501.BC Greece/5–847: Telegram
Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State
us urgent
niact
274. Ethridge 65. There seems to be basic misapprehension on part of Department (Deptel 3131) as to the facts Commission has uncovered and area of its investigation. The investigation has been primarily concerned with hearing evidence as to extent to which and methods by which three northern neighbors gave aid to the guerrilla movement in Greece. Very little attention was paid by the Commission to the question of frontier incidents except in so far as they evidenced the help that was being given by the northern neighbors to the guerrillas. For example, three most important incidents on the frontier (Skra, Sourmena, Idhomeni) showed clearly that the partisans retreated from Greece across the frontier thus making it clear to the Commission that one form of aid being given by northern neighbors was providing an avenue of escape for partisans who would otherwise be captured by the Greek Government forces. Those incidents were of course [Page 846] “border violations” and so were cases which showed that northern neighbors helped refugees who had fled from Greece return to Greece in order to join the guerrilla bands. It is not on other hand a “frontier violation” for the northern neighbors to have trained Greek refugees in art of guerrilla warfare nor to have given them military equipment and arms in Yugoslavia nor to have conducted a campaign of political indoctrination inimical to Greece while they were in the camp at Bulkes.
Each country provided the Commission with list of so-called frontier violations which each alleged were symptomatic of aggressive intentions on part of government complained against. These incidents ranged in importance from penetration of border of few yards to sheep stealing to exchanges of shots by border patrols. They are the sort of incidents and “frontier violations” which have been occurring in the Balkans for centuries. It would have been obviously absurd for the Commission to have attempted to have made a detailed investigation of each illegal frontier crossing and to assess the blame. The Commission would have investigated any evidence which tended to show that these illegal crossings were in fact part of a systematic plan of provocation by one country against another but none was brought forward. Accordingly in our proposed conclusions we say that.; to have said otherwise on the basis of the evidence would have been nonsense.
Thus we see no inconsistency between our conclusions as to Part I and Part III.
As to conclusions (3) (4) and (5) under Part V much of the explanation above is applicable to them. As to (3) the facts are that of approximately 1,000 battles and clashes with the guerrillas which have occurred since March 1946, about 700 occurred in the Greek provinces adjacent to the frontier. The remainder occurred in many other districts of central and southern Greece. Thus the conclusion is inevitable and does no more than state a fact which is apparent to anyone who has analyzed situation as all members of the Commission have.
As to (4) and (5) the facts are that northern neighbors in their efforts to help Communists get control of Greece, opportunistically took advantage of fact that about 20,000 refugees from Greece had fled into Yugoslavia and about 5,000 into Bulgaria. Some of these were the people who were trained, indoctrinated and, in some cases, sent back to Greece to join the guerrillas. Of those who sought and who are still seeking refuge in the territories of northern neighbors a substantial number fled because they had been persecuted in Greece or because they feared persecution. For the same reason many joined the guerrilla [Page 847] bands. Thus to that extent Greece itself by its own shortsighted attitude and by its discriminatory and gangster-like methods was providing grist for the mill of political indoctrination and training in northern countries. It is noteworthy that very large proportion of the refugees from Greece are Slavo Macedonians who bore the burnt of discrimination. It seems clear to me that unless the discriminatory treatment stops flight to mountains or across frontiers will not stop. Thus this is interrelation between nature and causes of trouble and conclusion that Greek discrimination had caused thousands to flee. I, of course, agree that this does not in any way lessen primary responsibility of the north countries as stated in my telegram 64.2 French are informally circulating a memorandum in support of their position that Commission should not reach any conclusions. Delay in circulating our conclusions, which I believe are best argument that we can put forward to counter French position, will make it easier for the French to gain adherents to their position. Accordingly I do not think that we should delay circulation beyond Sunday morning and unless I hear from the Department to the contrary will circulate them then. They will of course be stated as preliminary and tentative and subject to modification.
With respect to recommendations, because of the nature of the causes of disturbances in Greece and minor importance of most violations of the frontier, we did not limit proposed commission to authority to act as an agent of conciliation only to frontier violations. I can, of course, be so limited if Department wishes but in my view to have this Commission perform its labors for so many months and come out such a mouse would, I feel, lower prestige of the Commission and the SC.
It must be underlined that ordinary incidents on frontier are not cause of the trouble in Greece nor are they even symptom of it. Frontier violations have gone on for centuries and will continue and recommendation for the reestablishment of the border convention will take care of this aspect. The term threatening frontier situation is meaningless and without any relation to actual situation. Furthermore it is difficult for me to understand why sanctity is given to a proposed recommendation formulated by the Department in mid-February before the Commission had uncovered any facts.
I, of course, recognized the importance of not broadening the terms of reference of the Commission so as to permit any member to use it to delay or forestall the US program. On the other hand I do not see how giving the Commission power to act as an agency of conciliation for disputes between Greece and its northern neighbors of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the charter would have this result. British draft, of course, is not limited to border violations. I would like to [Page 848] have firm instructions on this point as undoubtedly within next several days an effort will be made to merge the US and UK recommendations into a single document which will have the approval of majority.
Hope Department will understand importance of fastest possible action on its part in replying to our inquiries and in authorizing release of tentative draft of conclusions. Friendly countries wait on American Delegation for leadership. In fact we have initiated every major proposal which Commission has so far adopted even to abortive proposal for temporary team which, to avoid appearance of too much aggressiveness, we turned over to British. Even now nobody is preparing conclusions except the Russians. Five Delegations have requested copies of our draft and I am in position of having to say to them that they will have to wait a few days even though everybody knows the British have seen them.
The drafting committee is almost through its factual analysis and we will probably move to conclusions next week. Delegations could have been studying them this week and we could probably by now have reached agreement on a draft. If we have sufficient time to have them studied by delegates we feel we can get enough delegates with us to stop any drift toward Daux’s idea.
Sent Department; repeated Athens, London as 7.
Department please repeat New York for Austin.