Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

711.90F/1–1747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

top secret

[Washington,] January 17, 1947.

Participants:	Secretary Byrnes.
	Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary.
	Mr. Henderson, Director, NEA.
	Crown Prince Saud, Saudi Arabia.1
	Ambassador Sheikh Fuad Hamza.
	Sheikh Asad al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Minister to the the United States.

This morning, at the suggestion of Crown Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia, the Prince, accompanied by Sheikh Fuad Hamza and Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, called on the Secretary in order to continue the conversations which had begun yesterday in the White House¹ between the President, Mr. Byrnes, Crown Prince Saud, Sheikh Hamza and Sheikh Al-Faqih.

During the course of this morning’s discussions, which lasted for over an hour and a half, Sheikh Hamza acted as the interpreter and spokesman for the Crown Prince and in fact frequently took the leadership in presenting the views of the Saudi Arabians.

At the suggestion of the Secretary, the Arabs outlined and enlarged upon some of the statements which they had made to the President yesterday. The following represents some of the points which they made:

1. King Ibn Saud² had worked in a friendly manner with the British for many years; he valued British friendship and hoped that it would be possible for Saudi Arabia to continue to enjoy British cooperation and support. The Saudi Arabs had noted during recent years that as their economic relations with the United States became closer, there had been a certain cooling off in the British attitude toward Saudi Arabia, The Saudi Arabs had begun to have a feeling that the British were not as frank with them as previously and that the British might be preparing to give support to certain Arab circles which were definitely hostile to the Saud dynasty.

2. In establishing his kingdom on the Arabian Peninsula, King Ibn Saud had been obliged to drive out the Hashemite family, who had been rulers of the Hejaz and Sherifs of Mecca and Medina, including King Hussein and his sons, among whom were Ali,³ the father of the present King of Syria [sic] and later King of Iraq and grandfather of the present King of Iraq; and Abdullah, the present King of Trans-Jordan. The members of the Hashemite family were naturally hostile to the Saud family since they felt that the latter family had ousted them from their position as hereditary Sherifs of Mecca and Medina, and King Ibn Saud had reason to believe that they were plotting eventually to endeavor again to seize power in the Hejaz. King Ibn Saud had received information to the effect that the Hashemites were planning to set up a Greater Syria including Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Palestine or a part of Palestine, and perhaps Lebanon, under a Hashemite King. Such a state would be powerful and under Hashemite rule would be a definite menace to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian Government, therefore, could not tolerate the carrying out of such a plan. The Hashemites were without roots or influence anywhere in the Arab world and could not carry out any kind of a plan for the establishment of a Greater Syria without British support. King Ibn Saud was concerned lest the British were giving or would give support to such a Hashemite enterprise. The Hashemites had obtained the thrones occupied by them in Iraq and Trans-Jordan only with the aid of the British; they were British puppets; there might be a temptation on the part of certain British officials to extend British influence still further in the Arab world by broadening the territories under Hashemite rule;

3. King Ibn Saud desired the Crown Prince to ascertain what the attitude of the United States was with regard to the project of a Greater Syria. Could Saudi Arabia depend upon the full support of the United States in case, as a result of Hashemite intrigues, Saudi Arabia should find itself threatened by the formation of an anti-Saudi coalition to the north?

The following represents a summary of the reply made to the Saudi Arabians:

1. One of the basic policies of the United States in the Near East was unqualifiedly to support the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia. Another basic policy was energetically to make sure that the principles of the United Nations should be fully applied to the countries of the Near East, including Saudi Arabia. King Ibn Saud could therefore depend upon the full and active support of the United States in the United Nations in case any outside forces should threaten or endeavor to undermine the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the United States would support in the United Nations the integrity and independence of other countries such as Syria and Lebanon or Iraq in the event these countries should be threatened by aggression.

2. The United States had scrupulously refrained from engaging in any intrigues in the Near and Middle East. It did not support one group or one state against another. It believed that by not entangling itself in various internal struggles among Arabs in the Near East it could best serve the interests of peace in that area.

3. The Government of the United States did not have information which would cause it to believe that the British Government was giving support to any scheme for the extension of British influence in the Middle East through the establishment of a Greater Syria. It was possible that certain British officials or groups were interested in schemes of this kind although the Department was in possession of no evidence to that effect. It was believed, however, that the British Government itself would not desire developments to take place at this time which might disturb the status quo of the Near and Middle East.

During the course of further discussions on this subject, Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Government of the United States might contribute to the maintenance of peace in this part of the world by making inquiries and otherwise manifesting an interest whenever there were any indications that plans might be afoot to overthrow or menace by force governments of the Near and Middle East. He suggested that if King Ibn Saud at any time should receive specific information regarding political or military developments which might threaten Saudi Arabia, he might care to convey his information at once to the Government of the United States, which would then make appropriate inquiries. It was pointed out that last year King Ibn Saud was concerned about reports which he had received of certain designs harbored against him in Iraq; that he had expressed his concern to the American Government discreetly, [which?] without betraying the source of its information, had made inquiries in several capitals, including Baghdad and London; and that nothing threatening to Saudi Arabia had materialized.

The Saudi Arabians asked if it would be possible in the future for King Ibn Saud to discuss with the American Government with the utmost frankness all his problems and all his fears and for the American Government similarly to discuss frankly with King Ibn Saud its problems and its concerns in the Near and Middle East. Mr. Byrnes replied that he hoped that King Ibn Saud would feel free to discuss with the American Government frankly any of his problems and the American Government on its part would not hesitate to take up with the King any matters which might be clarified as a result of discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In response to the Saudi Arabians’ request, it was agreed that the conversation should be treated as secret and that every effort would be made to prevent leaks of any kind. The Saudi Arabians pointed out that they did not desire to carry on conversations behind the backs of the British. Nevertheless, they felt that it would be preferable that the British should not learn of this particular conversation.

[Here follow sections on the questions of financial assistance to Saudi Arabia and of Palestine, which are printed on pages 1329 ff. and 999 ff., respectively.]

Crown Prince Saud expressed his deep appreciation of the courtesy with which he had been received by the President, by the Secretary and by other officials of the American Government and said that he was sure that the conversations which had been held would result in a deeper understanding between the United States and Saudi Arabia.⁴

1. The Crown Prince arrived in Washington on January 13, 1947, as a guest of the United States Government. He paid a brief courtesy call on President Truman the following day. He returned to the White House on January 16 “for an hour’s talk with the President and Mr. Byrnes. The chief subjects discussed were general Near East politics, Palestine and the possibility of a fifty million dollar loan from the United States to cover all phases of the development program.” (Report on “Crown Prince Baud’s Official Visit to America”, February 7, by Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 890F.0011/2–747.)
1. The Crown Prince arrived in Washington on January 13, 1947, as a guest of the United States Government. He paid a brief courtesy call on President Truman the following day. He returned to the White House on January 16 “for an hour’s talk with the President and Mr. Byrnes. The chief subjects discussed were general Near East politics, Palestine and the possibility of a fifty million dollar loan from the United States to cover all phases of the development program.” (Report on “Crown Prince Baud’s Official Visit to America”, February 7, by Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 890F.0011/2–747.)
2. King of Saudi Arabia.
3. The reference is possibly to Faisal I who was King of Iraq from 1921 to 1933.
4. President Truman and the Crown Prince made a “pleasant exchange of goodbyes” on February 18 and the following day the latter departed for Saudi Arabia (Report on “Crown Prince Saud’s Official Visit to America”. Pt. II, March 3, by Mr. Sanger, 890F.0011/3–347); for the official statement issued on the visit, see Department of State Bulletin, January 26, 1947, p. 167.