Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

891.6363/8–2347: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

secret
us urgent

Washington, August 23, 1947—2 p. m.

3655. Brit Min Balfour called at Dept Aug 20 on instructions his Govt discuss problem of Soviet desire oil concessions Iran. He read from two telegrams just received from For Off. One reported conversation between Bevin and Iranian Amb London calling under instructions similar Iranian Min Washington Aug 19 to ask what support Iran might expect in case Sov Union became aggressive in efforts force Iran grant Sov oil concession. Other telegram outlined Bevin’s tentative thinking re reply Iranian inquiry whether Brit would give more than moral assistance in case of trouble with Sov Union arising from Iranian refusal.

First tel indicated Bevin replied to Iranian Amb that he needed time to study question before giving final answer but stated tentatively his personal feeling Iran should meticulously live up to any undertakings given Sov Union. Bevin apparently tempered this remark with further statement that any Sov-Iranian oil arrangement should of course be one freely negotiated, fair and business-like and satisfying to Iranian Govt that concession would not be likely endanger integrity Iran. He indicated such arrangement not likely to result from apparent “take it or leave it” attitude Sov Govt. He felt nevertheless that Iranian Govt would do well to announce it was prepared to carry out its undertakings and to negotiate oil concession agreement on terms acceptable both parties and which would not endanger integrity and independence of Iran.

Second tel revealed Bevin’s tentative thinking on final reply to Iranian Govt might be along following lines:

Iranian Govt should make known to world it would not repudiate its undertakings and was prepared, subject Majlis approval, to negotiate detailed agreement based on principles original proposal. To safeguard interests of Iran Iranian Govt would probably wish to stipulate specific conditions under which joint company would operate. General principles already agreed upon would therefore require considerable elaboration. Should Majlis reject basis of original agreement it should be careful not to close door on further negotiations but indicate conditions under which it might enter another agreement. If Sov Govt should use force as means of obtaining concession and if independence of Iran should thus be seriously endangered Iran should appeal to SC. Brit support of Iranian independence in past sufficiently demonstrated Brit desire to see independence that country respected. It was believed premature however for Iran to appeal to SC at this stage.

In second tel Bevin asked Brit Emb to ascertain State Dept thinking. He would like to have US and UK if possible keep in step in matter.

When Balfour inquired present American attitude we outlined substance conversation Aug 19 with Iranian Min (Deptel 497 to Tehran Aug 20 rptd London and Moscow) which conversation Emb London might advise For Off (London’s 4545 Aug 21¹). We indicated our understanding Iranian Govt had entered no commitment with Sov Govt grant oil concession. Our info and we believe Brit Govt info likewise was that Qavam in return for Russian promise withdrawal Sov troops from northern Iran had agreed to present to Majlis proposal that Iran grant oil concession under certain conditions to Sov Union. We said that, although we were not advising Iran whether or not it should grant concession we did not feel there would be violation of any Sov-Iranian agreement if Majlis refused to approve granting concession. We added that manner in which Sov Govt had withdrawn its troops from northern Iran leaving behind agents to maintain Sov control Azerbaijan had greatly increased Iranian suspicions re long-range Sov attitude toward Iran. By Sov actions since Qavam–Sadchikov agreement Apr 4, 1946 Sov Union had furnished considerable justification for belief we understand held by many members Majlis that Sov Union would take advantage of any kind of foothold obtained in Iran through oil concession or otherwise in order undermine independence that country.

It seemed to us that by leaving door open for further discussions one of two results would be likely: either crisis in Sov-Iranian relations would be prolonged and thus become more bitter or Iranians would gradually be worn down by Russian insistence to point of finally granting concessions which they believed not in long-range interests of Iran.² In this connection Iranian Min’s simile seemed fairly apt namely for Iran to carry on negotiations of this kind with Sov Union would be like a mouse trying to carry on negotiations with a cat.

We obtained impression that Balfour was inclined to agree with our views in this matter.

Sent London as Dept’s 3655 rptd Tehran as Dept’s 501 and Moscow as Dept’s 1637.

Lovett

1. Not printed.
2. According to telegram 4729, August 30, from London, the British Foreign Office, on August 28, informed Ambassador Le Rougetel that although anxious to avoid giving advice to the Iranians differing from that of the United States, some advice was necessary to prevent the accusation that Mr. Bevin was obstructing the granting of oil facilities to the Soviet Union. The Ambassador was instructed to express the opinion that the Iranian Government should consider whether it would not be advisable, for the Majlis, if it rejected the agreement, to make a gesture to mollify the Soviet Union (891.6363/8–3047).