Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BC/8–847: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

secret
us urgent

Washington, August 8, 1947—2 p. m.

341. Following is US position on Anglo-Egyptian case for your guidance.

I. Background:

On August 5, 1947 SC heard statements of Egyptian PriMin and representative of UK on Anglo-Egyptian controversy.¹

Egyptian PriMin stated to SC that dispute which has arisen with UK over presence Brit troops in Egyptian territory and administration and future status Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is endangering international peace and security. He claimed that presence foreign troops in Egyptian territory is infringement of Egyptian sovereignty, is contrary to wishes of Egyptian people, and is without legal sanction. Latter position is based on argument that Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which provides for stationing of Brit troops in Egypt is no longer valid because it was signed under duress, conditions have changed, and is contrary to UN Charter. Egyptian PriMin also maintained that question of administration and future status of Sudan was matter for “people of Nile Valley” to decide. He asked SC to direct immediate evacuation of all Brit forces from Egypt and the Sudan and to direct termination of administrative regime in the Sudan.

Reply of UK representative was devoted largely to a refutation of the claims of Egypt, i.e., UK representative asserted that Egyptian Govt had shown no grounds for SC action, since presence of Brit troops in Egypt and arrangements for Govt of the Sudan are based on valid treaties, freely negotiated and publicly acknowledged, which are continuing in force. He emphasized that Brit policy with respect to the future right of the Sudanese to choose their status would not be abandoned.

Hence, statements of both Egyptian PriMin and UK representative were, in fact, based principally on the question of the validity of the Treaty of 1936 as the legal sanction for presence of Brit troops in Egypt and for the present Govt of the Sudan.

Preliminary conversations between representatives of USUN and the two disputants have indicated that neither side is ready either to resume negotiations at this time or to accept a recommendation by SC that they do so. As to the possibility, however, that negotiations may be resumed, see Baghdad’s #318 of August 2.²

II. The Problem:

The withdrawal of the UK from Egypt sooner than the UK has already agreed upon raises serious questions involving the security of that area, questions which are of great interest to all Members of the UN. At the same time, in view of intensely nationalistic feeling in Egypt, this Govt has not wished to take position which would further complicate our relations with the peoples of the Near East. Moreover, should question arise as to whether Anglo-Egyptian question is dispute continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, we could not, on merits of question at the present time, support Egyptian position. Dept also wishes to minimize opportunity this case provides USSR to propagandize and perhaps propose solutions not in interests of this Govt or UN. Finally, prolonged argument of case in SC might have some adverse affects on American opinion.

For these reasons, US Govt is particularly interested in early settlement of controversy.

III. Recommendations:

It would be most desirable if UK and Egypt could agree to accept SC resolution recommending that parties continue negotiations or settle their dispute by peaceful means of their own choice. USUN should immediately explore this possibility with UK and Egyptian delegations. If, as seems likely, two parties cannot agree to a solution of this nature, USUN” should proceed along following lines:

a. US should immediately explore with UK and Egyptian representatives possibility of introduction of resolution at next meeting of SC by which SC would suggest to parties that case be referred to ICJ under terms of reference to be agreed upon by two parties. (Reference to ICJ could be made on legal issues and/or ex aequo et bono depending on which course most acceptable to two parties.)

It would be desirable if parties could agree in advance to such resolution and every effort by USUN should promptly be made to seek such agreement. In view of statements by member of UK Delegation, it is believed that UK would not oppose adoption of such a resolution. It is recognized, of course, that reference to ICJ of legal issues alone would most likely result in decision for UK, and that a court decision might not provide solution of some of the substantive issues which have been in dispute during negotiations between UK and Egypt. (Dept office of legal advisor has expressed opinion that 1936 Treaty is valid, continues in force, and is consistent with UN Charter. Dept regards these legal questions as justiciable by ICJ.) Egyptian delegate might prefer reference ex aequo et bono since equities in case could thereby be determined.

If it is thought that the two Governments would not oppose a resolution along above lines, US should make every effort to obtain agreement of another member of Council to introduce such a resolution at earliest opportunity. By an early action of this kind, possibility of protracted argument by other members of SC on case might be diminished. USUN has been advised that both Belgian and French representatives are thinking of a settlement of this nature.

b. If one or both parties will not accept reference to Court as proposed in above, USUN should explore acceptability of resolution suggesting that parties would settle dispute by submitting it to an arbitration tribunal of their own choice. In meantime matter could remain on list of those matters of which SC is seized and parties should report to SC results obtained.

c. In event that agreement of parties cannot be obtained in advance to one of aforesaid recommendations and parties are not themselves able to propose suitable alternative acceptable to US, USUN should seek agreement of Belgian or some other representative to introduce resolution recommended in paragraph “a”. If it is impossible to obtain consent of Belgian or some other representative on Council to introduce such a resolution, US should itself make such a proposal in next meeting of SC or as soon thereafter as practicable.

d. To avoid possible restrictions on future SC jurisdiction and politically undesirable reactions in Near East, Dept believes that it is important that SC avoid a decision as to whether this dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. In discussing with Egyptians proposal to refer case to Court, you may wish if other arguments prove unavailing, to point out to them as last resort that if SC must make determination US cannot agree that their complaint as it now stands establishes a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

e. For your information Dept would not agree to act as mediator in this dispute.

Sent to New York, repeated to London [as 3402] and Cairo [as 1161].

Marshall

1. For the statements by Prime Minister Nokrashy and British Representative Sir Alexander Cadogan, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 70, pp. 1745, 1767.
2. Not printed.