrained from calling on him for past several days but plan to do so shortly.
Sent Department 866; Department pass to London as 108 and Moscow as 98.
- Airgram A–158, September 30, from Tehran reported that Prime Minister Qavam had resigned as Prime Minister with the convening of the Majlis. He presented his new government and program to the Majlis on September 14 (891.00/9–3047).↩