761.91/4–2847: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
329. Prime Minister asked me to come to see him urgently yesterday to inform me that Soviet Ambassador has recently made strenuous complaints to members of Iranian Cabinet against the “anti-Soviet and pro-American policy of the present Iranian Government”. Prime Minister showed considerable concern over situation and asked me to request urgently any observations or suggestions of American Government in the light of this latest Soviet pressure.
He said Soviet Ambassador had referred at length to assistance USSR had rendered Iran in past, for which Iran had shown no appreciation, and that recent Soviet efforts to assist Iran, notably Soviet offers of arms and ammunition, spurned in an unfriendly manner. Ambassador spoke at length regarding “generous” proposal of USSR for 50–50 commercial aviation company, which he said Qavam had continually put off on “ridiculous and untrue claim” that such an arrangement would be contrary to Chicago aviation agreements.1 Instead, Ambassador claimed Iran had encouraged formation of air American airline in Iran, with American pilots, who incidentally had flown over Soviet border towns such as Ashkhabad, which Soviet Government could not tolerate.
Soviet Ambassador then referred to American military missions in Iran, which he claimed were in direct operational control of the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie. He mentioned other American advisors and Morrison–Knudsen engineers and said that Iranian plans for economic development of country through dollar loans would result in full American economic as well as military control. He added that Qavam’s action in drawing up 7-year economic plan without consulting USSR was not friendly. He warned that new troubles might easily arise if things continued as they are.
Numerous smaller grounds for complaint against Iran were added by Ambassador, such as delivery by Iran of only 29,000 tons of rice last year when 30,000 had been promised, and recent difficulties caused by Iranian customs and monopoly officials in connection with Soviet trade. (Qavam said these “difficulties” have consisted of recent Iranian requirement that Soviet imports pass through Iranian customs and that monopoly goods be sold only to Iranian Government. Only during last month or two have Soviet imports even been asked to pass through [Page 907] Iranian customs, for first time since Soviet military occupation of northern Iran in 1941. Soviets still openly disregard Iran monopoly administrations for sugar, textiles, etc. Soviet trade delegation illegally sells imports direct to merchants at greatly inflated prices.)
Qavam asked that the matter be kept in strictest confidence, since Iranian relations with USSR would be rendered even more difficult if by any chance Soviets learned that Iranians had informed us. He would welcome our view whether, in light of Moscow conference, Soviet Ambassador’s representations indicated new Soviet campaign against Iran, now that their way is blocked in Greece and Turkey. He also wanted to know whether we could be prepared to support Iran in case of need. He referred to necessity for Iran to raise standard of living in order to combat Soviet propaganda here, and said he would welcome assurance that we will support Iran’s application for International Bank development loan when formally presented.
I said I would request urgent reply.
Last night Shah asked me to dine with him for long discussion of same subject. Shah was not quite as disturbed as Qavam and said he was prepared to meet even stronger Soviet pressure until after oil concession question was settled. Shah mentioned again our offer to give arms to Turkey, but said that on the whole he thought it just as well we had not included Iran in Greek-Turkish aid program since as it is, Iranian refusal of Soviet oil concession would appear as independent Iranian decision and not as action prompted by US. Shah is most anxious, however, to obtain indication of our support in obtaining development loan.
I expressed confidence to both Shah and Qavam that there had been no change in our policy of supporting Iran to extent Iran shows its determination to oppose aggression, and advised them to pay no attention to Soviet Ambassador’s threats.
Repeated London 48. Department pass to Moscow at 43.
- The reference is to the agreements adopted at the International Civil Aviation Conference which was held at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944; for documentation on the Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 355 ff.↩