501.BC/8–1947: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

secret
us urgent

361. In conversation with Loy Henderson Aug 16 Azzam Pasha stated his belief that, in order to be acceptable to Egyptian Government, any SC solution of Anglo-Egyptian dispute should be more than simple recommendation by SC that parties resume negotiations. Azzam indicated that Egypt desires that possibility of third party mediation not be foreclosed. He strongly implied orally and in personal letter to Secretary,1 handed to Henderson at same time, that some form United States mediation was desired by Egypt.

You are fully aware Dept’s views re US mediation in this case (re Sec III, e Deptel 341 Aug 8). However, Dept suggests that in your conversations with Brit and Egyptian delegations you determine whether they might be receptive to SC resolution along following lines (re Par L[1?], Sec. III, Deptel 341, Aug 8 and Par f, Sec. III, Deptel 353, Aug 15).

SC takes note of statements made by Reps of UK, Egypt, and other SC members; SC expresses hope that Egypt and UK will resolve their differences by negotiation, mediation, or other peaceful means of their own choice at the earliest opportunity, and that they will report to the Council the results achieved therefrom.”

As you will note, this draft resolution would permit Egypt and UK to resort to other means of pacific settlement, in addition to negotiation, if they so desire. Dept still believes that UK would prefer not to have reference made to other means of peaceful settlement than negotiation. However, we believe that it is essential to have Egypt and UK agree upon a formula for the settling of this dispute as soon as possible. We recognize that legal position of UK in this case is based upon sound concepts of international law. We believe, however, that other aspects of situation must be considered and that efforts must be made to find solution which, while not weakening theory of sanctity of existing treaties, would nevertheless aid in resolving present differences between the UK and Egypt.

[Page 797]

For similar reasons, draft Brazilian resolution contained urtel 7572 would be acceptable to Dept. It might be more satisfactory to UK if reference to Art 33 Charter were omitted from Preamble. In addition, substitution of word “suggests” for “recommends” might be more palatable to UK. Formulation of paragraph (A) would give wider scope to possible methods of agreement if it were amended to read: “(A) To resume direct negotiations or seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice”. These suggestions are in hope that if resolution is so changed prior to its introduction in SC it will be more acceptable to the parties.

While the Dept has hitherto believed that there are no substantial reasons why matter should remain on list of those of which Council continues to be seized, Dept is now more inclined to believe that if leaving the matter on continuing list would aid in settling case and if it were made very clear that no guilt was being imputed to UK thereby (re part d, Sec. III, Deptel 353, Aug 15) it might be desirable to have matter retained on continuing list. One practical result which would be achieved from such action would be to lessen probability of case being referred by Egypt to GA.

Whether parties should report to SC on specific date has been studied in Dept. At present we are inclined to doubt wisdom of such a course, particularly if matter remains on SC continuing list. However, Dept leaves this to your discretion.

Attention London: Please inform FonOff of above views.

Sent NY 361. Repeated to London 3556. Cairo 1201.

Lovett
  1. Copy of the letter, dated August 13, handed to Mr. Henderson on August 16.
  2. Dated August 18, not printed; the draft resolution read: “The Security Council … considering that the pacific methods of adjustment provided for by Article 33 of the Charter have not been exhausted and that a settlement of the dispute may best be attained through resort of those methods:

    Recommends to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt:

    A)
    To resume direct negotiations and, should these negotiations fail, to seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice;
    B)
    To keep the Security Council informed of the progress of these negotiations.” (501.BC/8–1847)