867.00/3–447: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
157. Department’s telegram 98, February 28. Comments and suggestions re note on Turkey as follows:
- (1)
- Our thinking in this matter based on assumption that Turkey is not faced with likelihood imminent attack. Probability exists continuance for several years present war of nerves by USSR but not aggression resulting in general war.
- (2)
- Recommendations as to material assistance for Turkish armed forces must necessarily depend upon mission which we expect those [Page 91] forces to perform. If we plan to give effective support to Turkey then presumably we want Turkish armed forces in case of ultimate aggression against Turkey to carry out delaying action providing us time to come to their support. If on other hand we decide against direct support for operations in Turkey then presumably we should want Turkish forces resist long as possible inflict major losses on enemy with maximum employment guerrilla tactics. In absence knowledge decision on this point our assumption is that we plan bring effective support to Turkey in case she is attacked.
- (3)
- Bearing in mind assumption under paragraph 1 above that no immediate aggression likely and war of nerves continue indefinitely we estimate Soviet policy towards Turkey as aimed at obliging Turkey keep large standing army thereby in long run hoping disrupt Turkish economy. Therefore in any program improve Turkish military establishment we must be careful not unconsciously play Soviet game by saddling Turkey with too heavy financial burden for equipment furnished. We should either make military equipment available at nominal cost or if we insist on anything like full payment should bear in mind that Turkey’s relatively limited ability service additional loans will mean whatever goes for military purposes that much less will be available for economic projects. We should also bear in mind many economic projects, e.g. communications, transport, port developments, would improve Turkey’s overall defense position.
[Here follows paragraph numbered 4 giving replies to specific points raised in telegram 98.]
Colonel Roberts’ estimate as follows: In making any estimate of probable extent of US military obligations to Turkey it must be assumed that (a) war between Turkey and a first class power is not imminent and (b) present strength of Turkish armed forces is maximum that can and will be maintained. Also considered that any long range reorganization of Turkish Army with view to increasing its efficiency by mechanization and motorization while maintaining present strength will be subject limitations imposed by ruggedness of terrain combined with very poor road net and inadequate rail communications. Added is fact that men capable of being trained in use of modern equipment are very ones required to increase industrial capacity of country. For these reasons it is believed a real modernization of Turkish armed forces will be long slow process and that meanwhile best procedure is fully to equip these forces with arms, ammunition and equipment with which they are familiar.
The best available index of immediate Turkish requirements is contained in list Military Attaché handed Director Intelligence last October. List was accompanied by troop basis of Turkish Army. List was however obtained from Turkish General Staff at time when they expected [Page 92] imminent attack and hence represents what they believed would be needed within period of months if not weeks in order sustain all-out attack. Military Attaché has just been requested to call at General Staff to discuss new list requirements. Possible that new list will show longer range needs with emphasis on training rather than combat. Immediate report will be made. In any case recommend War Department agencies which have latest data on combat and training requirements, not in possession this office, make study of Turkish list as compared their troop basis. Point here is that assuming Turks must pay for what they get, there is no use letting them load up with war stocks when what they currently need is only enough for thorough training. An example of this is list of ammunition requirements which appear too large for training needs only.
Should be borne in mind however that Turkish Army is deficient in some categories which should be supplied soon as possible. Most outstanding is additional tank division which would be vital to successful defense of Erzurum Arnj against airborne attack. Yet no request for such unit equipment appeared in October list, possibly because they thought not time to organize and train troops.
Another important point is that since large part Turkish Army equipment is German and since only partial and temporary replacement can be made from available German stocks, it obvious that eventually bulk of replacements must come from US sources. This must be long range project.
It is noted that British intimate they could supply navy and air force needs. Connection air force it was idea of General Ritchie AAF plans1 thought [that?] some squadrons of our combat planes should be furnished Turks as their ground echelon would be at least some extent familiar our combat types. Military Attaché believes this warrants careful consideration.
This preliminary estimate will be supplemented on receipt General Staff information.
- This reference is presumably to Brig. Gen. William L. Ritchie, Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army Air Forces.↩