891.00/3–2747: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran ( Allen ) to the Secretary of State
226. During a conversation with the Shah yesterday he expressed appreciation for American efforts to assist Greece and Turkey1 and was much pleased to have received word from Ambassador Ala that Iran would probably be similarly supported if similar need should arise. The Shah expressed some uncertainty, however, concerning reasons for our insistence that Iran make large dollar outlays on a loan basis, with interest, for military supplies at the time we were being so generous to others. He said it appeared we were planning to make further outright gifts of military supplies to Turkey in addition to the large amount of such supplies we had furnished Turkey under Lend-Lease during the war.
I cited the statements by Under Secretaries Acheson and Clayton before Congressional committees, as reported in recent radio bulletins, and said that the emergency in Greece and Turkey resulted from their being under immediate threats. The Shah said that while Iran seemed fortunately not the primary target for Soviet attack at the moment, continued lack of security in Iran and weakness of the Iranian Army would only invite renewed Soviet activity here. He felt it shortsighted to allow this weakness to continue and thereby invite an attack which could be forestalled by assistance to Iran with military supplies now.
I pointed out that in several telegrams which I had received from the Department prior to and during the Azerbaijan crisis, the Department had stated that the American Government was willing to support the independence of a member of the United Nations to the extent that that country showed willingness to fight for its own independence.2 The Shah replied that Persia’s recent action in recovering its sovereignty over Azerbaijan had been at very considerable risk of involvement with the USSR and he felt Iran’s determination to fight for its independence had been amply demonstrated very recently.
With particular reference to the statement by Mr. Clayton that nonproductive credits i.e. military supplies would be accorded Greece and Turkey as a grant, the Shah asked why we were so “severe” with Iran, demanding payments with interest. I said that each case must be considered on its merits and that ability to pay was one consideration. He expressed confidence that Turkey’s ability to pay was much greater than Iran’s, due to Turkey’s large foreign exchange holdings built up during the war.
[Page 902]The Shah’s remarks were made in an entirely friendly manner and he raised no objection to any assistance the United States might render any other country. It was clear, however, that while he understood the immediate necessity for assistance to Greece, in view of the actual guerrilla attacks across Greece’s northern border, he failed to understand why Turkey appeared to be treated so much better than Iran. As far as Soviet claims against the Dardanelles3 were concerned, he said that these were primarily radio attacks and that as far as physical aggression against the Straits was concerned, Turkey would certainly have the full support of the United Nations in case of any armed Soviet aggression, just as Iran and every other nation would.
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.↩
- See telegram 976, November 22, to Tehran, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 546.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 801 ff.↩