891.00/6–2847: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran ( Allen ) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

579. I conveyed contents of Department’s 337, June 21 to Qavam on June 25. (Receipt of correct text was delayed by transmission difficulty.) While Qavam showed regret that we were unable to accord the military supplies as a gift, he appreciated Department’s reasoning and advice that he should appeal to SC if and when he has positive reason to believe that Iran independence is threatened and he understands [Page 919] our refusal to make representations to Soviet Government at present time.

He said that the occasion for representations to SC might well arise after the opening of the Majlis because he did not propose to take any further action of any kind regarding Soviet oil proposals and Soviet Government might react strongly against Iran on this count. (Qavam’s attitude appears to be that he has put the Soviet Government on notice that their existing oil proposals are inadequate and that the next move is up to the Kremlin to make new proposals.)

On the question of according arms free of charge, I pointed out that the present Greek and Turkish Govts are regarded by the Kremlin as entirely objectionable and that there is little pretence of any friendly negotiations between the USSR and those two countries. I said that if President Truman had included Iran along with Greece and Turkey in his message to Congress, we would have automatically placed Iran in the same category vis-à-vis the USSR as the other two countries are. I said we could not have taken this step without ascertaining in advance whether the Iran Govt desired to be placed in this category. I recalled that Iran was still negotiating with the USSR concerning many questions, including the gold which he was endeavoring to recover from the Soviet State Bank.1 Qavam agreed that Iran was not yet ready to be placed in the same category as Greece and Turkey. He added, however, that Iran might become in that category shortly after the Majlis opened because of the oil question. He wanted to know whether we would treat Iran the same as we are treating Greece and Turkey if the situation as regards Iran should become identical with that of Greece and Turkey.

I said that I had no instructions in this regard that situations would have to be met as they arose, that situations were seldom identical and that, moreover, identical action was not always possible or desirable anyway. I reiterated the American position as set forth in Department’s 221, May 2.

The conversation went off surprisingly satisfactorily and ended with expressions of appreciation by Qavam for our continued interest and support. I am not certain, however, that Qavam accepts as final our refusal to accord the arms as a gift and he may delay presentation of [Page 920] the credit agreement to Majlis for a while hoping that something will happen outside Iran (either a definite agreement between the Western Powers and USSR or a definite disagreement) which will somehow relieve him of the necessity of fighting through Majlis an agreement calling for large appropriations for arms which is certain to encounter opposition in the Majlis and which Qavam himself does not genuinely like. While he recognizes that the agreement gives Iran an excellent opportunity to acquire much needed military supplies at a most favorable price, he still thinks Iran cannot afford to spend 30 to 40 million dollars on arms at this time.

Sent Department 579.

Department pass London 75 and to Moscow 67.

Allen
  1. The reference is to the Soviet-Iranian financial agreement, which was signed at Tehran on March 18, 1943, and expired on March 2, 1946. By the latter date, the Soviet State Bank owed the Bank Melli Iran 11,196,070.30 grams of gold, equivalent to approximately $12,600,000, and an additional sum of about $8,400,000 to balance exchange accounts. In despatch 429, June 7, the Embassy in Tehran forwarded translations of two notes on the matter, dated February 4 and May 26, 1947, as published in the Tehran press, which had been delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, by Iranian Ambassador Firouz. The text of the agreement was forwarded at the same time (891.51/6–747). For contemporary references to the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 345, 632.