Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

741.83/7–1647: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, July 16, 1947—6 p. m.

3889. 1. Lascelles listened with deep interest to contents Dept’s 3003, July 14 re Egypt, and was most appreciative of Dept’s informal views. He said that negotiations were “stuck” and in these circumstances new thoughts on a subject are always helpful.

2. Following are Lascelles’ personal off-hand reactions to ideas in reftel:

(a). Troop evacuation date was given most careful consideration during Bevin–Sidky conversations and he doubted whether there is anything to be done on this score. First problem facing British is “where shall our troops go?” Situation is very different from that in India because there a complete evacuation from Indian area is taking place. This was not true in Middle East, With fate of Palestine in balance and future of Cyrenaica uncertain it is essential that British have in the area some operational troops. He said, “I imagine your general staff agrees that this is desirable.” Asked whether any distinction could be drawn between troops proper and service troops, Lascelles said he understood from British military that operationally speaking troops proper must be last to go. Lascelles indicated that if Cyrenaica or some other place should become available as British base before September 1949; there could be a speed-up of withdrawal from Egypt.

(b). Lascelles’ reaction to Dept’s suggested phrasing of first sentence of protocol was that it was “too general to be of practical use”. He said that when Sidky returned to Egypt, what up to that time had been thought a pretty clear statement, was made object of interpretation which British regard as serious distortion. Dept’s phrasing was even more general than original and he thought that if it were employed it would offer a much wider opportunity for disagreement re interpretation. He foresaw that if it were used, British Government would be asked in Parliament whether it meant that Sudanese would have free choice re their political future in accordance with assurances previously given Commons. When British Government answered yes, Egyptian Government in Egyptian Parliament would be likely to take contrary line. With more room for debate than existed in original protocol the battle of interpretations might be resumed. Lascelles had no doubt that Egyptians, with new room to maneuver in mind, would be pleased to sign in accord with Dept’s suggestion.

(c). Lascelles was most interested in Dept’s idea that consideration might be given to more active Egyptian participation in administrative development of Sudan. He said that so far as he knew there was no obstacle to investment of Egyptian capital in business enterprises and public works. As for participation at level of political administrators in Sudan, he thought that it is now “a bit late to attempt this”. In first place Egyptians by and large hate serving in Sudan and when posts are advertised in both UK and Egypt very few Egyptian candidates (and these mostly unsuitable) appear. Meanwhile, Sudanization of Sudan civil service is about 75 percent complete and this has led to decline in number of British officials. Those remaining must be highly qualified by 10 to 15 years service in Sudan and must be wholeheartedly devoted to Sudanization program. If there were to be an Egyptian official for every British official, only way this could be done would be to start training from bottom of Sudan civil service so that after about 15 years, Egyptian trainees would be ready for difficult and specialized work of political administrators. Experience has shown that Egyptians are only interested in going in at the top and British have good reason to fear that instead of selfless administrators, Egyptians would send politicians to Sudan.

(d). Re Dept’s idea of tripartite commission to work out in Sudan after comprehensive visit, details of Egyptian participation in Sudan administration, Lascelles said that during Bevin–Sidky talks British had offered with a view to bringing in Egyptians at a high level a permanent tripartite higher council to consider development of self-government for Sudanese but that this offer produced no reaction.

(e). Re Dept’s idea that Egypt might receive substantial support for its claim to equal share in operations of condominium, Lascelles agreed that this was likely because Sudan is sui generis and its problems are not readily understood. He said that “essential weakness” of British position re Sudan is that Egypt charges that British administration is influencing Sudanese against Egypt. British deny this but it is a case of word against word. Lascelles said that no decision has been taken but that he personally thought that only way to overcome this difficulty would be to have an international investigation of conditions in Sudan along lines of UN Commission sent to Greece in connection with border incidents. He knew that there are many difficulties inherent in use of such a commission but he was sure Sudan Government would welcome a thorough international investigation of British activities in Sudan. Asked whether he contemplated such a commission leaving behind a group to keep constant watch over situation, Lascelles said that he had not thought this through but off-hand he could see no objection to such a group provided “we are spared Russians or Poles”. Lascelles emphasized that idea of investigating commission has not been cleared in FonOff. He promised to advise Embassy if and when British adopt this as a line of policy vis-à-vis SC.

3. Lascelles made detailed notes and Embassy believes that even though Lascelles’ off-hand reactions to them are somewhat negative, Dept’s thoughts will be carefully considered in FonOff which fully appreciates circumstances in which they have been tendered.

Douglas