741.83/4–1847
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Wailes) to the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)
With respect to the attached telegram from Moscow,1 the Department (NEA, IS, BC) feels that the British have a very strong case. [Page 768] IS has examined at length all points which they feel the Egyptians could raise, and feel in general that these would be resolved in favor of the British. The specific issue raised in the telegram of British troops being on Egyptian soil in violation of Egyptian sovereignty has been studied carefully and it is felt that the British position is covered by the 1936 Treaty. We have turned down a British request that we should approach the Egyptians with a view to Egypt’s not bringing the matter before the United Nations, on the grounds that every country should have the right to bring complaints before the Assembly or Security Council. I see no grounds whatsoever for our even considering taking the leadership in helping out the Egyptians, at least until we have seen what they have to offer.2
- No. 1446, April 18, 10 p. m., not printed; it gave the text of a memorandum of conversation between Benjamin V. Cohen and the Egyptian Ambassador in the Soviet Union on April 15. The latter was reported as stating that “his government hoped that our government would take the leadership in securing a decision favorable to the position of Egypt in the Security Council” and indicated further that “if we did not take leadership, our position in the Near East would be misunderstood.” (741.83/4–1847) Mr. Cohen, who was the Counselor of the Department, was then serving as Counselor to the United States Delegation at the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947.↩
- Marginal notation by Mr. Hickerson: “I fully concur.”↩